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ABSTRACT
This thesis comprises three essays on the relationships among basic research,
applied research, and innovation.  Earlier research emphasized that absorbing external
knowledge requires effort and investment (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 1990).  This
thesis explores various mechanisms through which absorptive capacity is developed,
including a firm's R&D, its connectedness to the external scientific community, the
provision of a science-oriented research environment, and investment in basic research.
The chief contribution of this dissertation is to document the many ways in which firms
develop absorptive capacity, and how absorptive capacity varies across industry, stage of
technology development, and scientific area.
The first essay explores how firms develop different kinds of absorptive capacity.
A firm’s absorptive capacity depends upon internal R&D and its connectedness to
universities, other firms and R&D consortia.  R&D is effective for absorbing disciplinary
knowledge; alternative mechanisms are useful for domain-specific knowledge.  A
science-oriented research environment is not necessary, as long as the firm remains
connected through other means.  To illustrate, I trace knowledge spillovers of copper
interconnect technology for semiconductors.
The second essay examines the concentration of basic and applied research
relative to innovation.  In the semiconductor industry, basic research is surprisingly
concentrated relative to innovation.  Since spillovers are prevalent in this industry, I
conclude that many semiconductor firms capture spillovers without performing much
basic research.  In the pharmaceutical industry, basic research and innovation have
similar concentrations.  In both industries, applied research is not concentrated relative to
innovation.
4The third essay examines researchers at five firms.  Given two researchers with
the same number of publications at IBM, AT&T, or Intel, the one who publishes a higher
fraction of her papers in basic research journals is less likely to patent.  These researchers
face a tradeoff between participating in basic and applied research (Allen, 1977).  The
opposite holds at Merck and DuPont, where researchers who publish a higher fraction of
papers in basic scientific journals obtain more patents.  Thus, basic research has a
positive impact on pharmaceutical patents (Gambardella, 1992; Cockburn and
Henderson, 1998).  Within Dupont and Merck, patenting is most closely associated with
publications in basic chemistry, and with pharmaceutical R&D.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter introduces the dissertation, summarizes the key findings and
contributions, and provides an organizing framework for the three chapters that follow.
1.1 Overview and Motivation
This thesis consists of three essays on the relationship between basic research,
applied research, and innovation.  I define basic research as research that seeks a
fundamental understanding of a problem; applied research is that which seeks useful or
practical results.1  These definitions are similar to those used Bush (1945), Stokes (1997)
and by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Research activities within firms, including both applied and basic research, are
crucial sources of innovation.  However, as Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) pointed out,
the main output of R&D activities is knowledge, a durable public good.  Once a firm has
created knowledge, other firms can easily exploit that knowledge without compensating
the innovator.  Thus, knowledge flows are spillovers.  Innovating firms cannot capture
the marginal value of the knowledge they produce, and therefore are likely to underinvest
in R&D relative to what is socially desired.  This problem should be worse for basic
research than applied research, for which the expected benefits are highly intangible to a
firm.
Nelson and Arrows’ seminal papers have spawned a huge literature on knowledge
spillovers.  Empirical research in this field is exceedingly difficult to perform because
knowledge spillovers are, by nature, difficult to observe.  The available evidence suggests
                                                
1 Other authors have defined “basicness” along other dimensions, including originality, autonomy, peer
evaluation of published results, length of time between discovery and use, motivation of researcher,
institutional affiliation of researcher, and source of research funding (see Stokes, 1997, chap. 1, for a
review).
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that (a) spillovers have a positive impact on economic growth2; (b) spillovers increase the
productivity of firms (Mansfield 1991; Jaffe 1986); (c) spillovers are geographically
localized (Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson 1993); and (d) the level of appropriability
varies greatly across industries (Levin et. al. 1987).  Scholars continue to explore many
issues, including how spillovers affect the incentives to innovate, whether governments
should fund R&D, and whether research consortia resolve these externalities.
Several researchers have questioned whether knowledge spillovers occur as easily
as portrayed by Nelson and Arrow (Rosenberg, 1990; Cohen and Levinthal 1989, 1990).
Cohen and Levinthal argue that especially when learning is difficult, firms may need to
make internal investments in order to absorb external knowledge.  While recognizing that
many alternative mechanisms are available, they assign a primary role to internal R&D
investments.  A firm’s prior relevant R&D helps to build “absorptive capacity,” which
they describe as the “ability to recognize the value of external information, assimilate that
information, and then apply it to commercial ends.”3  The need for absorptive capacity
arises because knowledge is tacit and highly embedded within organizational routines
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, pp. 135).
The notion of absorptive capacity is an influential one and has stimulated much
research.  But because spillovers are hard to observe, the relationship between R&D and
absorptive capacity is often assumed rather than explored.  A consequence of this
difficulty is that little theoretical development has occurred beyond the seminal paper of
Cohen and Levinthal.  How important are alternative mechanisms of building absorptive
capacity vis-à-vis R&D?  When is internal R&D most effective for building absorptive
capacity, and when are alternative mechanisms more effective?  Are there different kinds
of absorptive capacity, depending on the kinds of mechanisms used?
                                                
2 See Griliches (1992) for an excellent survey.
3 A parallel stream of research on absorptive capacity has existed since the 1960s on the international
transfer of technology, but deals with countries rather than firms (see Baranson 1970).
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Another issue with the literature on absorptive capacity is that much of the
empirical evidence supporting the theory comes from the pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industries (Gambardella, 1992; Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Zucker
and Darby, 1995).  It would be interesting to learn whether these results are equally
applicable in other settings.
Absorptive capacity is sometimes associated with the idea that firms should pursue
science-oriented research environments that offer autonomy to researchers (Gambardella,
1992) and promote scientists based on their publications and scientific reputations
(Cockburn and Henderson, 1998).  These studies suggest that science-oriented research
environments allow researchers within the firm to remain connected to top scientists in
various scientific disciplines, giving them better access to information and thereby
boosting their productivity.  The relationship between “connectedness” and spillovers is
further explored in this dissertation.
1.2 Research Questions and Findings
The central question of this thesis is: how does the ability to assimilate and exploit
scientific and technical knowledge developed outside the firm depend on investments in
internal research, formal connections with the external scientific community, or some
combination of these factors.  The three essays in this dissertation revolve around this
question.  Each essay constitutes a separate chapter in this thesis.  Table 1-1 provides a
summary of the research questions, unit of analysis, and key results of each essay.
The first essay, presented in Chapter 2, explores how absorptive capacity depends
upon a firm’s prior R&D and its connectedness to sources of external technical
knowledge (Figure 2-2).  Firms have many options available for developing
connectedness, and consequently, for building absorptive capacity.  These include: (1)
performing R&D; (2) funding research at universities, maintaining relationships with
faculty, and hiring graduate students; (3) forming alliances with companies that possess a
18
Table 1-1: Summary of the Three Essays
Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Research
Questions
§ How do firms develop
absorptive capacity?
§ What accounts for the
rapid adoption of copper
interconnect technology
(which was developed by
IBM) by other
semiconductor firms?
§ Is basic research more
concentrated than
innovation?
§ What about applied
research relative to
innovation?
§ What is the relationship
between the publications
and patents produced by
industrial scientists?
Research
Setting
The semiconductor industry. Two industries with high
spillovers: pharmaceuticals
and semiconductors.
Five innovative companies:
DuPont, Merck, IBM,
AT&T, Intel.
Unit of
Analysis
An innovation. A firm. A researcher.
Research
Design
A quantitative and qualitative
analysis of knowledge
spillovers relating to copper
interconnect technology.
An analysis of patents and
publications by firms in the
semiconductor and
pharmaceutical industries.
An econometric analysis of
patents and publications by
scientists at five companies.
Key
Findings
§ Firms used many ways to
build absorptive capacity.
§ Apart from R&D, firms
depended upon their
connectedness to external
sources of technical
knowledge, including
Sematech, universities,
equipment suppliers, and
other firms that possessed
copper technology.
§ In the semiconductor
industry, basic research is
surprisingly more
concentrated than is
innovation.
§ In the pharmaceutical
industry, basic research is
not more concentrated is
innovation.
§ Applied research was not
concentrated relative to
innovation in either
industry.
§ Scientists at IBM, AT&T,
and Intel who published a
higher fraction of their
articles in basic scientific
journals obtained fewer
patents
§ The opposite result holds
for scientists at Merck and
DuPont.  This is mainly
driven by a relationship
between basic chemistry
research and
pharmaceutical patents.
Contribu-
tions
§ Absorptive capacity is a
function of connectedness
as well as R&D.
§ Different kinds of
knowledge are absorbed
depending upon whether
firms invest in R&D or
alternative means to build
absorptive capacity.
§ A science-oriented
research environment may
not be necessary for
building absorptive
capacity.
§ The results suggest that
semiconductor companies
are able to capture
spillovers without
performing much basic
research.
§ The relationship between
basic research and patents
is stronger in the
pharmaceutical industry
than for semiconductors.
There is a suggestive
relationship between basic
research and patents at the
level of the individual, not
just at the level of the firm:
§ The relationship is
negative outside the
pharmaceutical industry.
§ Within pharmaceutical
firms, the relationship is
positive, but mainly
because of basic
chemistry.
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given technology; and (4) obtaining membership in research consortia.  The alternative
methods for building absorptive capacity are at least as important as internal R&D.
I illustrate this framework using a detailed case study of copper interconnect
technology, providing an “inside-the-black-box” view of how knowledge spillovers
occur.4  IBM created this important technology over a three-decade period, relying on
internal knowledge and secrecy.  Other firms invested much less than IBM in copper
interconnect R&D, but were able to adopt the technology very quickly by relying on
spillovers from IBM and from Sematech-funded universities.  Several firms that had
performed little R&D were able to adopt the technology faster than were others that had
invested more in prior R&D.  I show that the rapid adopters enhanced their absorptive
capacity by leveraging their connectedness to Sematech, universities, and other firms that
had access to copper technology.
While previous authors recognized the relationship between absorptive capacity
and connectedness (Powell et al., 1996; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998), my case study
clarifies this relationship and the following implications.  First, there are different types
of absorptive capacity.  IBM’s approach of investing heavily in internal R&D was useful
for capturing discipline-level knowledge.  However, other firms that didn’t perform as
much R&D were more concerned about acquiring domain-specific knowledge, which
they absorbed through their relationships with universities and other firms.  The
mechanisms used for acquiring external knowledge shifted over time, as firms became
more concerned about acquiring domain-specific rather than disciplinary knowledge.
Second, the case study shows that a science-oriented research environment may be
helpful for keeping up with outside knowledge, but is not essential.  IBM in particular
was able to keep up with all the external developments in the field although the company
was highly secretive about its own research.  Third, the multiplicity of approaches
                                                
4 The illustrative nature of this case study is similar in intent to Nelson’s (1962) study on the
development of the transistor and Rosenberg’s (1963) analysis of the machine tools industry.
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available to firms for building absorptive capacity implies that knowledge spillovers are
difficult to contain.  Unless many firms choose R&D as their means for building
absorptive capacity, it is unlikely that the underinvestment problem recognized by Arrow
and Nelson would be overcome.
The second essay (Chapter 3) examines the relationship between research and
innovation in the pharmaceutical and semiconductor industries.  It poses whether basic
research is more highly concentrated than innovation, and whether applied research is
more concentrated than innovation.  These industries exhibit high levels of knowledge
spillovers (Levin and Reiss, 1988; Mowery, 1983; Appleyard, 1996; Cockburn and
Henderson, 1998).  To the extent that internal research is a prerequisite for absorptive
capacity, we should expect basic research to be clustered within the same firms that
produce a large number of innovations.
I find that, in the semiconductor industry, basic research is highly concentrated
within IBM and AT&T, while innovation is dispersed across many firms.  Firms other
than IBM and AT&T produce a surprisingly large number of innovations relative to their
basic research.  Though several explanations are possible, one potential interpretation is
that most semiconductor firms are able to capture spillovers even though they perform
little basic research. 5  In the pharmaceutical industry, basic research is not appreciably
more concentrated than innovation; pharmaceutical firms that produce more basic
research are also more innovative.
In contrast to basic research, applied research is not more concentrated than
innovation in either industry.  I reconcile this fact with the results for basic research by
speculating that at least in the semiconductor industry, absorptive capacity “scales up”
with applied research, but exhibits a threshold effect with respect to basic research.  This
                                                
5 An alternative explanation is that the other firms are not capturing spillovers, but more productive at
translating R&D into innovation.  This is unlikely because there is a widespread practice among these
companies of co-authoring papers with universities and public-sector laboratories.
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threshold represents a “membership fee”, beyond which a firm is able to remain
connected to external scientific networks.
Overall, this second essay suggests that basic research is less closely connected to
innovation in the semiconductor industry than it is in the pharmaceutical industry.  This
theme is further explored in my next essay.
The third essay (Chapter 4) examines publishing and patenting by researchers at
five R&D-intensive firms (DuPont, Merck, IBM, Intel, and AT&T).  A new technique is
used to match the inventors of patents to the authors of publications.  The essay exploits
this technique to test various hypotheses, with the individual as the unit of analysis.  The
results show that researchers at IBM, AT&T, and Intel who published a higher fraction of
their papers in basic research journals were less likely to obtain patents.  This supports
the hypothesis that researchers face a tradeoff between pursuing a scientific career
(publishing in basic scientific journals) and contributing directly to the firm (producing
more patents).
The opposite relationship holds for Merck and DuPont, where scientists who
published a higher fraction of papers in basic scientific journals obtained more patents.
This is consistent with previous research suggesting a positive productivity impact among
pharmaceutical firms of participating in basic research (Gambardella, 1992; Cockburn
and Henderson, 1998; Zucker and Darby, 1995).  My results show that the effect occurs
at the level of the individual researcher, not just of the firm as a whole.
Interestingly, the results for Merck and DuPont are driven largely by publications
in the field of basic chemistry.  Even at these pharmaceutical firms, the relationship
between basic research and patents is weaker in other scientific fields (including
biology).  As well, basic research is more closely associated with patents among
scientists who work on pharmaceutical R&D than on other areas within these firms.
Together, these results imply that even within a firm, the relationship between basic
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research and patenting depends upon the scientific field being investigated and the area of
application.
Apart from the results on basic research, the analysis also shows that patents across
the five firms are positively related to the total number of publications by a researcher
(indicating differential individual ability or balanced incentives within firms).  However,
patents are negatively related to the fraction of articles co-authored by a researcher with
academic and public-sector scientists.  The latter result is surprising given the importance
of connectedness.  A likely interpretation is that researchers who co-author with
academics and public-sector researchers play the role of gatekeepers, increasing the
productivity of other researchers within the firm but not necessarily adding to the number
of patents they themselves obtain.
1.3 Contributions to the Literature
This dissertation presents a framework for understanding and clarifying the
relationship between absorptive capacity, R&D and connectedness.  Although previous
research has acknowledged the multi-faceted nature of absorptive capacity, this thesis
unpacks its constituent elements, compares alternative drivers of absorptive capacity, and
explores when each of these drivers is important relative to the others.
It is tempting to claim this leads directly to a set of managerial prescriptions, but to
do so would be to pretend to have a simple fix for a highly complex problem.  Rather, the
greater benefit is from the change in perspective that results from this understanding.
Recognizing the multi-faceted character of absorptive capacity changes R&D from a
simple “make versus buy” investment to a more complex series of choices.  These
include the kinds of absorptive capacity a firm wants to develop, its options available for
acquiring knowledge, and the relationships it plans to develop with other organizations.
Instead of suggesting to all firms seeking to build absorptive capacity that they invest in
internal R&D (particularly basic research), we should recommend that they choose from
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a broad range of choices— depending on the strategic options and other contingencies
they face.
Nonetheless, there is one public policy implication that seems reasonable to draw at
this stage: outside drug discovery and at least in the semiconductor industry, there is a
need to address the underinvestment problem, particularly for basic research.  The nature
and scope of such interventions are beyond the purview of this thesis, and much work is
needed to identify which interventions (if any) are appropriate.
Another important contribution of this dissertation is that it documents several
robust empirical regularities.  Chapter 3 shows that, by almost any measure, basic
research is much more concentrated than is innovation in the semiconductor industry,
while this is not the case in the pharmaceutical industry.  Chapter 4 shows that given two
scientists who publish the same number of articles, the one who publishes a larger
fraction of them in basic scientific journals produces fewer patents, unless she is at a
pharmaceutical firm (in which case a strong positive effect exists if she publishes in basic
chemistry journals).
Regardless of whether one agrees with my interpretations, these empirical
regularities exist and must be accounted for.  Why is basic research so much more
concentrated in the semiconductor industry than in pharmaceuticals?  What accounts for
the differences between the two industries?  In each industry, why are some firms
investing so much in basic research and others so little?  What accounts for the patterns
of publishing and patenting by industrial researchers?
This dissertation also makes several methodological contributions.  Chapter 2
presents a novel application of the Ellison-Glaeser Index for measuring relative
concentration.  The E-G Index allows us to measure the degree of “surprise” when
comparing two variables (in this case, basic research and innovation).  The simple fact
that basic research is concentrated in the semiconductor industry is uninteresting, but we
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learn something new by coupling this fact with the realization that innovation is
widespread.  The E-G Index provides a formal model for making such comparisons,
controlling for several competing explanations.
Another methodological contribution is the development of several new
bibliometric indices.  In Chapter 2, I introduce the variables HiAcad, HiSCI, and
JCRBas, which, respectively, identify journals that are highly academic, highly cited,
and oriented towards basic research.  These variables may be useful in other studies,
particularly for understanding the kinds of research being performed by different
organizations.  Each of these variables captures a different facet of scientific research, as
evidenced by the low correlation across measures (see Appendix 3-B).  While several
issues are associated with the use of bibliometric measures (Martin and Irvine, 1983;
Collins and Wyatt, 1988), they can be reduced by combining these variables with other
qualitative and quantitative measures, and by seeking empirical results that are robust to a
variety of measures.
A methodological theme that runs through all three essays is the conscious attempt
to combine data on patents and publications.  While there have been many studies on
patents, and a huge stream of literature exists on publications, there have been relatively
few studies that combine both data sources.  This is unfortunate, because such data
(although imperfect) give us a glimpse into the R&D activities within firms, for which it
is maddeningly difficult to obtain consistent and comparable R&D data.  Patents and
publications can inform our analysis as long as we do not rely on them exclusively, but
rather supplement them with qualitative evidence or other data.  I believe this dissertation
breaks new ground in the extent to which it combines such data alongside rich qualitative
analysis, particularly for the case study on copper interconnects.  A related contribution is
the development of a technique for matching names of individuals in the U.S. Patent
database to those in the Science Citation Index (SCI).  As discussed in Chapter 4,
deficiencies in both databases makes this a difficult challenge.  The method employed
partly overcomes some of these limitations, and may have other applications.
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A final contribution of this dissertation is that it raises new questions to be
answered.  Why are some firms more connected than others?  How do the different types
of absorptive capacity relate to firm capabilities and performance?  Do the strong links
between basic chemistry and patents exist anywhere outside drug discovery, or for any
other scientific discipline?  I hope these questions and others will lead to interesting
future research, so that we gain a better understanding of how to manage technological
innovation.
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Chapter 2: 
The Many Faces of Absorptive Capacity: Spillovers of Copper
Interconnect Technology for Semiconductor Chips
In this chapter, I unpack the mechanisms for acquiring absorptive capacity and
explore when each mechanism is important relative to the others.  There are many ways
for a firm to build absorptive capacity, which depends on internal R&D and the firm’s
connectedness to external sources of technical knowledge.  A firm’s investments in R&D
versus the alternative mechanisms are closely tied to the kinds of knowledge to be
acquired and its relationships with other organizations.  I illustrate the implications of this
framework with a case study on copper interconnect technology for semiconductors.
2.1 Introduction
Knowledge spillovers are important to the productivity of firms (Jaffe, 1986;
Mansfield, 1991) and to economic growth (Griliches, 1992; Romer, 1990).  Cohen and
Levinthal (1990) proposed a firm must make internal investments — particularly in R&D
— to improve its ability to absorb knowledge spillovers.  This notion of “absorptive
capacity” is an important theoretical contribution that has gained considerable influence
(see Section 2.2).  It raises many interesting questions that remain unanswered.  When is
internal R&D important for absorptive capacity, and when are alternative mechanisms
more effective? Are there different kinds of absorptive capacity?
In this chapter, I explore the mechanisms used by firms to build absorptive
capacity, and when each alternative is important relative to the others.  A firm’s
absorptive capacity primarily depends upon its internal R&D and the firm’s
connectedness to external sources of relevant technical knowledge.  The firm can
enhance its connectedness by: (1) performing R&D; (2) funding research at universities,
maintaining relationships with faculty, and hiring graduate students; (3) forming alliances
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with companies that possess relevant technology; and (4) obtaining membership in
research consortia.
The link between connectedness and absorptive capacity was noted by Cohen and
Levinthal (1990) and explored by other authors (e.g. Powell, et al. 1996; Cockburn and
Henderson, 1998).  This chapter clarifies the relationship between absorptive capacity,
R&D and connectedness, and explores the following implications.  First, there are many
ways to build absorptive capacity, with the alternatives being at least as important as
internal R&D.  Second, different types of absorptive capacity arise depending on whether
firms invest in internal R&D or the alternatives.  Third, a science-oriented research
environment, as advocated by Gambardella (1992), may be useful but not necessary for
absorption.  I discuss these implications in Section 2.2.
The importance of connectedness to absorptive capacity is usefully illustrated by a
case study on copper interconnect technology. 6  In the context of semiconductor
integrated circuits, interconnects refer to the conductors through which electricity flows
between various circuit elements (see Figure 2-1).  The use of copper instead of
aluminum for making on-chip interconnects is a recent innovation of great importance.
Certain features of copper technology make it very attractive for this study (see Section
2.3.1).  The most important is that its adoption relies upon a new and clearly defined set
of skills.  This makes it feasible to identify the prior relevant R&D performed by each
firm and to track the spillovers of ideas across organizations.
Copper interconnect technology was developed by IBM over a 30-year period, but
has been adopted with great rapidity by other companies.  The IBM story is itself of great
interest and is reported elsewhere.7  The focus in this chapter is on how other firms
absorbed spillovers from IBM and other external sources of knowledge.
                                                
6 I use “copper interconnect technology” and “copper technology” interchangeably.
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Figure 2-1: Semiconductor Chip with Copper Interconnects.
Top: A copper-based
semiconductor chip.
Right: Close-up view of the
copper interconnects on the
chip.
Source: IBM Corporation, Research Division, Almaden Research Center. Reproduced with permission.
The semiconductor industry is one in which prior relevant experience should be
paramount because it depends upon complex, embedded knowledge.  Surprisingly,
several firms were successful at capturing spillovers from IBM and universities even
though they did not perform much of the early research.  Furthermore, several firms were
quicker to ship products based on copper technology than other firms that had made
greater investments in relevant R&D.  Both patterns are explained by the connectedness
of the faster adopters to universities, Sematech, and to other firms that had worked on
copper technology.  The better-connected firms gained useful information and an
advantage in recruiting people with copper-related expertise from those sources.
                                                                                                                                                
7 Published accounts include an IBM Think  magazine article (1998), an article in the IBM Research
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This chapter makes several contributions to the literature on innovation.  Firstly, it
presents a framework that clarifies the relationship between internal research,
connectedness and absorptive capacity.  There are many ways for building absorptive
capacity.  Therefore, knowledge spillovers are difficult to contain, just as Nelson (1959)
and Arrow (1962) had recognized.
Secondly, this chapter presents a novel methodology for identifying prior relevant
R&D performed by each firm: it exploits the dependence of copper technology on new
technical skills identify prior experience that should have helped firms to absorb external
knowledge.
Thirdly, this chapter integrates the quantitative analysis of patents and publications
with detailed qualitative fieldwork to overcome the limitations of each approach if used
on its own. 8
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  The next section critically
analyzes the literature on knowledge spillovers.  Section 2.3 presents the methodology
and research setting.  Section 2.4 describes the development of copper technology by
IBM and the surprising speed with which other firms adopted it (including those that had
invested little in prior R&D).  It then shows that the connectedness of firms to external
technical knowledge strongly affected the speed with which they adopted copper
technology.  Section 2.5 discusses alternative factors that influenced adoption and how
they affect the results.  It also discusses why IBM pursued copper R&D and published
research on the technology despite the spillovers.  Section 2.6 draws conclusions.
                                                                                                                                                
Magazine (1997), and an EETimes special feature (1998).  These are listed in the bibliography.
8 For other studies on spillovers that combine qualitative and quantitative approaches, see Verspagen
(1999) and Kim (1997).  Kim (1997) relates how Samsung built absorptive capacity by being closely
connected with Micron Technologies and by setting up an R&D outpost in Silicon Valley to hire U.S.
engineers, including Korean-Americans with Ph.D. degrees from top U.S. universities.
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2.2 The Determinants of Absorptive Capacity
In two seminal articles, Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) characterized knowledge
as having the features of a durable public good.  The knowledge produced through the
R&D of an innovator is easily “borrowed” by another party to increase the latter’s
productivity, without compensating the former.  The innovator cannot appropriate the
marginal value of the knowledge it produces and therefore under-invests in its
production, relative to the social optimum.9  Griliches (1992) makes an important
distinction between ideas that are expropriated, and inputs that are purchased below their
actual costs.  Borrowed ideas are “true” spillovers and a source of productivity growth,
while under-priced inputs constitute a measurement problem.
Departing from the view that knowledge spillovers are easily acquired, Cohen &
Levinthal (1989, 1990) proposed that knowledge spillovers come at a cost to the
recipient.  Firms must invest resources in order to absorb knowledge spillovers.  Cohen
and Levinthal note that this investment may take many forms, and that many mechanisms
exist for building absorptive capacity (including connectedness).  However, the form of
investment that they primarily emphasize is prior related R&D.  According to Cohen and
Levinthal (1990, pp. 135) this relationship between R&D and absorptive capacity arises
because knowledge is (1) hard to codify or tacit (Polanyi, 1958) and (2) embedded in the
routines of the organization (Nelson and Winter, 1992).  From this perspective, R&D has
two “faces”: it increases a firm’s productivity and its absorptive capacity.
This theory is broadly consistent with empirical data.  Jaffe (1986, pp. 993) found
that the interaction between a firm’s R&D expenditure and spillovers is strongly
correlated with the firm’s performance.  Similar evidence is offered by Gambardella
(1992), Henderson and Cockburn (1996), Arora and Gambardella (1992), Lane and
Lubatkin (1998), and Zucker and Darby (1995).  However, these studies are hindered by
the difficulty of separating the two faces of R&D.  It remains unclear whether R&D made
                                                
9 Nevertheless, Spence (1984) argues that the negative impact of spillovers on appropriability is partially
offset if those spillovers reduce ex-post costs for the industry as a whole.
32
some firms more successful because they were better at capturing spillovers or because
their R&D was more productive.10
Cohen and Levinthal made an important theoretical contribution by uncovering the
relationship between R&D and absorptive capacity.  This raises many interesting
questions that remain unanswered.  When is R&D important for building absorptive
capacity, and when are the other mechanisms important?  Do different kinds of
absorptive capacity exist?  Can a firm increase its absorptive capacity by hiring people
whose heads contain valuable tacit knowledge?
Adopting a social network perspective may help resolve some of these questions.
This shifts the focus of attention to the relationships surrounding the firm (Wasserman
and Faust, p. 4).  From this perspective, the crucial factor is the firm’s connectedness to
external sources of public and private knowledge (Cockburn and Henderson 1998;
Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996).
The emphasis on connectedness may seem subtle, but it has important implications.
Chiefly, it disentangles the role of R&D and connectedness as distinct, but related,
phenomena.  Performing R&D may increase a firm’s ability to recognize technological
opportunities, and to attract and retain employees connected to the external scientific
community (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Pavitt, 1991).  However, a firm that does
not perform R&D is not excluded from building absorptive capacity if alternatives are
feasible.  Such alternatives include funding research at universities, co-authoring with
academics, joining R&D consortia, and forming alliances with other companies with
access to technology.  These activities permit a firm to remain in close connection with
important external sources of technical knowledge, and provide it with opportunities to
hire individuals who possess valuable tacit knowledge.
                                                
10 Also, much empirical work has concentrated on the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, and
it is uncertain how well the results apply in other areas.
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I propose that these alternative ways for building absorptive capacity are at least as
effective as internal R&D.  Along with R&D, they constitute the “many faces” of
absorptive capacity.  This framework for understanding absorptive capacity is shown in
Figure 2-2.
Figure 2-2: Absorptive Capacity as a Function of Connectedness
A second implication of connectedness is that there may be different kinds of
absorptive capacity, depending on whether a firm obtains it through R&D or alternative
means.11  Internal R&D may be useful for absorbing disciplinary scientific knowledge.
However, a firm without deep internal R&D could leverage its connections with
universities and other companies to hire individuals who possess domain-specific
Absorptive
Capacity
CONNECTEDNESS
A firm’s connectedness
to external sources of
knowledge provides:
§ Early access to
information
§ Ability to hire
individuals with
relevant skills from
these sources
Internal R&D
Relationships with Universities
§ Fund research at universities
§ Co-author with academics
and public sector scientists
§ Hire external scientific board
members
Membership at R&D Consortia
Alliances with other
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34
knowledge.  In section 2.5.3, I elaborate on how IBM used internal R&D to absorb
disciplinary spillovers, while other companies leveraged their relationships to acquire
domain-specific knowledge from universities and other firms.  Over time, as an
increasing amount of relevant knowledge became accessible and codified, the dominant
mode for building absorptive capacity shifted from internal R&D to relationships with
universities, and eventually to strategic alliances with competitors and equipment
suppliers that already possessed knowledge on copper interconnect technology.
A third implication of connectedness is that an “open” scientific environment,
while useful, is not essential.  Gambardella (1992) noted that successful pharmaceutical
firms are like academic departments, offering their scientists autonomy to choose
research projects and publish their work.  This openness is viewed as a way to gain
access to the inner circle of scientific communities.  But a science-oriented research
environment could also be a means of rewarding researchers in lieu of better
compensation (Stern, 1999).  To increase appropriability, a firm could decide to
implement a less open scientific environment and reward its researchers through better
salaries and promotions.  Yet, it could still remain connected to the scientific community
by funding research at universities and paying top researchers to join its scientific
advisory board.  In section 2.4, I describe how IBM kept up with external research while
maintaining the secrecy of its own copper R&D project.
A re-examination of the empirical literature highlights the importance of
connectedness.  According to Cockburn and Henderson (1998), pharmaceutical firms that
co-authored research articles with public-sector scientists had better performance.
Zucker and Darby (1995) showed that biotechnology firms that collaborated with star
scientists at universities (or employed them) were faster adopters.  Liebeskind et al.
(1996) reported that scientists at two biotechnology firms improved the integration of
external knowledge by collaborating with outside researchers.  In the remainder of this
                                                                                                                                                
11 Hansen (1999) explores a related theme, that the nature of relationships required for knowledge
transfer depends on whether knowledge is tacit or explicit.
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chapter, I present a case study of copper interconnect technology to illustrate how the
absorptive capacity of various firms depended upon their prior R&D investments and
their connectedness to external sources of technical knowledge.
2.3 Methodology
I conducted an in-depth case study to trace knowledge spillovers of an important
semiconductor technology: copper interconnects.  The case study approach was chosen
over a large-scale research design because it provides an important advantage: the ability
to trace specific ideas that were “borrowed” by other firms. Spillovers are by nature
difficult to observe, so large-scale studies often have to infer that spillovers actually
occurred.12  By tracing the flow of ideas, I offer an “inside-the-black-box” view of
spillovers instead of assuming that they occurred.
This section is organized as follows: Section 2.3.1 describes the choice of this
setting; Section 2.3.2 describes the quantitative and qualitative methodology used for the
case study; and Section 2.3.3 introduces copper technology and the skills upon which it
relies.
2.3.1 Research Setting
The semiconductor industry is a major pillar of other high-technology industries
and shipped $144 billion worth of products in 1999.13  Spillovers are pervasive in this
industry (Tilton, 1971; Mowery, 1983; Appleyard, 1996).14
                                                
12 Some methods include: (1) citation analysis without corroborating fieldwork; (2) counting the number
of articles co-authored with outside researchers; (3) interacting a firm’s R&D with the sum of all other
R&D in a regression; and (4) assuming technological closeness implies greater spillovers.
13 Source: Semiconductor Industry Association.
14 According to Mowery (1983), these spillovers occur among industrial laboratories, universities, and
the military.  Appleyard found that public sources of knowledge are important in the semiconductor
industry.
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The semiconductor industry is an excellent setting for studying absorptive capacity.
Producing semiconductor chips requires highly technical knowledge covering a broad
range of disciplines, including physics, chemistry, and materials science.  Much of this
knowledge is tacit and deeply embedded in organizational processes.  Designing and
manufacturing a semiconductor chip involves a great deal of judgement that is difficult to
codify.  The manufacturing process itself is horrendously complex and requires almost
perfect coordination among hundreds of intricate and interrelated steps, each subject to
variability from human operators and minor details in the manner and sequence in which
it is performed.  In short, the semiconductor industry depends upon complex, embedded
knowledge.  These are the conditions under which we should expect prior relevant R&D
to enhance absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
One of the most significant recent innovations in the semiconductor industry is the
development of copper interconnects to replace aluminum.  IBM was largely responsible
for creating this technology, devoting three decades of research and millions of dollars.
In September 1997, IBM announced the availability of copper technology to great fanfare
(Zuckerman, 1997).15
Copper technology will have a large economic impact.  IBM’s stock price jumped
5% on the day of the announcement and an additional 6% when it went into production a
year later.16  As the semiconductor industry moves to smaller devices, the use of copper
will become pervasive.  By some estimates, this will occur as early as 2002.17
Several features of copper interconnect technology make it suitable for this study.
The most important is that it depends upon a different set of skills and competencies than
do traditional aluminum interconnects (see Section 2.3.3).  These skills are distinct and
                                                
15 This news made it to the front page of The New York Times and other newspapers.  By comparison, the
invention of the transistor was announced on page 46 of that newspaper (Riordan and Hoddeson, p. 8).
16 A 5% increase in IBM’s stock price in 1997 corresponded to an increase in market capitalization of
around $5 billion (source: analysis of CRSP data).
17 The “SEMI Copper Critical Survey 1999” reports that two-thirds of semiconductor companies will
have copper-based chip in full production volume by 2001-2002.
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fairly well defined, making it feasible to account for the “relevant prior experience” of
each firm.  Had copper technology been simply an extension of aluminum, tracking the
vast amounts of prior research would have been a formidable task.18  Another useful
feature of copper interconnect technology is that the spillovers are recent.  Thus, the trail
of evidence was still fresh when I began this research project at the time of IBM’s
announcement.19  In addition, the spillovers occurred from relatively few sources, making
them possible to track.
2.3.2 Research Method and Data
This case study combines both qualitative and quantitative approaches.  This helps
to overcome the limitation of each (Yin, 1994).
Quantitative Analysis
The quantitative analysis is based on a dataset of patents and publications relevant
to copper interconnect technology (see Appendix 2-A).  Data on publications were
obtained from the Science Citation Index (SCI) and data on patents from the U.S. Patent
Office.  The dataset contains 413 relevant articles (1985-1997) and 216 U.S. Patents
(1976-1999).  The definition of a “relevant” set is necessary because copper has many
other uses within and outside the semiconductor industry.  Relevant patents and
publications were chosen based upon the relevant skills identified in Section 2.3.3.
I approximated each firm’s level of prior relevant R&D using the number of patents
and publications it produced.  This data is subject to bias, as not all research results are
published or patented (some firms may choose to keep them secret).  Also, papers may
not meet the standards for publication and patent applications may be rejected.  Another
issue is that the coverage of the Science Citation Index, while excellent, is incomplete: it
                                                
18 In addition, the citation analysis would have been much more difficult because of the massive number
of publications and patents on aluminum interconnects throughout its 30-year history.
19 For example, I was able to attend an IBM technical presentation at which that firm finally lifted the
shroud of secrecy covering its development efforts.
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covers all major scientific journals, but excludes several related engineering journals and
neglects conferences.  However, the SCI is the best available source, because other
bibliographical databases contain only the address of the first author.
I traced knowledge flows using patent-to-patent and patent-to-science citations.
The dataset contains all cited patents awarded after 1960, as well as all the scientific
publications cited by the copper patents of four leading companies.
Citation analysis has long been used to measure knowledge spillovers across
organizations (e.g., Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993; Martin and Irvin, 1983;
Narin and Rozek, 1988; Verspagen, 1999).  Patent-to-patent citations indicate spillovers
of technological knowledge, while patent-to-science citations indicate spillovers from
scientific fields (Narin, et al., 1997; Verspagen, 1999).20  Unfortunately, not all the
citations in a patent are placed there by the inventor(s).  An unspecified number are
introduced by patent examiners, who have a duty to check the originality of the invention
and its limits (Collins and Wyatt, 1988, p. 66).  Thus, one cannot determine conclusively
from patent citations alone whether the initial inventors actually relied upon the
knowledge cited.21  An additional problem with patent-to-patent citations is that few
universities obtained patents on copper interconnects even after the Bayh-Dohl Act
(1980) made it legal for them to do so.  Thus, patent-to-patent citations are not a good
measure of spillovers of copper interconnect technology from academia to firms.
In order to overcome these limitations and to provide additional insights, I
performed extensive qualitative fieldwork.
Qualitative Analysis
The qualitative analysis includes semi-structured interviews with about two dozen
scientists, R&D managers, and academics involved directly in developing copper
                                                
20 Patent-to-patent citations indicate the flow of technology because the cited patent must contain useful
knowledge (a precondition for it to have been granted).
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technology. 22  Each interview lasted 45-60 minutes and included in-depth information
about (1) the internal development efforts of each firm; (2) technological options
explored; (3) sources of internal and external knowledge; (4) appropriability; and (5)
adoption of the technology.  I visited several of the companies and attended technical
conferences to gain a better understanding of the technology and access to industry
sources.  I also analyzed more than 200 related articles from technical journals,
newspapers, and trade journals.
2.3.3 Copper Interconnect Technology and the Skills Upon Which it
Depends 23
Copper is the preferred material for conducting electricity because of its low
resistance.  It is ubiquitous in electrical wiring and printed circuit boards.  But for the past
thirty years, aluminum has been used instead of copper for the interconnections within
semiconductor integrated circuits.  Over time, aluminum interconnects have evolved so
that today’s interconnects are actually made from aluminum alloys, usually Al-Cu.  The
process involves depositing a blanket layer of the metal onto a silicon wafer, after which
                                                                                                                                                
21 Further issues regarding the use of patent citations are discussed in Narin, et al. 1997.
22 Prior to 1990, there were 102 unique researchers who published articles on copper interconnects;
between 1990 and 1999, the number was 978.  Most of the interviewees were involved early on, and
played a key role in the development of copper interconnect technology.
23 Liu (1996) provides an excellent introduction to interconnect technology.  For copper interconnects,
see Park (1998), Gutmann (1999), and Liu et al. (1999).  The material in this sub-section draws upon
these sources and other technical publications.
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Figure 2-3: Copper Damascene versus Etch Process
Aluminum Interconnects with Tungsten Plugs Copper Damascene Copper Dual Damascene (See Note 1)
Step A1: Deposit interlayer dielectric (ILD) and etch
location of tungsten plugs, or “vias”
Step B1: Deposit interlayer dielectric (ILD) and etch
location of copper vias
Step C1: Deposit ILD and etch away the location of
interconnects
Step A2: Deposit barrier layer and Tungsten Step B2: Deposit barrier and seed layers Step C2: Use lithography to define via patterns and
etch away vias
Step A3: Remove unwanted Tungsten to form “plug” Step B3: Electroplate copper and polish top surface Step C3: Remove photoresist, deposit seed and barrier
layers
Step A4: Deposit Aluminum (or Al-Cu) Step B4: Deposit ILD and etch location of
interconnects
Step C4: Deposit copper and polish
Step A5: Use lithography to define the areas of
Aluminum interconnects
Step B5: Deposit barrier layer and seed layer
Step A6:Etch away unwanted  Aluminum using RIE Step B6: Electroplate copper and polish top surface
Step A7:Deposit Interlayer Dielectric
Note 1: There are three main variants of dual damascene.  For further details, see Liu et al., (1999), Park (1998), and Gutmann (1999).
Note 2: These steps are repeated for each layer of metallization.
Substrate: Dielectric: Copper: Tungsten: Al-Cu: Photoresist: Barrier & seed layer Barrier Layer
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the desired pattern of interconnections is defined using photolithography (see Figure 2-3,
steps A4-A5). This leaves the unwanted portions unprotected.  The surface is then placed
inside a chamber containing a reactive gas (plasma), which “eats away” the unwanted
portions, leaving the desired interconnects (steps A5-A6).  An insulating layer known as
an interlevel dielectric (ILD) is then deposited (step A7).  These steps are repeated to
form multiple levels of interconnects stacked atop each other.24  Connections between the
layers are made by etching holes (known as “vias”) into the interlayer dielectric and
filling them up with Tungsten “plugs” (Figure 2-3, steps A1-A3).
Unfortunately, copper is very difficult to etch using plasma gases, so it is difficult
to apply the traditional aluminum process.  Worse, research by IBM in the 1960s showed
that copper easily diffuses into silicon, thereby contaminating the very transistors it is
meant to connect.  To overcome these problems, all commercially available copper
interconnect processes to date employ a method developed by IBM known as the
damascene process.25  This process cleverly eliminates the need to etch away the metal
by reversing the sequence of steps used in the traditional process (see Figure 2-3, steps
B4-B6 versus A4-A7).  Specifically, the dielectric is deposited first, rather than the metal.
The desired interconnect pattern is then etched into the dielectric (step B1).  Next, a thin
barrier layer is deposited to protect the silicon from being contaminated by the copper
(step B2).  This is followed by a seed layer of copper, which acts as an “electrode” for an
electroplating process that is used to deposit the actual copper layer (step B3).  The
surface is then polished flat.  In a single damascene process, these steps are done once for
the interconnect and once for the via.  In the dual damascene process, both are combined
(steps C1-C4).
IBM introduced the damascene process in the early 1980s.26  Aluminum
interconnects were used in this initial attempt.  Formidable technical obstacles had to be
                                                
24 Today’s chips generally contain four to six levels of metal interconnects, depending on the application.
25 The Damascene process is named after an ancient swordmaking technique used in Damascus for
combining two metals.
26 IBM first introduced the damascene process in DRAM chips.
42
overcome before the damascene process could be implemented using copper instead of
aluminum.  First, unlike with aluminum, the propensity of copper to contaminate silicon
requires that a barrier layer be placed between the two materials.  The risk of
contamination also has organizational implications: it requires careful handling on a
production line so as not to contaminate the equipment being used and other wafers being
processed.  Organizational processes and the production flow must be modified to
accommodate copper.  Some companies consider the risk of copper contamination so
great that they build entirely new fabrication plants for copper.27
The second, and perhaps most difficult, technical challenge is how to deposit a
uniform layer of copper into the interconnect structures.  These structures are deep and
narrow, especially the vias that connect different layers.28  For a long time, researchers
struggled to identify a way to deposit copper into the vias without forming air bubbles
and imperfections inside the copper.  They explored four options: chemical vapor
deposition (CVD), physical vapor deposition (PVD), electroless deposition, and
electroplating. 29  All commercially available copper processes employ PVD to deposit the
barrier and seed layers and use electroplating to deposit the interconnect itself.  In
contrast, the traditional aluminum process relies exclusively on PVD to deposit the
aluminum (see Liu, 1996, p. 379).  Although electroplating had been used on printed
circuit board, it is an entirely new approach for on-chip interconnects.30  In fact, the use
of electroplating was highly counterintuitive at first, as it requires the delicate silicon
                                                
27 For example, AMD built a new factory in Dresden, Germany to produce copper-based Athlon
microprocessors.  The identical part is being manufactured at the company’s existing plant in Texas,
but aluminum interconnects are being used instead; AMD is not planning to make these factories
copper-capable. (source: Tom’s Hardware Guide, http://www.tomshardware.com, June 2000).
28 This problem does not arise with the traditional aluminum process because the interconnects and vias
are laid down first and then blanketed by the dielectric.  In the damascene process, the dielectric is laid
down first, and then the vias and interconnect structures are etched into the dielectric.
29 CVD involves suspending copper in a chemical vapor, which then produces a coating of copper on the
semiconductor wafer.  PVD involves bombarding the target surface with copper atoms that gradually
form a layer.  Electroplating involves immersing a surface into an electrolytic solution and running an
electric current through two electrodes (one of which is the desired pattern on the surface), thereby
accumulating copper on one electrode.  Electroless deposition is similar to electroplating, but depends
on a chemical reaction rather than requiring electrodes.  See Liu (1996) for further details.
30 Electroplating has also been used for multi-chip packaging, an area pioneered by AT&T and IBM.
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wafers (which are manufactured in ultra-clean environments) to be dipped into “dirty”
electroplating solutions.
A third technical obstacle arose because copper is a soft metal, making it difficult
to polish each layer into a flat surface upon which to build the next layer.  To do so, IBM
developed a process known as Chemical-Mechanical-Planarization (CMP),31 in which a
rotating disk coated with slurry (a mix of chemicals) is used to polish the surface flat.
The polishing action actually occurs at the molecular level, arising from chemical
reactions between the surface and the slurry.  This technique produces extremely flat
surfaces.  As with electroplating, CMP was a highly counterintuitive idea when first
proposed.  People were opposed to dunking their precious silicon wafers into a cocktail
of powerful chemicals and then grinding them flat.  Moreover, the process is extremely
difficult to control, and even today remains somewhat of an art.32
Once the copper is deposited and polished flat, a final technical obstacle remains:
unlike aluminum, which forms a natural protective coating, copper oxidizes when it is
exposed to air, and so the copper interconnects require a passivation layer to protect them
from corrosion.
These were difficult technical obstacles to overcome, which explains why
aluminum has been used instead of copper throughout the history of the semiconductor
industry.  But these difficulties also point to the technical skills that would have helped
adoption.  They include prior R&D on: (1) copper deposition — CVD, PVD, electroless,
                                                
31 CMP techniques were initially developed in the 1920’s for polishing glass.  IBM adapted the technique
for semiconductor wafers.  For more details on CMP, see Liu, et al. (1999).
32 The traditional aluminum process uses CMP for polishing the dielectric (ILD) and the tungsten plugs.
However, the CMP process is much more complicated with copper, because it is a soft metal.  The
copper has to be polished down to the dielectric layer without damaging it, a difficult task because the
copper is subject to erosion and dishing (Park, 1998, p. 15-17).
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and electroplating; (2) copper damascene or dual damascene; (3) copper CMP; (4) barrier
layers for copper; and (5) passivation layer for copper.33
The companies that developed these capabilities and adopted copper could expect
an attractive reward in terms of circuit performance and manufacturing cost.  First, the
electrical resistance of copper is 40% lower than that of aluminum, which translates into
faster chips and lower heat dissipation (ideal for high-performance and portable
devices).34  Second, the dual damascene process has fewer steps and is estimated to cost
20-30% less than the traditional aluminum process.  And third, the electromigration
properties of copper are better than those of aluminum.35
2.4 The Copper Puzzle
The pattern of R&D on copper interconnects and its adoption by various firms
reveals an interesting puzzle (see Table 2-1).  IBM pioneered much of the early research
on copper interconnects and became the first company to ship copper-based products.
However, two surprising facts emerge.  First, it was only a very short time between IBM
shipping its first product and other firms (Motorola, TSMC, UMC, VLSI and AMD)
shipping their products.  In fact, Motorola and Texas Instruments announced their own
copper interconnect technologies just weeks after IBM’s announcement.  Within a year of
IBM, four other companies were also shipping copper-based products.36  These firms had
                                                
33 While searching for patents and publications, I also included work on copper etching.  In any case, the
number of patents and publications on copper etching for interconnects is exceedingly low, and does
not affect the results of the quantitative analysis.
34 Electrical resistance interacts with capacitance to limit the switching frequency of a circuit.
Consequently, a conductor with lower resistance enables faster switching to occur.
35 Electromigration is the movement of atoms when an electrical current runs through a metal.  After
extended periods, electromigration causes physical distortions in the shape of an interconnect and
adversely affects its electrical properties.
36 In 1999, Motorola began shipping copper-based SRAMS and PowerPC chips (the PowerPC chips are
used to power the Apple Macintosh G4).  Apart from IBM and Motorola, the only other companies to
ship copper-based products by 1999 were TSMC and UMC in Taiwan and VLSI Technology in USA.
In 1999, AMD demonstrated copper-based Athlon microprocessors; it began shipping them in June
2000.  These early adopters will be followed in 2000 by Lucent, Texas Instruments, Chartered
Semiconductors, NEC, and Hitachi.  Most other companies plan to adopt copper interconnect
technology by 2001 or 2002.
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done much less R&D than IBM.  The second interesting fact is that several firms —
including Motorola, AMD, UMC, and TSMC — were quick to ship their copper products
relative to firms that had published a greater number of research articles on that topic,
(e.g., AT&T, Hitachi, and NTT).  Astonishingly, TSMC, UMC and VLSI began shipping
copper-based products only two years after they began R&D.
Table 2-1: Prior R&D Relevant to Copper Interconnects versus Year of First Shipment
Organization No. of Publications on
copper interconnects
in the Science Citation
Index (1985-1997)
Start of
Copper
R&D
First
Shipment
Years elapsed
IBM 40 1960s Sep 1998 30+
Motorola 3 1990 Mid 1999 10
TSMC- Taiwan
Semiconductors
0 Mid
1998
End 1999 2
UMC- United
Microelectronics
0 Mid
1998
End 1999 2
VLSI Technology 0 1997 End 1999 2
AMD 1 1995 June 2000† 5
Texas Instruments 2 Mid
1990s
2001* 6
AT&T
(now Lucent)
7 1993 2001* 8
CSM -Chartered
Semiconductors
0 July
1997
2001* 4
Hitachi 5 »1986 End 2000* 14
NEC 1 Early
1990s
End 2000* ?
NTT 8 »1990 2000 or later* ³ 10
Intel 3 1988 2002* 14
Sematech
(consortium)
2 1988/
1993
NA NA
Notes: Sorted by date of first shipment
*  Estimates from interviews and news reports.
† AMD demonstrated copper-based microprocessors at the end of 1999 and began shipments in
June 2000.
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The first observation suggests that other firms had absorbed knowledge spillovers
from IBM (even though they had performed much less R&D than had IBM).  The second
observation suggests that several firms with little prior R&D used other means of
developing absorptive capacity, so that they were at least as fast at absorbing spillovers as
other firms that had done more R&D.  These claims are substantiated using the following
logic:
§ I first provide evidence that firms depended on knowledge spillovers from IBM and
other sources (Section 2.4.1).  This rules out two alternative explanations: (1) that
they did not rely on spillovers but developed copper interconnect technology by being
more productive at R&D; and (2) that copper interconnect technology was an
‘obvious’ technological solution that other firms developed independently.
§ Having established that firms depended upon spillovers, I then show that the prior
R&D activity of each firm is insufficient to explain its absorptive capacity (Section
2.4.2).
§ I then show the importance of a firm’s connectedness to absorptive capacity (Section
2.4.3).  In the case of copper interconnects, better-connected firms obtained superior
access to technical information and had greater opportunities to recruit relevant talent.
2.4.1 Firms Depended On External Knowledge, Primarily from IBM
It is tempting to believe that the other firms did not depend on external knowledge, and
therefore did not perform much R&D because they had no need for absorptive capacity.
Perhaps they were simply more productive at internal R&D than IBM?  Or perhaps they
independently invented copper interconnect technology?  However, neither of these
explanations is persuasive.  Although other firms performed relatively little research, they
depended heavily upon external knowledge from IBM, universities, and research
consortia.  IBM was the single most important source.  The most compelling evidence of
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IBM’s importance is that all commercial copper processes to date use the damascene
process developed by IBM, and they deposit the copper using electroplating.37
As noted above, damascene electroplating involves process steps that were not
intuitive at the time of its invention, including reversing the sequence of steps from the
traditional etch process and immersing the semiconductor wafers into “dirty” solutions
(the electroplating bath and CMP slurry).  This makes it highly unlikely that all the firms
independently and simultaneously developed the same process.  In retrospect, other
companies could have pursued alternative metals and alloys.38  But even had they chosen
copper, they might have developed something other than the damascene process, and
could certainly have deposited copper some other way (e.g., PVD, CVD, or electroless
deposition).39
The knowledge dependence on IBM is consistent with the patent citation analysis.  As
shown in Table 2-2, the patents on copper interconnects by Motorola, TI, AMD, and
other firms include a large number of citations to IBM patents.  In aggregate, patents for
copper interconnects make 265 citations to IBM patents, almost four times more than any
other source.40  The results remain robust if self-citations are eliminated, as shown in the
last row of Table 2-2.  The only firm that did not exhibit knowledge dependence on IBM
in the patent-to-patent citations is AT&T, which had access to the bountiful resources of
                                                
37 The ubiquity of this technique is apparent from industry interviews, news reports, and descriptions in
the patents and publications of various companies.  The first technical announcements of successful
copper processes by IBM, Motorola, and Texas Instruments report using damascene electroplating
(Proceedings of the IEEE IEDM Conference, 1997).  Moreover, semiconductor companies do not
manufacture their own equipment, but rely on a handful of equipment companies.  To date, these
suppliers only offer equipment for copper interconnects that employ the damascene process (see Wolfe
1998b).
38 Murarka and Hymes (1995) present a comparison of copper with other metals, favoring copper.  Each
metal has advantages and disadvantages.
39 Researchers at universities and firms continue today to explore PVD, CVD, and electroless deposition.
These are expected to become important in the future because electroplated copper does not produce
conformal surfaces (source: interviews).  Intel and Applied Materials are exploring ways to apply
traditional etch to copper interconnects (Koch et al. 1999).
40 Interestingly, Motorola and AMD make as many citations of IBM patents as they do of their own
patents.  Texas Instruments cites IBM patents more than its own patents.
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the Bell Laboratories (it is the only company that primarily cites itself).41  Similar results
are obtained if we consider only citations to patents directly related to copper
interconnect technology (Table 2-3).
Another interesting result from Tables 2-2 and 2-3 is the strong knowledge
dependence on Motorola, which received the second-highest number of citations.  As is
discussed below, Motorola relied heavily on knowledge spillovers from IBM, and then
played a major role in disseminating this technology to other companies.
The knowledge dependence of other firms on IBM existed even though IBM relied
heavily on secrecy to protect its technology. 42,43  IBM was so successful at keeping the
project under wraps that many industry experts were surprised when the company made
the official announcement in 1997.44  Publications emerged from IBM on the general
ideas relating to the damascene process and copper technology, but process-specific
knowledge was kept carefully hidden.
                                                
41 According to my interviews, Bell Laboratories has investigated almost every facet of semiconductor
technology, including CVD, PVD, and electrodeposition (which it used for pioneering work on multi-
chip modules).
42 The other companies were not as secretive as IBM.  At the other end of the spectrum stood AT&T’s
Bell Laboratories, which prided itself on the openness of its research and its resemblance to top-tier
academic departments.  Other companies fell between these extremes. (Source: interviews.)
43 The information in this paragraph was obtained through field interviews.
44 This is reflected in the 5% shock in IBM’s stock price on the day of the announcement. My interviews
reveal that industry experts knew about IBM’s progress with copper but hadn’t realized how close it
was to putting copper into full-scale production.  On the day of IBM’s public announcement, The New
York Times quoted an Intel spokesman:  “If [IBM] can move it into production this early, that is
certainly more aggressive than we and others had anticipated”.
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Table 2-2: Number of Citations by Copper Interconnect Patents to All Other Patents
Reference To
Top Ten Not Top 10 Total
Reference By IBM Moto-
rola
TI AT&T Hita-
chi
GE Fujit-
su
Blank MCC* Micro
n
Sharp AMD Char-
tered
Toshi-
ba
Other
IBM 103 16 29 10 18 17 16 10 8 6 2 4 10 187 436
Motorola 20 22 3 3 2 6 2 34 92
Texas Instr 16 2 5 3 4 2 2 8 42
Lucent/ AT&T 13 4 17
Hitachi 3 2 0 5
Fujitsu 16 2 2 2 2 5 29
MCC* 22 5 5 3 3 27 2 40 107
Sharp 9 4 5 3 3 9 2 7 31 73
AMD 19 4 3 2 4 2 4 2 21 4 21 86
Chartered Semi. 6 3 5 4 2 4 5 29
Toshiba 3 3 2 2 2 2 14
Other 54 20 19 14 7 15 10 17 3 18 0 5 4 5 147 338
Total 265 77 70 50 43 41 39 38 38 36 13 32 8 34 484 1268
Total exc. Self-cites. 162 55 65 37 43 28 39 38 11 34 4 11 6 32 439 1004
Notes:
· MCC* = Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corp. of Austin, Texas, an industrial research consortium (http://www.mcc.com).
· Patents included are for 1976-1999, while citations to patents are for 1960-1999.
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Table 2-3: Number of Citations by Copper Interconnect Patents to Copper Patents
Reference To
Top Ten Not Top 10 Total
Reference By IBM Moto-
rola
Fujit-
su
MCC* Air
Prod
Hita-
chi
TI Micro
n
Sharp AT&T AMD Char-
tered
Toshi-
ba
Other
IBM 14 2 4 4 3 1 6 34
Motorola 2 10 2 1 1 3 1 20
Fujitsu 2 1 2 5
Texas Instr 2 1 2 2 3 1 1 1 13
Sharp 5 3 7 3 8 6 32
Lucent/AT&T 5 0 5
AMD 4 3 2 4 1 2 3 6 25
Chartered Semi. 5 5 3 2 1 3 5 24
Toshiba 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
Other 21 6 11 14 7 3 7 7 1 0 0 1 2 32 112
Total 50 32 25 19 18 17 15 12 12 8 3 2 5 60 278
Total excl self-cites 36 22 25 19 16 17 12 12 4 3 0 1 5 48 220
Notes:
· MCC* = Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corp. of Austin, Texas, an industrial research consortium (http://www.mcc.com).
· Patents included are for 1976-1999, while citations to patents are for 1960-1999.
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Copper research was deemed a top commercial priority at IBM.  According to one
IBM employee, the firm’s researchers were “rewarded internally through other means”
(financially and through promotions) rather than given permission to publish their more
sensitive research. 45  For example, IBM’s work on the chemical vapor deposition of
copper (CVD) produced tangible results around 1983, but was not published till 1990.
Some of IBM’s research is still not published today, including the type of material it uses
for the barrier layer and the chemical composition of its electroplating bath.
Only one part of the copper project was not done within IBM: the development of a
copper-deposition tool, for which IBM, in 1995, signed a top-secret joint-development
agreement with Novellus, a small but reputable equipment supplier.  Under this
agreement, Novellus was not permitted to reveal that it was working with IBM until
months after IBM’s public announcement, and IBM maintained a list of companies to
which Novellus could not initially sell the tool. To mislead competitors, the joint-
development project was located in Portland, Oregon — far away from IBM and close to
Intel’s development facilities.
IBM’s secrecy makes the results in Tables 2-2 and 2-3 even more remarkable.  By
choosing secrecy, IBM withheld from patenting aggressively until the mid-1990s (see
Table 2-6).  Therefore, the data in Tables 2-2 and 2-3 understate the dependence of other
firms on IBM, since there were fewer IBM patents to cite than had IBM patented its
inventions earlier.  A better measure of the dependence of other firms on IBM is the
number of citations that are made by copper patents to the scientific literature.  As Table
2-4 shows, IBM is the single largest source of publications cited in the copper
interconnect patents of Motorola, AMD, and Applied Materials (the world’s largest
semiconductor equipment supplier).
                                                
45 Stern (1999) showed that biologists on the job market experienced a compensating differential between
the permission to publish research and monetary compensation.
52
Table 2-4: Citations by U.S. Patents on Copper Interconnects to Scientific Articles.
Patents By IBM Motorola AMD Applied Materials
IBM (63) IBM (12) IBM (10) IBM (9)
Text Books (16) RPI (4) Trade Journals (3) Applied Mat(5)
AT&T (7) U.C. Berkeley (4) Microel Ctr N Carolina (3) Oki Electric (3)
Unknown (6) Motorola (4) Varian Associates (2) Univ. de Paris-Sud (2)
Toshiba (4) Text Books (3) Text Books (2) Tech. U. Chemnitz Germany (2)
Varian Associates (3) Sematech (3) Intel (2) RPI (2)
Number of Mitsubishi (3) SUNY Albany (2) Georgia Inst Tech (2) NTT (2)
References Univ Alberta (3) NTT (1) Northeastern Univ (1) NEC (2)
to Articles Oki Electric (3) AT&T (1) Airco Temescal Inc (1) Hitachi (2)
Published by: Hosei Univ, Tokyo (3) CalTech (1) Unknown (1)
Harris Corp (3) CNET France (1) U. New Mexico(1)
CNET France (3) CNRS, France (1) Sharp (1)
Carleton Univ (3) Intel (1) Korea Inst. Sci & Tech (1)
Philips (3) Microel Ctr N Carolina (1) CNET France (1)
Fujitsu (2) Air Prod&Chem (1) AMD (1)
Intel (2) NEC (1)
Korea Inst. Sci & Tech (2) Samsung (1)
Hughes (2) Stanford Univ (1)
Motorola (2) Tech. Univ. Dresden (1)
Sharp (2) Tokyo Inst Tech (1)
Siemens (2) Toshiba (1)
Spectrum CVD (2) Taiwan Nat Chiao Tung U. (1)
Univ Uppsala, Sweden (2)
Others (6)
Notes:
· Patents included are for 1976-1999.
· Citations are to all scientific articles, regardless of date.
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Table 2-4 also shows that copper patents by these companies make a large number
of citations to research published by universities and government laboratories.  These
laboratories and universities were crucial sources of knowledge spillovers for companies
other than IBM (see Section 2.4.3).  Unfortunately, their importance is not reflected in the
patent-to-patent citations (see Tables 2-2 and 2-3).  Few universities and government
laboratories filed for patents on copper interconnects (see Figure 2-4), although they
published a large number of articles on the subject (see Figure 2-5).46
2.4.2 Prior R&D is Insufficient to Account for Absorptive Capacity
I now turn to the prior relevant R&D of each firm, as indicated by the number of
publications and patents it produced and by the number of years it worked on copper
R&D.
Tables 2-5 and 2-6 show that other firms produced far fewer patents and
publications on copper interconnects than did IBM.  These tables also show that IBM is
the only firm to have systematically investigated copper interconnects prior to 1989.47
But due to IBM’s secrecy, these data grossly underestimate the scale of IBM’s R&D.
Published accounts and interviews with IBM researchers show that IBM began
                                                
46 The Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corp (MCC), an industry R&D consortium in Austin,
Texas, is the one exception: MCC is one of the most highly cited sources in Tables 2-2 and 2-3, for its
work on copper electroplating for the packaging inside of which integrated circuits devices are
mounted.  This is similar to the work on multi-chip modules within IBM, which the firm drew upon for
electroplating expertise.
47 Scattered efforts were made at other companies, including Boeing, General Electric, Motorola, and
Intel. (Source: patent and publication data; interviews)
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Figure 2-4: Number of U.S. Patents Related to Copper Interconnect per Year
  Source: Analysis of Science Citation Index.
Figure 2-5: Number of Articles per Year on Copper Interconnects
  Source: Analysis of Science Citation Index.
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Table 2-5: Number of Publications on Copper Interconnects per Year by Companies
Company 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total
IBM 3 1 2 1 3 7 1 6 3 1 8 3 1 40
NTT 2 1 1 2 1 1 8
Lucent/ AT&T 1 3 3 7
Hitachi 1 1 2 1 5
Toshiba 1 1 2 4
Intel Corp 1 1 1 3
Mitsubishi 1 2 3
Motorola 2 1 3
National Semicon. 1 1 1 3
Nippondenso 1 1 1 3
Oki Electric Ind. 2 1 3
DuPont 1 1 1 3
Applied Materials 2 1 3
Other 0 1 0 2 1 3 1 2 0 0 2 2 7 21
Total 3 2 2 4 5 11 7 15 13 3 22 10 12 109
Source: Analysis of Science Citation Index.
researching copper interconnects in the 1960s.48  By the early 1980s, the company had
invented the damascene process and pioneered CMP.49  By the late 1980s, IBM had
developed a barrier layer, and in 1989 IBM demonstrated a working RAM chip with
copper interconnects laid down using chemical vapor deposition.
Around 1989, researchers at IBM discovered a way to electroplate copper onto
semiconductor chips.  For reasons not understood at the time, the copper thus deposited
did not contain imperfections.  Moreover, it had electrical properties far superior to that
of IBM’s CVD process.  Almost overnight, IBM decided to switch to electroplated
copper.  IBM jealously guarded this secret for many years.
So, in the 1989 timeframe, IBM had all the pieces in place for a copper damascene
                                                
48 See the IBM Think  magazine article (1998) and EETimes  special feature (1998).
49 IBM also tried to etch copper, but technical difficulties convinced the firm to pursue the damascene
route and abandon all etching efforts.
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Table 2-6: Number of Patents on Copper Interconnect per Year
Company 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
IBM 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 1 5 4 3 5 5 37
Sharp 1 1 5 10 17
Motorola 1 1 4 1 1 2 6 16
AMD 1 2 3 8 14
Texas Instr. 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 12
Lucent/
AT&T
2 1 1 2 2 8
Air Prod &
Chem.
3 1 1 5
Chartered
Semicon.
1 2 2 5
Fujitsu 1 1 2 1 5
Toshiba 1 1 3 5
Boeing 2 2 1 5
Applied
Materials
1 3 4
LG Semicon. 1 1 2 4
Hitachi 1 1 1 1 4
Intel 1 1 1 1 4
Others 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 4 3 3 7 4 0 10 45
Total 1 4 3 0 0 0 1 2 1 3 2 2 2 5 7 3 14 8 11 19 15 16 21 50 190
   Source: Analysis of US Patents
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process.  In 1991, the firm moved the project into development and, in 1993, announced a
chip with four levels of copper.50  In 1997, IBM began moving copper interconnects into
production.
Other firms did much less exploratory R&D on copper interconnects than IBM, and
only began to explore the technology seriously in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Patents
and publications began appearing from other companies around 1989 (see Tables 2-5 and
2-6), and grew at a rapid rate (see Figures 2-4 and 2-5).  Academic research also began to
emerge at this time (see Section 2.4.3).
Several factors contributed to this expansion of research.  There was a growing
realization that the industry would not be able to cope with future needs using aluminum.
In addition, IBM — although tight-lipped about the details — began to reveal that it was
making progress with copper.51 Momentum grew as technological breakthroughs began
to appear from non-IBM researchers.  Many of the researchers I interviewed described
the emergence of a critical mass of people working on copper, and how this legitimized
their own research and provided a justification for obtaining resources from their own
organizations.
Intel’s effort is noteworthy among the early firms to investigate copper.  In 1989,
Intel researchers published an article on copper interconnects using electroless deposition
(Pai and Ting, 1989).  One author was a former IBM employee; the other had recently
completed a Ph.D. on VLSI interconnect technology at Berkeley. 52  Unlike electroplating,
electroless deposition was not amenable to mass production, but eventually influenced
researchers outside IBM to consider electroplating as a viable option. 53  However, at the
                                                
50 This chip was not quite ready for the market.  It used a special material known as Polyimide for the
dielectric, which was expensive to manufacture in large quantities.
51 Recall that IBM demonstrated a copper-based RAM chip in 1989 and published its work on CVD
copper in 1990.
52 Sources: Dissertation Abstracts Online; interviews with researchers.  The origin of these two
researchers suggests that Intel absorbed knowledge from IBM and Berkeley.
53 By 1999, the Pai and Ting (1989) paper had been cited at least 91 times. (Source: WebOfScience.com)
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time, electroplating received a lukewarm welcome because it seemed ludicrous to put
silicon wafers into “dirty” electroplating solutions.
Despite its early lead, Intel did not follow up its research in a serious way. 54
Meanwhile, other U.S. companies — including Motorola, AMD, AT&T (Bell Labs) and
Texas Instruments — began to explore copper interconnects.  Motorola’s copper program
began around 1990 and AT&T’s around 1993, but both went into full-scale development
only around 1995.  AMD did not begin its copper program until 1995, but ramped up
quickly and moved into development by 1996.  In Japan, NTT and Hitachi began copper
R&D in the late 1980s.55  However, interviewees indicate that most firms outside the
United States were generally slower to explore copper technology and only began in the
mid-1990s.56
It is revealing to compare the patterns of publications and patents (Tables 2-5 and
2-6) with adoption (Table 2-1).57  Following Gambardella (1992), one might expect the
firms that participated in “open science” (by publishing their research) to have produced
more patents or adopted copper faster.  Figure 2-6 shows the number of patents awarded
to each firm versus the number of publications it produced.  IBM is high on both counts,
but several companies — including AMD, Motorola, TI, and Sharp — obtained a
surprisingly large number of patents relative to the number of articles they published.58
Among these firms, Motorola and AMD were subsequently early to market with the
technology (see Table 2-1), while TI was at least as fast as NTT and AT&T, which had
                                                
54 Or if it did, this was never publicly revealed.  According to industry sources, Intel seriously began
pursuing copper interconnect technology only around 1997.
55 Hitachi began producing patents on copper interconnects from 1988 (e.g., see U.S. Patent No.
4842891).  NTT published research on copper for multi-chip modules in 1991 and copper
interconnects using CVD in 1992.
56 After IBM’s announcement, a prominent Japanese researcher was quoted as saying that Japan was 3-5
years behind America in copper technology (see Lammers, 1998a).
57 Ideally, one would run a regression of the hazard rate of adoption against patents and publications.
However, the small sample of firms that have adopted this technology to date precludes this analysis.
58 Excluding IBM, the raw correlation between copper patents and publications in Figure 2-6 is –0.09.
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published more articles.59  Thus, there appears to be a relationship between patents and
adoption, but not between publications and adoption.
Figure 2-6: Number of Copper Patents versus Number of Copper Publications
Source: Analysis of Science Citation Index and U.S. Patents
An even more intriguing pattern is the absence from Figure 2-6 of the chip
foundries (TSMC, UMC, VLSI, and Chartered).60  These firms performed none of the
initial R&D (some didn’t even exist at the time), but they were at least as fast at adopting
copper as other firms that had invested earlier in R&D.  How did Motorola, AMD, and
the foundries acquire the knowledge needed to adopt copper technology so quickly,
despite the relatively low publication rates of these firms, and IBM’s attempts to keep its
                                                
59 Sharp received a large number of patents, but most of them were in awarded in 1999 (see Table 2-6).  I
was unable to obtain its expected shipment date.
60 Chip foundries are companies that manufacture semiconductor devices for other companies.
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own knowledge secret?  The next section proposes a solution: that these firms had other
means of being connected to external sources of technical knowledge.
2.4.3 Absorptive Capacity Depends upon Connectedness
The most important sources of external knowledge differ before and after 1997.
Prior to IBM’s announcement in 1997, the absorptive capacity depended strongly upon
relationships with Sematech and several universities that followed in IBM’s footsteps.
IBM also contributed knowledge indirectly.  After 1997, the absorptive capacity
depended mainly on relationships with companies that already possessed copper
interconnect technology and with equipment vendors.  The remainder of this sub-section
elaborates upon how and why this occurred.
2.4.3.1 Spillovers before 1997
Sematech and several universities played a key role in facilitating spillovers of
copper interconnect technology between 1989 and 1997.  Prior to 1989, academic
research on the metallurgy and electrochemistry of copper existed, but there were no
formal university programs directed specifically at copper interconnect technology for
semiconductors.  Table 2-7 shows that academic institutions and government laboratories
published almost no research on copper interconnects prior to 1990.
Sematech and Sematech-Funded Universities
Around 1988, copper interconnects became a priority at Sematech, the consortium
of leading American semiconductor companies.61,62 Sematech began to fund a significant
amount of university research by forming research centers, known as Sematech Centers
of Excellence (SCOE).  The SCOE project on interconnects was led by the Rensselaer
                                                
61 Sematech was founded in 1986 to enhance the competitiveness of U.S. companies.  In 1989, it had 14
members: IBM, AT&T, Motorola, Intel, AMD, Texas Instruments, DEC, Harris Corp, Hewlett-
Packard, LSI Logic, Micron Technology, National Semiconductor, Rockwell, and NCR.
62 Information in this paragraph and the next was obtained through interviews with researchers at
universities, firms, and Sematech.
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Polytechnic Institute (RPI) and also involved Cornell and SUNY. 63 Table 2-7 shows that
publications began appearing from these universities around 1990.  Universities in Japan,
Korea, and Taiwan also began to research copper interconnects, but the Sematech-backed
universities led by quite a margin in the number of publications (see Table 2-7).  The
work of Sematech-funded universities would eventually play a critical role in the
diffusion of knowledge on copper interconnect technology.
Table 2-7: Number of Publications on Copper Interconnects per year
by the Top 10 Universities and Government Laboratories
Company 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total
Rensselaer Poly Inst* 5 1 3 4 5 1 1 20
Cornell* 2 2 2 2 1 1 6 16
Korea Adv Inst Sci &
Tech
1 2 6 6 15
Univ New Mexico* 3 2 5 2 1 13
Lawrence Berkeley/
UC Berkeley
1 3 2 1 1 2 10
SUNY* 1 2 1 4 1 9
Univ-Illinois 1 1 1 2 3 8
Kyoto Univ, Japan 1 1 1 1 3 7
Nat Chiao Tung,
Taiwan
1 1 2 1 1 1 7
Ecole Poly Lausanne,
Switzerland
1 1 3 1 1 7
Other 1 1 0 3 4 3 4 6 9 8 25 15 12 91
Total 1 1 0 3 5 13 10 20 20 23 44 31 32 203
   * = university affiliated with the Sematech SCOE Program on Interconnects.
   Source: Analysis of Science Citation Index.
Researchers at various universities and Sematech acknowledge that, during this
period, they were “rediscovering” what IBM already knew.  Much of the university
research was in the same vein as earlier work at IBM, the important difference being that
it was in the public domain.  A handful of university researchers who attempted to etch
copper quickly abandoned the process, and instead began to explore the damascene
process.
                                                
63 This program later expanded to include the University of Texas (Austin), Stanford University, and
others.  The Semiconductor Research Corporation (SRC) helped manage the SCOE program on
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The basic idea of the damascene process had diffused out of IBM in the 1980s,
although little was known outside IBM regarding implementation.  In the early 1990s,
much of the academic research was directed at copper deposition, primarily CVD.  This
was due in part to IBM’s announcement around 1990 of its CVD work, although the firm
had already moved on to electrodeposition by then (which provides further evidence that
universities were, in fact, borrowing IBM’s ideas).
RPI was a major contributor to the CVD work, and also worked jointly with SUNY
Albany on PVD. 64  IBM, itself a member of Sematech and in close geographic proximity
to RPI, kept track of and encouraged the research performed by universities.  IBM even
privately funded some research at RPI and other nearby universities.65  However, there
was no direct transfer of knowledge from IBM to the universities, apart from papers IBM
published in journals and presented at conferences.  IBM’s perspective was that although
it was way ahead in copper R&D, the firm had nothing to lose by learning from others —
 especially if they came up with ideas even better than those of IBM.66
At Cornell University, another important Sematech-funded project explored
electroless plating.  The research produced, among others, three copper interconnects
patents jointly assigned to Cornell, Sematech, and Intel. 67  Interestingly, the inventors of
these patents included C. Ting, one of the two Intel researchers (and originally from
IBM) who had written the initial paper on electroless deposition.  This is surely an
indication that the knowledge created at IBM and Intel had spilled over to its Sematech
partners through this individual.  According to researchers I interviewed, the research at
Cornell eventually generated data that helped firms realize that electroplating was more
feasible than electroless plating.
                                                                                                                                                
interconnects.
64 The focus of research at RPI, SUNY, and Cornell is manifest in the publications covered by the
Science Citation Index and Dissertation Abstracts Online.  References are available upon request.
65 The work IBM funded at RPI was on low-k dielectrics, a complement to copper technology.
66 Source: interview with IBM researcher.
67 U.S. Patents Nos. 5695810, 5824599, and 5891513.
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How did companies apart from IBM access knowledge at these universities?  Some
knowledge was exchanged at conferences attended by a small but expanding community
of researchers from around the world who studied copper interconnects.68  Only broad
information was exchanged at these conferences; the academic researchers worked at that
level, and firms were unwilling to reveal intimate technical details.69  Thus, the function
of these conferences was to chart the overall research direction.
The movement of people was a much more important channel through which
knowledge flowed from the universities to firms.  In particular, firms actively recruited
graduate students who had worked on copper-related technologies at Sematech-funded
universities.  Academic researchers reported strong demand for graduates with such
experience.70  One professor mentioned how a graduate student had done a less-than-
“marketable” Ph.D., stayed on for post-doctoral research on copper interconnects, and
was then snatched up by a company.
The companies that recruited these graduate students — unlike AT&T and IBM —
were attempting to hire individuals with domain-specific skills.  According to the R&D
director at one company, “The people we hired from universities had the right set of
skills.  They were familiar with specific technical areas, such as plating, sputtering, etc.”
Sematech member companies had an advantage in that regular meetings provided
them with an opportunity to evaluate students they might recruit.  According to one
professor:
                                                
68 These included the VLSI Multilayer Interconnect Conference (VMIC) and the IEEE International
Electron Devices Meeting  (IEDM,) which has special sections on interconnect technology.  Between
1991 and 1996, RPI also conducted its own summer meetings.
69 Several researchers I interviewed described this situation, which is reflected in the content of the
papers published in the relevant conference proceedings.
70 Most academics interviewed reported that their students went into industry rather than academia.
According to one Professor, “a much higher percentage of graduate students go to industry compared
to MIT, and in this area, even more so.”
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In most cases, graduate students went to U.S. industry — especially Sematech companies.  This is
because Sematech funded the research, and therefore people from Sematech companies were at the
annual review, where they had early indications of the quality of the students.71
Although Sematech began funding university research around 1988, its in-house
copper program did not take off until 1993-95.72  While the universities played an
important role in developing fundamental knowledge, Sematech concentrated on
integrating copper into the rest of the manufacturing process.  This required working
closely with equipment suppliers to develop tools  (Table 2-10 lists the public agreements
between Sematech and equipment suppliers).  Sematech’s biggest contribution was its
detailed benchmarking tests on equipment.  Until then, there was “lots of anecdotal
knowledge but no performance data available.”73
Sematech signed a controversial contract with IBM around 1994 or 1995,74 under
which Sematech paid IBM $1 million for samples and electrical performance data from
IBM’s copper process.  Sematech wanted to compare IBM’s data with the results of
Sematech’s experiments to deposit copper using CVD, PVD, and electroplating.  At the
time, IBM did not disclose which of these processes it was using, nor did it send
Sematech any completed wafers.  However, the IBM data helped Sematech decide to use
electroplating instead of the alternatives.75
The overall result of Sematech’s efforts was that it succeeded, in August 1997, at
producing test wafers using copper interconnects.76
                                                
71 Source: interview.
72 The material in this paragraph comes from interviews with Sematech and its member companies.
73 Source: Interview with Sematech personnel.
74 The information in this paragraph comes from interviews with IBM and Sematech.
75 Basing themselves on IBM data, several researchers guessed that IBM had used electroplating.  But
these researchers could not be sure.  Around 1996, IBM revealed to Sematech that it was using
electrodeposition.
76 Sematech press release, 11 August 1997 (http://www.sematech.org/public/news/archive97.htm).
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An important feature of Sematech’s in-house development was that except for a
handful of publications and patents Sematech filed, the knowledge produced was made
available only to member companies.  Almost all member companies sent assignees on
two-year attachments to the Sematech R&D facility in Austin, Texas.  Several firms,
including AMD, Motorola, and TI, also had research facilities in Austin.  The
relationship with Sematech gave U.S. firms a strong advantage over their foreign rivals,
who were barred from joining Sematech till 1999.
IBM as a Source of Spillovers
Apart from Sematech and the universities, IBM was, of course, the other major
source of knowledge between 1989 and 1997.   IBM introduced basic ideas that others
explored, such as the damascene process and copper CMP.  In interviews, several
professors mentioned that IBM researchers also occasionally gave them suggestions on
suitable questions to investigate (while not sharing proprietary information).
IBM contributed directly useful knowledge in three ways.  The first was through its
information-sharing contract with Sematech described above.   Further, IBM encountered
some severe financial difficulties IBM in the early 1990s, which forced the firm to scale
back the copper R&D project drastically, and almost shut it down. 77  As a result, several
key individuals left IBM to join competitors and equipment suppliers.78  This flow of
people from IBM to other firms was the second way in which IBM contributed useful
knowledge, and although the companies who employed these people insisted that their
new employees honor their non-disclosure agreements with IBM, it is likely that the
firms realized at least an indirect benefit.79  An analysis of the copper publications shows
that only two authors originally affiliated with IBM subsequently changed their corporate
                                                
77 This story is recounted in an IBM Think  magazine article (see bibliography).  I have corroborated it
through interviews with IBM employees.
78 Unfortunately, my industry sources have been reluctant to reveal the precise number of people who left
IBM’s copper program.  According to one interviewee, at least three key people departed IBM to join
other firms, one of them to Motorola.
79 The norm in the semiconductor industry is for employees who leave one firm to join another to work
on unrelated projects for at least 6-9 months.
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addresses.  However, this underestimates the actual flow of people from IBM, because
some went on to managerial positions elsewhere and did not continue to publish.
A third way in which IBM contributed knowledge was through accidental losses.
According to one interviewee, “Someone at IBM blundered some information and some
people [at an equipment company] figured out that with the right [electroplating] bath it
would work beautifully.  Now several plating tools have been developed based on the
idea.”
Motorola as a Source of Spillovers
Consider the case of Motorola, which highlights the importance of connectedness.80
Thanks to its PowerPC alliance with IBM (through which the two firms worked jointly to
design a microprocessor), Motorola sensed earlier than other companies that IBM was
making progress on copper technology. The alliance did not involve the exchange of
process technology, but Motorola was able to draw inferences from the design rules
employed by IBM when it planned to use copper interconnects.  According to an IBM
source, “Motorola knew more than anyone else what IBM was doing.”
Motorola also absorbed external information by actively recruiting people from
IBM and from Sematech-related universities.  At Sematech, Motorola was deeply
immersed in the copper program.  In fact, the past two consecutive directors of
Sematech’s interconnect program were Motorola assignees.  Motorola’s relationship with
IBM and its strong involvement with Sematech helped the firm to adopt copper
technology rapidly, even relative to other Sematech member companies.
Motorola’s ability to be connected to outside research did not depend on
performing early-stage R&D (recall that the firm published only three articles on the
subject).  According to a Motorola employee, the company “operated in tactical mode” to
integrate external knowledge with its own talent.  But while it was clearly dependent on
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external technology, Motorola was also more open about sharing its knowledge than
IBM.  For example, Motorola worked jointly with suppliers from an early stage to
develop tools for copper technology.  A member of Motorola’s copper team remarked
that “unlike IBM, we are quite open with vendors.  There are vendors down there in the
fabs!  Most other companies would not allow it.”
Motorola’s relative openness — coupled with IBM’s secrecy — would eventually
make the firm an important source of information for the rest of the industry.  Table 2-3
shows that citations of Motorola’s copper patents rank second only to those of IBM.  And
Table 2-8 shows that the most highly cited patent on copper interconnect technology
belongs to Motorola.
Table 2-8: Patents Most Highly Cited by Copper Interconnect Patents (1960-1999)
Patent No Patent Assignee Title No of citations
to this patent
5391517 Motorola Process for forming copper interconnect structure 16
4810332 MCC* Method of making an electrical multilayer copper
interconnect
13
4985750 Fujitsu Semiconductor device using copper metallization. 12
4789648 IBM Method for producing coplanar multi-level
metal/insulator films on a substrate and for forming
patterned conductive lines simultaneously with stud
vias
11
4910169 Fujitsu Method of producing semiconductor device
[including copper]
10
4931410 Hitachi Process for producing semiconductor integrated
circuit device having copper interconnections and/or
wirings, and device produced
9
4944836 IBM Chem-mech polishing method for producing
coplanar metal/insulator films on a substrate
8
5225034 Micron Method of chemical mechanical polishing
predominantly copper containing metal layers in
semiconductor processing
7
5447599 Cornell & IBM Self-aligned process for capping copper lines 7
5071518 MCC* Method of making an electrical multilayer
interconnect [by electroplating Copper]
7
MCC* = Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corp. of Austin, Texas, an industrial research
consortium (http://www.mcc.com).
                                                                                                                                                
80 The material in this paragraph was obtained through interviews with Motorola and IBM.
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In summary, between 1989 and 1997, companies and universities re-explored the
path that IBM had shown, in turn developing their own variants based on the same basic
ideas.81  These borrowed ideas are true knowledge spillovers.  They account for why IBM
was so secretive, and at the same time produced research that was so highly cited.  The
ability to absorb spillovers was greatly enhanced for firms that had relationships with
Sematech, universities and IBM.  Sematech helped to fund crucial university research and
offered its members benchmarking data on equipment suppliers, access to data on IBM’s
copper technology and an advantageous position in recruiting talent from universities.  It
is no surprise that foreign firms who were barred from joining Sematech (such as NTT
and Hitachi) were slow to develop and adopt copper technology, even though they
performed early research on it.
At one level, these facts are consistent with stylized notions of absorptive capacity
(IBM performed fundamental research and captured knowledge spillovers).  But IBM did
not have to be open with its own research in order to keep up with university research.
And the success of Motorola, TI and AMD at capturing spillovers from universities and
other external sources were not predicated on their having to perform much of the early
research.
2.4.3.2 Knowledge Spillovers after 1997
IBM’s 1997 announcement of its copper technology triggered a race among other
firms to offer copper technology as well (Lineback, 1998; Dagastine, 1998).  This contest
radically changed the dynamics of knowledge-flow.  Firms could no longer rely on the
relatively slow process of converting academic knowledge into a commercial product.
Besides, some companies had already done so, including Motorola and the equipment
vendors.  Alliances and joint ventures formed rapidly between firms that wanted the
                                                
81 That these processes are sufficiently different in their details from IBM’s is evidenced by the fact that
other companies received patents (for which novelty is required) on their inventions.  Likewise, some
originality can be expected of research papers that qualify for publication.
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Table 2-9: Copper Alliances, Joint Ventures, and Acquisitions among Semiconductor Firms
Date Companies Nature of Alliance
Pre-
1988
NONE NONE
July
1998
AMD and Motorola Motorola licences its copper interconnect technology to AMD.  In
exchange, AMD licenses Motorola its flash memory processes.  This
seven-year deal includes the exchange of technology, sharing
development costs, and assigning employees to one another’s design
labs.  No money is exchanged.
July
1998
IBM & Sanyo In a five-year agreement, Sanyo licenses design methodology from
IBM, including ASIC and copper technology.  IBM will
manufacture the devices.
July
1998
Sun and TI TI will manufacture Sun’s UltraSparc III using copper in year 2000.
Mar.
1999
IBM and
Infineon (Siemens)
IBM gives Infineon access to copper technology (0.18 and 0.13
micron) for joint development of DRAMs.
Dec.
1998
IBM and Pacific
Electric Wire & Cable
IBM licensed its technology, including copper, to this new
Taiwanese foundry.
Mar.
1999
Lucent (AT&T) and
Chartered
Semiconductors,
Singapore
Lucent and Chartered agree to joint development of 0.18 micron
copper technology.
Feb.
1999
Motorola, Hewlett-
Packard and
Chartered
Motorola licensed its copper technology to a joint venture between
Chartered Semiconductor Singapore and Hewlett Packard (0.18
micron copper with low-k dielectrics).
Mar.
1999
UMC Taiwan and
Kawasaki LSI Japan
Strategic alliance to develop 0.18 micron copper technology with
copper and low-k dielectric.
Jan.
2000
UMC joins the
alliance between IBM
and Infineon
Joint development of 0.13 micron technology, including copper
interconnects.
NA Lucent-NEC Long-term agreement that includes copper interconnects
  Sources: News articles, company websites, and interviews.
70
Table 2-10: Copper Alliances, Joint Ventures, and Acquisitions Involving Suppliers
Date Companies Nature of Alliance
Companies and Equipment Suppliers
1997- Intel and Applied
Materials
Research on copper etch as an alternative to damascene (IEEE
Conference 1-3 June 1998)
July
1998
AMD & Applied
Materials
AMD ordered Applied Ion Metal Plasma technology to develop copper
interconnects
1998 AMD & CuTek Joint venture. Purpose unknown.
1999 TSMC and Applied
Materials
TSMC purchases AMAT copper-processing machine.
1999 UMC and the
Novellus Alliance
Collaborated on copper interconnect process.
Sematech and Equipment Suppliers
1993 Sematech and
Semitool
Sematech bought Semitool’s electroplating tool for experiments on
copper interconnects.
Sep.
1996
Sematech and Varian Sematech bought a PVD/CVD cluster tool for the Sematech project at
SUNY Albany.
May
1998
Sematech and
Applied Materials
Second phase of project to etch low-k materials for copper interconnects
1996 Sematech and CVC
(Rochester)
Developed copper deposition tool
Nov.
1997
Sematech and Lam
Research
Developed high-density oxide etch systems
Jan.
1999
Sematech and
Novellus
Sematech selected Novellus’ Sabre electrofill tool for its Advanced Tool
Development Facility.
Equipment Supplier Alliances
1997 Novellus and Varian
(thin-films division)
Novellus acquired Varian’s thin-films unit, thereby acquiring the PVD
expertise it used in developing tools with IBM.
May
1998
Novellus, Lam, IPEC
and OnTrak
Novellus announced partnerships with Lam and IPEC to provide a
complete copper solution.  Novellus offers an electrodeposition tool and
a PVD tool (for barrier and seed layers); IPEC is market leader in CMP.
Lam produces dielectric-etch systems, and Ontrak supplies post-CMP
cleaning systems.
Jan
1998
Semitool and Shipley Semitool partners with Shipley, a electronic chemicals company
Nov.
1998
Semitool and Ulvac,
Japan
Semitool (electrochemical deposition) partners with Ulvac (thin-film
deposition equipment)
1999 Semitool and ASM
(Netherlands)
Semitool (copper electrodeposition tools), forms an alliance with ASMI
(CVD tools for low-k dielectric).
Sources: News articles, company websites, and interviews.
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technology and firms with the expertise (see Tables 2-9, 2-10).82  Even IBM became less
secretive and began to seek ways to license or trade its technology.  Third-party
information traders also materialized, such as a company that began selling reverse-
engineering reports of IBM’s copper-based chips almost as soon as they were shipped.83
It is important to distinguish the relationships that involved “borrowed” ideas from
those that simply reflect inputs purchased below their actual costs (Griliches, 1992). The
alliances involving IBM probably should not be viewed as true spillovers, since IBM
must have expected reciprocal benefits.  Neither should the manufacturing alliances (e.g.,
Sun and TI).  However, technology-sharing alliances that did not involve IBM should be
considered true spillovers from IBM’s perspective (even though they are not externalities
among the alliance partners).  For example, the alliance between Motorola and AMD did
not involve payments by either party to IBM.84  As for the equipment suppliers, IBM
receives an unspecified royalty from Novellus with whom it jointly developed tools.85
However, IBM  receives no royalties from any of the other equipment suppliers,
including Applied Materials, Semitool, and Cutek. More important, equipment vendors
act as conduits through which much more information flows than is embodied in the tools
they sell.86  Hence, it is reasonable to consider knowledge flows from equipment vendors
as externalities, or as General Purpose Technologies (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995).
                                                
82 Note that no alliances existed prior to 1998, reinforcing the fact that the dynamics had shifted.
83 Integrated Circuit Engineering Report #SCA 9808-587 advertisement: “ICE Corp. is excited to
announce the immediate availability of a construction analysis report on the recently announced IBM
PowerPC 750 … This report represents one of the most detailed reports ICE has ever produced …”
(Source: ICE website.)
84 Semiconductor companies often exchange patents with one another (Hall and Ham, 1999).  IBM may
be able to appropriate some benefit through such ex-post bargaining, but it is difficult to monitor and
implement (which is why negotiations are for portfolios of patents rather than for specific
technologies).  Moreover, other firms also have strong patent positions, including Motorola, AMD, and
TI (see Table 2-6).  Their bargaining positions against IBM would, therefore, be strong.
85 According to IBM sources, this amount is low in relation to the benefits of being early to market.
86 This point was made to me by numerous interviewees.
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Perhaps the most viable of the alliances formed after 1997 was that between AMD
and Motorola.87  AMD had been very aggressive in developing its copper technology and
in May 1998 announced two test-chips (Wolfe 1998a).88  However, the firm needed to
accelerate its effort.  So, AMD signed a major agreement in July 1998 to trade its flash
memory technology for Motorola’s copper interconnect technology (Matsumoto 1998).
Motorola’s technology formed the basis for AMD’s new production facility in Germany,
which began producing samples of copper-based Athlon microprocessors at the end of
1999.89  The seven-year agreement also includes the joint-development of Motorola’s
next generation of copper technology.
Chartered Semiconductors, a chip foundry based in Singapore, also drew upon
Motorola’s expertise.  In 1999, Chartered licensed Motorola’s technology for a
manufacturing facility jointly owned by Chartered and Hewlett-Packard (see Table 2-9).
Chartered’s dependence on Motorola technology accounts for the fact that its patents
make a large number of references to Motorola’s patents (see Table 2-2).  Also in 1999,
Chartered signed an agreement with Lucent Technologies for joint development of
copper interconnect technology. 90
Chartered also has depended upon knowledge from universities in Singapore.  It
funded several students at these institutions who conducted research on copper
interconnects and who, upon completion of their studies, were obliged to join the
company.  The knowledge from Motorola, Lucent, and the universities will help
                                                
87 As shown in Table 2-1, Motorola was only 1 year behind IBM at shipping copper-based chips.  AMD
was less than 2 years behind IBM.
88 AMD’s copper program began around 1995 and grew very rapidly.  Interestingly, it hired C. Ting who
had previously worked at IBM, Intel and Sematech, as evidenced by the fact that Ting is listed as an
inventor in one of AMD’s patents  (see U.S. patent No. 5969422).  Ting eventually left to form his
own equipment company focussing on copper interconnects (see the founder’s biography at
http://www.cutek.com).
89 Volume shipment will begin in mid-2000.  These chips will compete with Intel’s Pentium III chips
(see Cataldo, 2000).  Motorola eventually took an equity stake in AMD’s copper fabrication plant
(EETimes, September 20, 1999).
90 The agreements with Motorola and Lucent are for different applications, and are managed separately
within Chartered in order to protect the intellectual property of each partner.
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Chartered ship its first copper products in 2001, only four years after commencing
R&D.91
The Taiwanese chip foundries (TSMC and UMC) adopted copper interconnect
technology with the greatest speed.92  Both began copper R&D programs in mid-1998
and, at the end of 1999, shipped IC chips with the top two metal layers made from
copper.93  According to my interviews, TSMC and UMC depended primarily on technical
knowledge from equipment suppliers.94,95  TSMC worked closely with Applied Materials,
while UMC was one of first customers of Novellus (which had jointly developed tools
with IBM).96  According to one interviewee, “Taiwanese [semiconductor firms] bring
everything up and co-develop technology with vendors.  This way they minimize risk
because they have no early-stage [sic] research.”
There are several other similarities between TSMC and UMC.  Both recruited
highly trained personnel, including people who received their graduate-level education at
top universities in Taiwan and the United States; some had also worked at U.S.
companies.  Yet, neither firm perceived a direct relationship between university research
and their copper projects.97  One interviewee characterized university research as being
in the literature [and] available for years.  It’s helpful, but they are pure research — basic,
fundamental studies.  But to make things work is really different [sic].
                                                
91 Chartered also relied on samples and tools obtained from equipment vendors and on process-
integration consultants with previous copper experience.
92 VLSI Technology, a U.S. foundry, followed the same rapid adoption pattern and also shipped IC chips
with two-level copper interconnects around the same time as UMC and TSMC.
93 IBM and Motorola use six layers of copper.  By 2000, UMC and TSMC will be offering six-layer
copper interconnects as well.
94 Researchers at VLSI tell a similar story of how they depended mainly on equipment suppliers for
technical knowledge.
95 In January 2000, UMC joined an alliance with IBM Microelectronics and Infineon (Siemens) to co-
develop process technology (including copper) for 0.13 micron chips (Clarke 2000).  However, this
was after UMC had developed in-house capabilities and shipped copper products by the end of 1999.
96 UMC’s relationship with Novellus is reported in a UMC press release dated 12 April, 1999.
97 UMC funds the UMC Chair Professorship in the Department of Electrical Engineering, National Chiao
Tung University.  In November 1999, UMC became the first foreign member of the Semiconductor
Research Corporation (SRC).  Also in 1999, TSMC joined Sematech and began collaborating with
MIT.  By then, both companies had already developed their copper capabilities.  They look towards
these relationships for future knowledge on interconnects and in other areas.
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Another interesting similarity is that while the copper development teams at both
companies had highly talented people, they did not include individuals with extensive
prior experience with copper interconnects. Because much of the technical knowledge
came from equipment suppliers, the primary role of internal teams was to integrate the
knowledge of suppliers into their manufacturing processes.
TSMC and UMC are only the first in a larger wave of companies that depend
primarily on equipment vendors.  How do these equipment companies, which perform
little R&D, absorb external knowledge?98  While Novellus certainly benefited from its
work with IBM, that alone was not sufficient.  Novellus drew upon another important
source of external knowledge: in 1997, it acquired PVD capability by purchasing Varian
Associates’ thin-films division. 99  Varian had been the main supplier for the Sematech-
funded copper project at SUNY Albany. 100  Novellus provides an interesting example of
how absorptive capacity can be enhanced through a technological acquisition.
As for Applied Materials, it claims that its primary source of knowledge was
“working with customers,” which include Motorola, AMD, Intel, and Fujitsu. 101  Apart
from maintaining relationships with customers, equipment vendors also built strong ties
with universities.  Applied Materials funds $1 million a year of research at universities.
Novellus is a member of the SRC and also has a board member who is an MIT
professor.102  According to several equipment companies, the primary benefit of such
relationships is the opportunity to recruit top-notch graduate students who are assigned to
                                                
98 Even the largest equipment vendor, Applied Materials, does not have a central R&D laboratory.  While
a central group develops common platforms for its business groups, it is not a traditional “central
R&D” facility that performs a great deal of research.  R&D is financed and performed mainly by
business units.  An interview with a manager revealed that the business units spend 5% of their budget
on “basic” research, but only in areas where there is a strong chance it will generate commercial
products in the future.
99 PVD is used to deposit the seed and barrier layers in a damascene process.
100 Source: BusinessWire, Sept. 12, 1996,  p. 9120025.
101 I constructed this partial list of Applied’s customers from news reports and co-authored articles on
copper interconnects presented at technical conferences.
102 I obtained information about the Novellus board from the firm’s 1999 Annual Report.
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the early stage of development projects, bringing with them a wealth of scientific
expertise.
The equipment companies play an increasing role in transferring knowledge from
early developers (IBM, Motorola) to later adopters (e.g., TSMC, UMC).  This is a
difficult task because each piece of equipment is only a small part of the overall puzzle of
putting together a copper process. To fill the void in their knowledge, equipment
companies have coalesced into alliances that provide complete solutions.  The first such
alliance was created in 1998 by Novellus, Lam Research, IPEC, and Ontrak (see Table 2-
10).103  It was followed by another alliance led by Semitool.  The exception to this pattern
of alliances is Applied Materials, which is large and horizontally integrated.  In 1998, the
firm began offering an integrated set of tools for copper interconnects.104  It also opened a
service center where customers can “test-drive” this technology.
As a result of the work by equipment companies, much of the technical knowledge
had become “unstuck” (von Hippel, 1994) by the end of 1999.  Adoption has since begun
to depend on other issues, such as how to organize a facility to avoid copper
contamination and whether to invest in a new facility or deploy copper technology into an
existing facility.
2.5 Discussion
In Section 2.5.1, I discuss other factors that may have influenced the costs and
benefits of adoption, and how this affects the interpretation of the results.  In Section
2.5.2, I explore why IBM pursued copper interconnect R&D despite the rapid rate of
spillovers, and why it published its research.  And in Section 2.5.3, I discuss IBM’s
approach to capturing spillovers at the disciplinary level, as opposed to at the domain-
specific level.
                                                
103 Source: BusinessWire, May 28, 1998, p5280060.  (see also http://www.novellus.com).
104 Source: Company press release dated Nov. 3, 1998.
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2.5.1 Other Factors that Affected Adoption
There are two “dependent” variables in my analysis: the date on which firms
shipped their first products, and the duration from the start of their R&D to that shipment
date (see Table 2-1).  However, unobserved factors could have influenced the costs and
benefits of adoption.  This affects the comparison between firms with and without prior
R&D.  Specifically, firms with prior R&D may have chosen not to adopt copper
technology due to different anticipated costs and benefits, rather than being unable to
absorb spillovers as quickly.
Heterogeneity in adoption costs is unlikely to be significant.  Semiconductor
companies all buy equipment and raw materials from the same handful of suppliers, and
the only commercial option right now is damascene electroplating.  However, firms are
likely to have different expected benefits.  Certain segments of the market that demand
high-performance and low power-consumption are likely to see earlier adoption, such as
microprocessors (AMD, Motorola, IBM) and portable telecommunications devices
(Motorola, TI).  In addition, the chip foundries (TSMC, UMC, VLSI and Chartered) had
strong reasons to adopt copper technology because IBM Microelectronics is now an
aggressive competitor in the foundry business.
However, anticipated benefits alone cannot explain why several companies such as
Lucent, NEC, Hitachi, and Intel were slower to adopt copper technology.  These
companies also compete in the product spaces with high expected benefits.105  Intel
claims that it decided not to adopt copper technology until 2002 because it has developed
other ways of achieving the same performance using aluminum interconnects with low-k
dielectrics (McGrath, 1998).  But other companies (IBM, Motorola, and TI) have already
created prototype chips that incorporate both copper and low-k dielectrics, so choosing
                                                
105 Intel is the world’s leading microprocessor company. Hitachi and NEC produce mainframe computers.
NEC and Lucent compete in telecommunications (including the mobile market).
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one over the other isn’t necessarily a tradeoff. 106  It is revealing that Intel was on the list
of companies to which IBM prevented Novellus from selling.107  And it is hard to
imagine that copper technology would not help Intel as the race to build better
microprocessors intensifies.108
There are other reasons to doubt that the benefits of adoption were much lower for
companies like Intel, Lucent, Hitachi, and NEC. The fast adoption of a new technology
— particularly in the semiconductor industry — allows a firm to descend the learning
curve quickly (Spence 1984).  This is a main reason for the intensity of the race to adopt
copper after 1997.  Shortly after IBM’s announcement, a news article quoted the manager
of interconnects at Texas Instruments:  “Everybody wants to be second, after IBM …
Nobody is going to get caught out on this” (Lammers, 1997).
Although unlikely, it remains possible that some firms chose not to adopt copper
rapidly for other reasons, even though they had performed related R&D.  Therefore, it is
difficult to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of internal R&D relative to other
means of developing absorptive capacity.
Regardless of the costs and benefits of adoption, one must still account for how
firms such as Motorola, AMD, and the foundries captured spillovers rapidly from IBM
and academia without performing much prior R&D.  In other words, unobserved costs
and benefits do not explain the early shipment dates of these firms relative to IBM.  Here,
the results are stronger: in the previous section I show that the ability of firms to absorb
spillovers rapidly was facilitated by their connectedness to external sources of technical
knowledge.
                                                
106 On IBM’s copper plus low-k dielectric, see Markoff (2000).  On Motorola’s efforts, see Wils on
(1999).
107 This fact is well-known within the semiconductor industry.  However, Intel has been working with
Applied Materials to develop its own copper technology (e.g., see Koch et al., 1999).
108 In late-1999, AMD became the first company in history to unveil microprocessors for personal
computers that were faster than Intel’s.  In January 2000, Transmeta began production of an extremely
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2.5.2 Why did IBM innovate and why did the Firm Publish?
In view of the rapid spillovers, why did IBM bother to invest in copper interconnect
research over three decades?  Through a variety of means described below, IBM could
appropriate (or expected to appropriate) some of the returns from innovation.  While the
firm will capture less than the value it created, this does not conflict with theory.  Nelson
and Arrow do not suggest that firms faced with spillovers would invest nothing, only that
they would invest less than is socially optimal.
When IBM initially began investing in copper technology during the 1960s, the
company had expected to use copper in the mainframe computers market, for which its
expected appropriability was high.  IBM had initially intended copper for super-fast
bipolar devices in mainframes.109  Such devices operate very high current loads that place
great demands on interconnects. This was (and continues to be) a market in which IBM
held the dominant position and enjoyed high margins.
In the early 1990s, IBM researchers realized that CMOS technology — which
dissipates less heat and is less demanding on interconnects — would overtake bipolar.
Having lost the initial motivation to pursue copper and faced with IBM’s financial
distress at the time, senior managers drastically scaled back the copper project.  It
survived for about a year as a “skunk-work” project within the organization.
One year later, the project was picked up by a new internal customer, IBM
Microelectronics, which realized that copper interconnects would be needed for CMOS
sooner than expected. Unlike for the mainframe market, IBM’s expected lead from
CMOS would be more transitory.  So, IBM Microelectronics invested aggressively to
                                                                                                                                                
low-powered processor for mobile internet computers built using IBM’s copper technology (source:
http://www.transmeta.com).
109 Material from this paragraph was obtained from the IBM Think  magazine article, the IBM R&D
Magazine article, the EETimes special issue, and interviews with IBM employees.
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make the process cost-competitive by switching from polyimide to silicon dioxide as the
dielectric material and moving from single to dual damascene.
The firm eventually obtained a lead of one to two years in the marketplace —
significant in the fast-paced semiconductor industry.  This lead allowed IBM to ship more
than a million copper chips ahead of its competitors.110  More important, IBM is ahead of
its competitors on the learning curve and has the highest process yields using copper.111
Being first to market also brought other benefits: it boosted IBM’s market visibility and
demand for its products.  IBM has also begun to exploit economies of scope, extending
the use of copper technology into other areas such as servers and mainframes and
successfully combining copper with low-k dielectrics and silicon-germanium
technology. 112
IBM is also attempting to capture indirect benefits.  According to my interviews,
several IBM employees realized in the mid-1990s that the company would benefit from
lower equipment costs if the rest of the industry also adopted copper technology. 113  This
is consistent with the literature on the strategic sharing of information. 114  In line with
this, IBM relied on an external supplier for the equipment (Novellus) and later relaxed its
secrecy to a degree.  Although it continues to guard sensitive process information, IBM
has also begun to share its copper technology with other companies, including Siemens
(Infineon), Sanyo, and a startup foundry in Taiwan (see Table 2-9).  It is important to
point out, though, that this strategy of sharing technology was only feasible once IBM
had established itself as the leader.  Otherwise, another firm might have exploited the
knowledge to beat IBM to market.
                                                
110 Source: IBM Press Release, Sept. 23, 1999.
111 According to industry interviews, IBM is the only company with yields from its copper process
approaching that of aluminum.  The electrical properties of the copper exceed those of aluminum.
112 Sources: CNN, Dec. 3, 1999; The New York Times, April 3, 2000.
113 IBM represents a small share of the equipment industry’s production capacity.  The firm wants to
spread out the fixed costs of equipment suppliers over more units sold.
114 Firms may deliberately  share knowledge if this increases the demand for their products (Harhoff,
1996).  According to Gawer (2000), Intel invests in R&D activities that they willingly share with other
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A separate but equally intriguing question is why IBM published at all in the open
literature.  After all, these publications were useful to other researchers who were trying
to retrace IBM’s footsteps.  According to researchers at IBM and elsewhere, IBM chose
to publish general ideas but kept valuable process-specific information and recipes
proprietary: “IBM shared information that didn't fall into their crown jewel
capability.”115
IBM’s approach to publication explains why IBM refrained from patenting till the
mid-1990s, since patenting entails heavy disclosure requirements.  However, if IBM
hadn’t allowed anything to be published at all, it would have had difficulty getting
talented individuals to work on the project.116  Also, many innovations (e.g., damascene,
CMP) were developed within IBM but outside the copper group.  To keep everything
under wraps probably would have required a firm-wide policy of non-publication.
Finally, the emergence of publications by academics after 1989 may have acted as a
catalyst.117  In other words, had IBM not published its work, someone else would have
done so.  According to one professor, “With copper or damascene, when we publish
something, IBM starts to publish also.”  This pattern of behavior could account for why
IBM’s publication rate increased in the 1990s, after universities and other firms also
began to publish (see Table 2-5).
2.5.3 IBM’s Dependence on Disciplinary Spillovers
In contrast to other companies and in line with its efforts to preserve secrecy,
IBM’s efforts to develop copper interconnect technology depended very much on
internal knowledge.  As Table 2-2 shows, IBM’s copper patents cite the company’s own
patents more than they cite patents from any other organization.  This is consistent even if
                                                                                                                                                
firms, in the hope that those firms develop complementary products, thereby increasing the demand for
Intel’s products.
115 Source: Interview with an academic researcher.
116 In other words, the Stern (1999) “premium” would have been high.
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we only count citations to patents related to copper interconnects (see Table 2-3).
Likewise, the citations made by IBM patents to the scientific literature make the largest
number of references to articles published by IBM (see Table 2-4).  This is unsurprising,
since IBM’s Watson Laboratories did much of the fundamental research on copper
interconnects.
If IBM depended at all on external knowledge, it was at a broad, disciplinary level,
rather than for knowledge specific to copper interconnect technology.  Interviewees at
IBM emphasized the company’s primary policy of recruiting top-notch researchers
directly from graduate programs and allowing them to pursue interesting problems at
IBM, rather than hiring people with domain-specific knowledge.  In fact, IBM’s Watson
Laboratories has never hired anyone to work on its copper R&D who had previously
worked on copper at other firms, or had written a Ph.D. thesis on the topic.118  Rather,
IBM’s copper project depended upon internal sources of technical knowledge: IBM
employees who had helped create the damascene process and CMP technology,
electrochemists familiar with electrodeposition for chip-packaging, a physicist who
developed the barrier layer, materials scientists who understood corrosion and device-
failure, and in-house process integration experts.119
2.6 Conclusions
The case of copper interconnects offers a rare glimpse into the process of
knowledge spillovers, one that is much talked about but seldom observed up close.  The
case shows that the mechanisms of absorptive capacity are more complex than the
literature has suggested.
                                                                                                                                                
117 This was suggested to me by an academic researcher who worked on copper interconnects.
118 Unlike the Watson Laboratories that does fundamental research, IBM’s development team hired one
person who had completed a Ph.D. thesis on copper interconnects around 1994. (Source: interviews
and analysis of Dissertation Abstracts Online).
119 The team did not include people who had worked on aluminum-copper interconnects, which is not
directly related.  This further supports the point that copper depended upon different skills.
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To a first order, absorptive capacity depends on both a firm’s internal R&D and its
connectedness to external technical knowledge.  There are many ways of achieving
connectedness, with other means being at least as effective as internal R&D.  These
include relationships with universities, research consortia, and other companies that
possess relevant technology.
This case further illustrates that the openness of a firm’s research environment may
not be necessary for connectedness (as with IBM).  And it suggests that different kinds of
absorptive capacity exist.  Specifically, investments in internal R&D may improve the
absorption of disciplinary knowledge, while other methods may be more useful for
absorbing domain-specific knowledge.
One implication of this view is that while prior R&D may increase a firm’s
absorptive capacity, the multitude of alternatives makes it difficult to overcome
externalities.  Unless many firms choose to perform R&D rather than using alternative
means for acquiring absorptive capacity, the aggregate amount of R&D invested by all
firms is unlikely to be sufficient to overcome the underinvestment problem caused by
spillovers.  Another implication is that it is extremely hard to contain spillovers.  Because
there are so many ways of achieving connectedness, blocking one path may simply
encourage firms to try another.  This is consonant with prior research showing that
technological knowledge diffuses very rapidly (Mansfield, 1985).120
There is a need for future research to explore whether the insights from this study
hold outside the semiconductor industry.  Further investigation is needed as well to
understand the relative effectiveness of internal research versus other means for acquiring
absorptive capacity.  Research is also needed on the relationship between absorptive
capacity and financial outcomes.  And most important, we must learn why some firms are
                                                
120 Mansfield (1985) reports that product innovations are generally in the hands of rivals within a year and
that process innovations (except for chemical processes) leak out within 15 months.
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better connected than others are — and how this is explained by economic, social and
institutional factors.
84
Appendix 2-A: Construction of Data Set
U.S. Patents
I obtained patents awarded by the U.S. Patent and Trademarks office between
January 1976 and December 1999 relating to copper interconnects (U.S. patent data is
available in electronic format only for this period).  I searched the database for:
(1) All patents with titles and abstracts containing the keywords (“cu” or “copper”) and
“intercon* 121.”
(2) All patents with titles and abstracts containing the keywords “damascene.”
(3) Patents in the two main semiconductor patent classes (257 and 438) containing the
keyword “copper.”
I downloaded each of these patents and manually identified those directly related to
copper interconnects, based on each patent’s title and abstract.122  Where ambiguity
arose, I consulted the “background” section of the patent, which clearly describes the
patent’s purpose.  I then downloaded and similarly coded the references made by these
patents to other U.S. patents, repeating the process repeated two additional times to
ensure that I obtained practically all the patents relating to copper interconnect.
The final database contains 2440 patents, of which only 216 are directly related to
copper interconnects.  Of those remaining, 159 patents involve interconnect technology
not specific to copper and another 283 involve copper processing techniques not specific
to interconnects.  Some of these may have an indirect relationship to copper interconnect
technology, but were eliminated from the analysis as a conservative measure.123  Another
group of patents were safely eliminated, including 62 patents for damascene processes
                                                
121 When used in a search, an asterisk (*) acts as a wildcard that matches one or more characters.
122 These are based on the “relevant” skills identified in section 3.3.  My field interviews, attendance at
technical conferences, and engineering background provided technical knowledge that was immensely
helpful in identifying patents and publications directly related to copper interconnect technology.
123 I underestimate the number of patents awarded to each firm, but the bias should not be great.  By
industry estimates, IBM has about 50 patents issued or pending dealing with copper technology
(Newsbytes, 13 Jan. 1998).  For this paper, I traced 37 IBM patents directly related to copper
technology.
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that do not use copper, 54 patents for traditional aluminum interconnects, and 48 patents
for aluminum-copper interconnects (which are an extension of the aluminum process).
The other 1618 patents were completely unrelated to on-chip interconnects,124 reflecting
the breadth of the search and the presence of patents cited by copper interconnect patents
that are not themselves related to copper interconnects.
I identified the organization that owns each patent using its “assignee” field.  I then
generated a cross-reference of citations by patents on copper interconnects to all other
U.S. patents. To provide an exhaustive analysis, I include all cited patents as far back as
1960.  I looked up patents prior to 1976 in the Patent Gazettes printed by the U.S. Patent
Office, as these are unavailable in electronic form.
The next step was to create a cross-reference of the scientific publications cited by
each copper interconnect patent. To do so, I obtained the address of the first author of
each cited publication from the Science Citation Index, Compendex, INSPEC, and the
IEEE Online Library. 125  I then constructed a matrix showing the sources of scientific
publications cited by each organization’s patents.
Publications
I searched the Science Citation Index (SCI) for all scientific publications with titles
containing “Copper*” or “Cu” and at least one of the following keywords:
· intercon*
· metalliz*
· ULSI
· VLSI
                                                
124 These included patents for creating copper connections between integrated circuits and the packages in
which they are mounted, printed circuit board connections, solar cells, superconductors, heat sinks,
heat pumps, components for electric motors, electric power transmission, electroconductive paints, etc.
125 It was necessary to use numerous databases, as each source covers different journals and conferences.
The SCI has an excellent coverage of scientific journals, while Compendex and INSPEC have better
coverage of engineering journals.  I used the IEEE library to find papers presented at conferences not
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· damascene
· etch
· planari*
· CMP
· barrier
· deposition
· PVD
· CVD
The search produced 1017 publications between 1985 and 1997.  I then manually
identified those related directly to copper interconnect technology, based on their titles.
Of the 1017 publications, only 502 were directly related to copper interconnects.126  I
then eliminated all meeting abstracts, review articles, notes, and letters to obtain a final
sample of 413 original research articles.
I mapped each article to companies and public-sector research organizations, based
on the address field of its authors.  The SCI records up to 255 authors per publication.
Unfortunately, it does not indicate which authors are associated with each address.  Thus,
I adopt the following convention: for each distinct address listed in an article, I increment
by one the number of articles published by that organization. The rationale is that each
publication involves costly research plus the opportunity cost of writing and revising the
                                                                                                                                                
covered by the other databases.  With the exception of the SCI, these databases include only the
affiliations of the first author.
126 The remaining publications consisted of 47 articles on aluminum-copper interconnects, 89 articles on
copper films not specific to interconnects, and 379 articles in unrelated areas (e.g., general copper
chemistry, copper printed circuit boards, geological copper deposits, and superconducting alloys
containing copper).
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paper.  This approach counts articles that are co-authored among organizations multiple
times, but this should not be a severe problem: only 32 articles in the sample were co-
authored among organizations.
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Chapter 3: 
The Concentration of Basic and Applied Research In the
Semiconductor and Pharmaceutical Industries: Implications
for Theories of Knowledge Spillovers
This chapter estimates the concentration of basic and applied research relative to
innovation in the semiconductor and pharmaceutical industries (1985-1997) using
publication and patent data.  In the pharmaceutical industry, basic research and
innovation are equally widespread.  However, in the semiconductor industry, basic
research is concentrated in only a few firms, although innovation is widespread.  I
interpret this to mean that many semiconductor firms capture knowledge spillovers
without performing much basic research.  The alternative explanation is that many
semiconductor firms are not capturing spillovers, but are more productive at R&D
instead.  This is unlikely: researchers at these firms co-author papers with academics at a
very high rate.
3.1 Introduction
To what extent is research activity concentrated in only a few firms in an industry,
relative to overall innovation in that industry?  More specifically, are there differences
between basic and applied research with respect to their concentration relative to
innovation?  A gap between research activity and innovation could arise because some
firms are more productive than others in translating research into innovations, or because
some firms are more successful than others at capturing knowledge spillovers.127  Hence,
studying this gap may inform our understanding of how spillovers are related to basic and
applied research.
                                                
127 In this paper, “spillovers” include knowledge obtained from other companies, academic institutions,
industry consortia, and government research laboratories.
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In this chapter, I estimate the concentration of both basic research and applied
research, relative to innovation, for the semiconductor and pharmaceutical industries.
Basic research in the semiconductor industry includes efforts to understand the physics of
solid-state devices and the chemical reactions used to fabricate integrated circuits.128  For
pharmaceuticals, basic research explores the bio-molecular and genetic mechanisms of
diseases associated with rational drug design (Cockburn et al., 1999).
I measure basic and applied research output using the number of scientific articles
published by each company; I measure innovation using patent counts.  I find that a
surprisingly large number of innovations in the semiconductor industry emerge from
companies that perform little basic research.  In the pharmaceutical industry, however,
basic research is not concentrated relative to innovation.  In both industries, the
concentration of applied research is similar to that of innovation.  The results are robust
to several alternative measures of “applied” versus “basic” research (see Appendix 3-B).
While other explanations are possible, one likely interpretation of these results is
that firms in the semiconductor industry are able to capture spillovers without performing
a great deal of basic research.  Instead, they rely on other means, including by funding
basic research at universities, co-authoring papers with academics, inviting external
researchers to join their scientific advisory boards, and hiring graduating Ph.D. students
from leading schools.
The main alternative explanation for these results is that firms that did little basic
research, while not capturing spillovers, were more productive at innovation.  However,
this explanation is unlikely to hold — for two reasons.  The practice of co-authoring
papers with academic institutions is as widespread as innovation.  Isn’t it likely that
knowledge is exchanged in the intimate meetings of minds required to co-author papers?
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Further, there is a plethora of previous research showing that spillovers are significant in
both of these industries.129  Nonetheless, other interpretations of these results are
possible, and will need to be further investigated.
Another empirical regularity observed is that the gap between basic research and
innovation in the semiconductor industry narrowed considerably between 1985 and 1997.
These may have been the result of financial difficulties at IBM and AT&T, which
triggered these firms to reduce the amount of basic research they performed (see section
3.6.3).  For pharmaceuticals, the decline in the concentration of basic research relative to
innovation over the same period is probably due to the corporate mergers that occurred
during the period studied.
This chapter makes several contributions to the literature on innovation.  It presents
the first estimates for the concentration of basic and applied research relative to
innovation using a comparable methodology across industries.  It introduces new
bibliometric techniques for measuring scientific research.  It presents a novel application
of the Ellison-Glaeser index of relative concentration.  And it extends the empirical
literature on “absorptive capacity” beyond drug discovery.
In the next section, I discuss the relationship between a firm’s internal research and
its innovation.  Section 3.3 presents a methodology for measuring the concentration of
research relative to innovation and Section 3.4 describes the data used.  Section 3.5
presents the results, robustness checks, and the limitations of this study.  Section 3.6
discusses the results; Section 3.7 concludes.
                                                                                                                                                
128 “Basicness” is a relative concept.  The theory of how transistors work is “basic” relative to its
manufacture, but “applied” relative to quantum physics, which provides the scientific foundations for
understanding how it works.
129 Levin and Reiss (1988, Table 6) found that the semiconductor and pharmaceutical industries have
among the highest elasticities of product and process R&D with respect to spillovers.  Tilton (1971),
Mowery (1983) and Appleyard (1996) describe the high level of spillovers in the semiconductor
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3.2 The Economics of Scientific Research and Innovation
What determines the relationship between a firm’s research effort and its ability to
innovate?  Notwithstanding empirical issues, there is evidence that a firm’s research
effort, when combined with conventional inputs, increases its productivity (Griliches,
1980; Hall, 1996).  This is true not only for applied research, but for basic research as
well (Griliches, 1986; Mansfield, 1981).  According to Rosenberg (1990), a firm that
performs basic research may benefit from first-mover advantage, unexpected innovations
arising from the research, credibility in contests for government contracts, an improved
ability to select areas of applied research, and an improved ability to evaluate the
outcome of applied research. 130
Despite the potential benefits, firms may be reluctant to invest in basic or applied
research.  This is because the knowledge produced by R&D is a public good (Nelson,
1959; Arrow 1962).  Knowledge spills easily from innovating firms to other firms that
can free ride on the efforts of the innovators.  This problem is likely to be more serious
for basic rather than applied research, as its anticipated appropriability is lower.131  This
concern led Vannevar Bush (1945) to advocate for government funding of basic research.
The public-goods nature of R&D complicates the relationship between a firm’s
R&D and innovative ability, since firms may also benefit from external research.
Moreover, Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) suggest that firms may need to invest in
their own R&D to effectively absorb knowledge spillovers.  This implies a positive
                                                                                                                                                
industry.  Spillovers are also important for drug discovery (see Cockburn and Henderson, 1998, and
the references therein).
130 To this list, we might add the desire of firms to influence governments and consumers with respect to
product safety or efficacy.  For example, tobacco companies have spent millions of dollars on research
to show that smoking is not harmful.  Firms may also invest in R&D to gain goodwill or political
capital.
131 A firm’s appropriability from innovation is also affected by its size and access to complementary
assets (Levin, et al., 1987; Teece, 1987).
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interaction between a firm’s own R&D and spillovers.132  As described in the previous
chapter (section 2.2), empirical research supports this hypothesis.
Unfortunately, the literature on absorptive capacity does not deal satisfactorily with
the optimal mix among basic and applied research needed to capture spillovers.  The
question remains: how much basic (rather than applied) research must a firm perform to
benefit from spillovers?  Existing theories assume that some element of basic research is
necessary.  These theories are often based on the notion that knowledge is tacit and that
one has to be involved in an activity to understand or exploit that knowledge (Nonaka,
1994; Leonard-Barton, 1995, chap. 6).  Cohen and Levinthal (1990) speculate that “firms
may conduct basic research less for particular results than to be able to provide
themselves with the general background knowledge” that would help them exploit
technological advances more effectively (1990, p. 148).  Hence, “as a firm’s
technological progress becomes more closely tied to advances in basic science (as has
been the case in pharmaceuticals), a firm will increase its basic research, whatever its
degree of product-market diversification”.133
Research on the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries offers the best
support for the view that firms must perform basic research to capture spillovers.
Gambardella (1992) shows that pharmaceutical firms that perform basic research produce
more patents.134  He points out that “the winning models of the U.S. pharmaceutical
industry during the 1980s were firms like Merck, which organized their internal research
like academic departments” (1992, p. 404).  Cockburn and Henderson (1998) found that
drug discovery firms with a strong research orientation produced a greater number of
important patents.  Successful firms decentralized decision-making on the allocation of
                                                
132 In contrast, Levin and Reiss (1988) do not assume that a firm’s research interacts with knowledge
spillovers to increase productivity.  They propose that if a firm's own R&D and that of its rivals are
strategic complements, an increase in spillovers might actually increase each firm's R&D expenditure.
133 Unfortunately, Cohen and Levinthal had no data on the composition of basic versus applied research
for each firm, and so could not test their theory in its nuanced form.
134 However, it is inconclusive from this study whether research-intensive firms produced more patents
because they are better at capturing spillovers or because they have higher research productivity.
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R&D resources and promoted scientists based on their publications in the open literature.
Zucker and Darby (1995) reported that star135 scientists had a large positive impact on the
research productivity of biotechnology firms.
The close link between basic research and drug discovery arises because basic
research allows a firm to hire high-quality researchers and to be “actively connected to
the wider scientific community” (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998, p. 158).  This raises
the interesting question of whether membership into the scientific elite increases
continuously with R&D expenditure, or whether it is the same for all firms who spend
beyond a threshold amount on R&D (which represents a “membership fee”).
Outside the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, there are no conclusive
studies showing that basic research helps firms capture spillovers.  Indeed, the
relationship between science and spillovers is highly complex, and varies across time and
between technologies (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989, pp.147).  Anecdotal evidence
exists in both directions, suggesting the need to explore this issue further.  Whereas some
companies, such as IBM, have a reputation for successfully exploiting basic research,
others — including Apple, Sun, and Microsoft136 — have been said to capture spillovers
from competitors and academia without conducting much basic research.
3.3 Empirical Methodology
The discussion in the previous section can be summarized as an indication that a
firm’s output of innovation, fi(), depends directly on the productivity of its basic and
applied research, and indirectly on knowledge spillovers through absorptive capacity.
More formally:
),,()*),,(,,( iiiiiiiiiiiii XABCXABAbCapABf -=P -s
                                                
135 “Star” scientists produce many papers, are highly cited, and collaborate heavily in public science.
136 Sun capitalized on the RISC architecture developed by IBM and leading universities; Apple adapted
the windows-based interface from Xerox PARC; in its early days, Microsoft developed the dominant
PC operating system based on concepts developed at leading academic institutions.  Each of these
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where Õi = firm i’s returns from innovation,
fi() = firm i’s innovative output,
Ci(.) = firm i’s costs,
Bi, Ai = firm i’s investment basic and applied research, which are functions of E(Pi),
Xi = firm i’s alternative instruments for developing absorptive capacity, (e.g. hiring
newly graduated Ph.D.s, funding university research, co-authoring papers with
academics, and inviting external researchers to join its scientific advisory
board.)
Abcapi = firm i’s absorptive capacity, and
s-i = spillovers from outside firm i.
In this formulation, Abcapi refers to a firm’s ability to evaluate and internalize
outside knowledge, while fi() refers to its productivity in utilizing knowledge.137  The
main estimation problem here is that absorptive capacity (Abcapi) is inherently difficult
for a researcher to observe or quantify.  Likewise, spillovers are difficult to measure.
Another problem is that a firm’s investments in basic and applied research (Bi, Ai) depend
endogenously on anticipated benefits, E(Pi).
However, under special conditions stipulated below, it is possible to infer how
absorptive capacity depends on basic and applied research by comparing the
concentration of Bi and Ai with that of fi.
Suppose we choose an industry with high spillovers ( åsi >> 0 ), in which there is
heterogeneity among firms in the benefits they anticipate from performing research.  In
such an industry, some firms would invest in basic and applied research as a means of
acquiring absorptive capacity, while others would invest in alternative instruments, Xi.
Suppose we observe that innovative output is concentrated in the firms that perform a
great deal of basic research, which implies a positive relationship between basic research
                                                                                                                                                
companies performs little basic research.  Only recently did Microsoft seriously begin to invest in basic
research (“Software’s Ultimate Sandbox”, Technology Review, Jan-Feb 1999, pp. 44-51).
137 Arora and Gambardella (1994) propose another model using similar concepts, and come up with
interesting predictions for the number of projects a firm undertakes and its propensity to form strategic
alliances.
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and innovation.  But we cannot distinguish whether this relationship is due to the direct
productivity effect or the indirect effect of spillovers.  The same reasoning applies for
applied research.  This equivalence among the observed variables is proven as
Proposition 1 in Ellison and Glaeser (1997).
Now, consider the special case of a high-spillover industry in which many firms
produce innovations, but do not perform much basic research (an analogous explanation
holds for applied research).  In this case, a possible reason why they do not perform much
basic research is that doing so is not necessary for capturing spillovers.  Of course, the
alternative explanation is that firms which do not perform much research are not
capturing spillovers, but rather are highly productive at translating internal research into
innovations.138  To minimize this likelihood, one must show that these firms are, in fact,
capturing spillovers — which, in this thesis, is demonstrated by showing the widespread
practice among these companies of co-authoring papers with researchers at universities
and government laboratories.139  Surely, knowledge is exchanged between co-authors in
this process. In addition, other researchers have shown that the semiconductor and
pharmaceutical industries exhibit high spillovers.140
Calculating the concentration of research relative to innovation should be seen as
complementary to traditional regression analysis.  Whereas performing a regression
measures the strength of the relationship between innovation and research, this
methodology focuses on the “off-diagonal” terms in the regression.  It allows us to ask
whether far fewer firms are investing in research than we would expect, given the amount
of innovation produced by each firm.
                                                
138 If (s-i >> 0) and most firms have low Bi but high fi , this could mean that Abcapi does not depend much
on Bi , or that ii Bf ¶¶ is high.
139 Co-authoring an article with academic institutions is not necessarily the same as performing basic
research.  Many academics also perform applied research, some of which is co-authored with industrial
researchers.
140 See footnote 129 for references to these studies.
97
3.3.1 Concentration Indices
I use several indices to compare the concentration of research to that of innovation.
First, I use the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (H) and the four-firm concentration ratio
(C4).141
(1) Ck = å
=
k
i
is
1
,  and
(2) H = å
i
is
2 , where si is firm i ’s share of basic research, applied research or innovation.
The Herfindahl and C4 indices are not the most appropriate for comparing the
concentration of research to that of innovation, because both research activity and
innovation are likely to be concentrated within large firms.  The key issue is whether
research activity is concentrated relative to innovation.  Hence, the concentration index
developed by Ellison and Glaeser (1997) is preferable, because it allows us to calculate
lg , the excess concentration of research relative to innovative output:
(3) 
å
å å
--
---
º
j lj
j j ljjlj
l
Hx
Hxxs
~
2
~
22
)1)(1(
)1()(
g ,
where Research Area l Î {basic, applied}
s lj = firm j's share of research (publications) in area l
xj = firm j's share of innovation (patents).
~
lH = Herfindahl of research papers in area l.
Note: lg  takes on values between zero and one.
Imagine a map containing regions proportional to the size of each firm’s innovative
output.  Now, imagine a person randomly throwing darts — each representing a basic
research article — at the map.  The Ellison and Glaeser index for basic research ( Bg ) tells
us whether basic research articles are more concentrated than we would expect from this
random process.  A similar map may be drawn for applied research to compute Ag .
                                                
141 The properties of these and other indices are discussed in Curry and George (1983).
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In their work on the geographic concentration of manufacturing, Ellison and
Glaeser assume that in each industry l, firms choose to locate plant i in area j.  The
corresponding assumption is that firm j decides whether to publish research paper i in
each research area l Î {basic or applied}. Table 3-1 summarizes the ways in which the
Ellison-Glaeser model has been used in this paper and in Stern and Trajtenberg (1998).
Table 3-1: Applications of the E-G Model
Variable Ellison-Glaeser (1997) Stern-Trajtenberg (1998) This Paper
L Industry (l) Physicians (l) Research Area (l) = {basic,
applied}
lg Spillover parameter in
industry l
Excess concentration of
drug prescription by
physician l
Excess concentration of
research over innovation in
area l
J Area (j) Drug (j) Firm (j)
Xj Share of total employment
in area j
Share of drug j in the
market
Firm j's share of patents
Slj = Sum(ziluij) Share of employment of
industry l in area j
Share of drug j among
prescriptions by physician l
Firm j's share of research
papers in area l
i Firm/plant i in industry l Patient i treated by
physician l
Research paper i in area l
zil Share of firm (plant) i's
employment in industry l
Share of patient i's visits
seen by physician l
Paper i’s share of research
in area l
å=
lN
i
ill zH
2
~ Herfindahl index of plant
size in industry l
Herfindahl index of
physicians (l) in terms of
their patients
Herfindahl index of
research papers in area (l)
Analogy In industry l, each plant i is
located in area j.
For physician l, each
patient i is allocated to drug
j.
For research area l (basic,
applied), each research
paper i is “allocated” to
firm j.
Note: u ij is an indicator variable set to 1 if research paper i is published by firm j.
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The Ellison-Glaeser index overcomes spurious results that may arise if we simply
compare Herfindahl indices, C4 ratios, or scatter-plots. It compares each firm’s research
and innovation pair-wise, because lg  is a function of ( )2jlj xs - .  Further, it accounts for
the possibility that there may be too few articles in a given research area.  For instance, it
would be incorrect to conclude that a research area is more concentrated than innovation
were there only a handful of articles in that research area, and the index corrects for this
by including 
~
lH  into equation (3).  Finally, the index accounts for the possibility that
innovation may be concentrated in only a few firms by incorporating å j jx 2 into the
equation.  Thus, if only two firms produced all the innovations in an industry,
å j jx 2 would be high.  Conditional on the research level of each firm, this would cause
lg  to be high.  The intuition is that it would be surprising to observe other firms
performing research since only two are innovating.
A simpler version of the Ellison-Glaeser index can be used if a research area
contains many articles.  Define Nl to be the total number of scientific publications in
research area l by all the firms. Article i’s share of research in area l is given by zil = 1/Nl.
Therefore, å=
lN
i
ill zH
2
~
= 1/Nl .  If there are many papers in research area l, then 0
~
®lH ,
and we obtain a simplified expression:
As ¥®lN , å
å
-
-
®
j j
j jlj
l x
xs
)1(
)(
2
2
g  (see Stern and Trajtenberg, 1998, footnote 11).
In this case, the concentration of basic and applied research with respect to
innovation are given by:
(4a) Basic research relative to innovation: 
å
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(4b) Applied research relative to innovation: 
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where sAj and sBj are firm j’s share of applied and basic research.
3.3.2 Measuring Basic Research, Applied Research and Innovation
In order to implement this methodology, it is necessary to measure the level of
basic research, applied research, and innovation of each firm.
I measure each firm’s innovative output as the number of patents it is awarded.
The are limitations associated with using patent data to measure innovation (Griliches,
1990; Jaffe 1986).  However, the empirical results are robust to the use of cumulative net
profits rather than patents (at least for the American companies in the sample, for which
CompuStat  data were available).
I define the research output of each firm as the number of articles it publishes.142
Each research article is classified as “basic” or “applied” based on the journal in which
the article is published.143  This makes the classification scheme tractable (as there are
many more articles than there are journals).  However, the price paid is the inability to
capture heterogeneity among papers within each journal.  Nonetheless, articles published
in the same journal are circulated to the same community of scholars and, in most
disciplines, there is specialization among journals.  Thus, it is fairly easy to distinguish an
applied journal oriented to solid-state engineers from a basic science journal aimed at
quantum physicists.144
                                                
142 For details on bibliometric measures of scientific output, see Stephan (1996, p. 1216) and Martin and
Irvine (1983).
143 Classifying research articles into basic and applied categories in this way does not provide a
meaningful interpretation of the ratio of basic to applied papers for a given firm, since it is unclear how
many “basic” papers are equivalent to each “applied” paper.  However, it does allow for a comparison
of the distribution of research papers across firms and in the same firm across time .
144 Some journals are highly multidisciplinary and cover both basic and applied research (including
Nature, and Science).  Highly multidisciplinary journals are classified as “basic” because this adds a
conservative bias against finding that basic research is concentrated.
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While it may be preferable to measure basic and applied research using the
composition of R&D expenditures, such data are not readily available.145  The use of
publication data rather than R&D expenditures has several advantages.  Firstly they are
more comparable across firms because papers submitted to the same journal go through
the same peer-review process.  Secondly, the data are publicly available, and thus are
verifiable.  And thirdly, they are available for privately owned companies, not just
publicly traded ones.
3.4 Data
This section discusses the construction of the dataset (subsection 3.4.1).  It then describes
the data on patents (subsection 3.4.2), publications (subsection 3.4.3) and co-authorship
with academic and public-sector researchers (subsection 3.4.4).
3.4.1 Sample Construction
The sample consists of patents and publications by all major semiconductor and
pharmaceutical firms between 1985 and 1997146 (see Appendix 3-A for a complete list of
firms).  The number of semiconductor firms in the sample each year ranges between 84
and 86, and between 30 and 36 for pharmaceutical firms (see Table 3-4).  The year-to-
year fluctuations are due to the entry and exit of firms, as well as mergers and
acquisitions.
For semiconductors, a list of 297 firms was originally compiled from reports
published by the Integrated Circuit Engineering (ICE) Corporation, Semiconductor
Industry Association, Electronics Business and other sources.  Seventy-three “fabless”
                                                
145 The NSF provides data on R&D expenditures at the level of each industry, but not the firm (see
National Science Foundation, 1998).  Several researchers have obtained firm-level data through
surveys and interviews (e.g., Mansfield, 1981, and Ernst, 1998), but this is a costly process and subject
to respondent bias.
146 The year 1997 was chosen as a cut-off because the U.S. Patent Office takes several years to process
each application.
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semiconductor companies were eliminated because they do not manufacture their own
semiconductor chips.147  Another 135 companies with less than 15 publications per year
and less than 100 patents between 1985 and 1995 were also dropped.148  Six other
companies were dropped because they compete primarily in other lines of business, but
happen to operate semiconductor-manufacturing facilities (including these companies
does not change the results).149
The pharmaceutical firms in the sample are those in Cockburn and Henderson
(1998), plus four firms with significant numbers of publications or patents (BASF, Bayer,
Astra-Zeneca, and DuPont).
For each industry, a list of major subsidiaries, mergers, and acquisitions was
painstakingly constructed from public sources.150  This list was used to combine the
patents and publications of subsidiaries with the parent company. 151
3.4.2 Data on Patenting Activity
The number of U.S. Patents awarded to each firm between 1985 and 1997 was
obtained from the U.S. Patent Office.  To restrict the analysis to innovations relevant to
these industries, I include only patents awarded within the U.S. Patent Classes listed in
                                                
147 According to the Fabless Semiconductor Association, “Fabless (without fab) refers to the business
methodology of outsourcing the manufacturing of silicon wafers, which hundreds of semiconductor
companies have adopted. Fabless companies focus on the design, development and marketing of their
products and form alliances with silicon wafer manufacturers, or foundries.”
148 Each of these firms represents less than 0.2% all publications and 0.1% of all patents during the time
period, therefore contributing insignificantly to any concentration index.
149 The six firms include four auto manufacturers (Honda, Nissan, Ford, Toyota) and two steel companies
(Nippon Steel and Kawasaki Steel).
150 Sources include annual reports, company websites, the Directory of Corporate Affiliations, Hoover
Company Profiles, and analyst reports.  I thank Celina Lee for helping me to compile these data for the
pharmaceutical firms.
151 Majority-owned subsidiaries and acquisitions are considered part of the parent company with effect
from the year the transaction is completed.  Merged companies are treated as new entities from the
year the merger takes effect.
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Table 3-2.152  These patent classes were chosen with reference to USPTO Technology
Profile Reports,153 patent concordances, and by manually examining several hundred
patents in each industry.  Concentration indices depend on each firm’s share of patents,
and so it is more important for the patent classes to be representative than complete.  In
any case, the empirical results are robust to the inclusion of a broad range of patent
classes (see section 3.5.2).
Table 3-2: US Patent Classes Relevant to each Industry
Semiconductors Pharmaceuticals
156/345: Film Deposition
257: Active Solid-State Devices (e.g.,
Transistors, Solid-State Diodes)
327: Miscellaneous Active Electrical Nonlinear
Devices, Circuits, and Systems
330: Amplifiers
331: Oscillators
365: Static Information Storage and Retrieval
438: Semiconductor Device Manufacturing:
Process
711: Electrical Computers and Digital
Processing Systems: Memory
424: Drug, bio-affecting and body treating
compositions
435: Chemistry: molecular biology and
microbiology
436: Chemistry: Analytical and Immunological
Testing
514: Drug, bio-affecting and body treating
compositions
530: Chemistry: natural resins or derivatives;
peptides or proteins; lignins or reaction
products thereof
585: Chemistry of hydrocarbon compounds
Note: The most important patent classes are shown in italics.
The semiconductor firms in the sample were awarded 47,224 relevant patents
between 1985 and 1997 (see Table 3-4).  Most fall within Patent Classes 438
(semiconductor device manufacturing) and 257 (active solid-state devices).  These
represent only one-fifth of the total number of patents awarded to semiconductor firms,
because several companies were heavily involved in other lines of businesses (e.g.,
electronics, computers, telecommunications, and consumer products).
                                                
152 Most patents fall into more than one Patent Classes.  I include a patent in the sample if at least one of
the Patent Classes it is assigned to lies within the relevant set.
153 Technology Report TAF3290P covers Semiconductor Device and Manufacture.  Report TAF3250P
covers Drug, Bio-Affecting and Body Treating Compositions.  For concordances, see
http://patents.cos.com/class/nest.shtml and http://metalab.unc.edu/patents/index/indexs1.html.
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During this period, the pharmaceutical firms in the sample received 18,438 relevant
patents, mainly in Patent Classes 424 and 514 (drug, bio-affecting, and body treating
compositions).  This accounts for only 40% of the total patents awarded to these firms,
since the firms also manufactured chemicals, personal-care products, drug-delivery
systems, and hospital supplies.154
3.4.3 Data on Scientific Publications
Data on the scientific publications of each firm between 1985 and 1997 were
obtained from the ISI Science Citation Index (SCI).  The SCI is the best source of this
information because it lists up to 255 authors and addresses for each publication. 155,156
Another advantage of the SCI is its excellent coverage of basic scientific journals.
Unfortunately, the SCI does not indicate which authors are associated with each address,
and so I adopt the following convention: if one or more authors of an article lists a
company as her address, I add one to the number of articles published by that company.
For example, a paper written by three researchers from IBM and two from AT&T would
increment the publication count once for IBM, and once for AT&T.157  The rationale for
this procedure is that each publication involves costly research as well as the opportunity
cost of writing and revising the paper for publication. 158
                                                
154 Pharmaceutical firms were also awarded numerous patents for organic compounds (Patent Classes
532-570), but these were excluded from the analysis because many organic compounds are unrelated
to pharmaceuticals (e.g., they are used for producing chemicals by BASF and Bayer).  The inclusion of
these patent classes does not qualitatively change the results.
155 Source: personal communication with ISI staff.  In the sample, each article by semiconductor firms had
between 1 and 51 authors with a mean of 1.8.  Each article by pharmaceutical firms had between 1 and
243 authors, with a mean of 2.3.
156 Other databases (Compendex, INSPEC, and Biosis) only include the institutional affiliation of the first
author for each article.
157 Without each author’s affiliation, it is impossible to weight each paper by the number of authors from
each firm.  Of more than 75,000 articles in each industry, only 1,032 semiconductor articles and 1,618
pharmaceutical articles were jointly authored by more than one of the firms in the sample.
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Table 3-3: Classification of Journal Categories into “Basic” and “Applied”
JCR Journal Category Semiconductor
Industry
Pharmaceutical
Industry
All Clinical Medical Journals -U- Applied
Biochemistry & Molecular Biology -U- Basic
Biology -U- Basic
Biophysics -U- Basic
Cell Biology -U- Basic
Chemistry, Analytical Applied Applied
Chemistry, Applied Applied Applied
Chemistry, Inorganic & Nuclear Applied -U-
Chemistry, Medicinal -U- Applied
Chemistry, Organic -U- Applied
Chemistry, Physical Basic -U-
Chemistry Basic -U-
Engineering (Electrical, Chemical & Nuclear) Applied -U-
Genetics and Hereditary -U- Basic
Material Science Applied -U-
Mathematics, Applied Applied -U-
Mathematics, Misc. Applied -U-
Mathematics Basic -U-
Medicine, General & Internal -U- Applied
Medicine, Research & Experimental -U- Basic
Microbiology -U- Basic
Multidisciplinary Science Basic Basic
Physics, Applied Applied -U-
Physics, Atomic, Molecular & Chem Basic -U-
Physics, Condensate Matter Basic -U-
Physics, Mathematical Basic -U-
Physics, Misc. Applied -U-
Physics, Nuclear Applied -U-
Physics, Particles & Fields Applied -U-
Physics Basic -U-
… Other categories
Notes: -U- indicates an unrelated field.
Categories not shown are either Applied or Unrelated.
As with patents, I chose sets of relevant journals for each industry.  I built upon the
journal classification scheme published with the SCI, known as “JCR categories.”  I
classified some of these as “basic” and others as “applied” (see Table 3-3).  For
pharmaceuticals, “basic” JCR categories include biochemistry, molecular biology, and
                                                                                                                                                
158 In applying this procedure, only original research articles were included.  I excluded meeting notes,
review articles, book reviews, editorials, and so on.
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genetics; for semiconductors, these categories include pure physics, mathematics, and
chemistry.  Each article was analyzed and the variable JCRBas set to 1 if it were
published in a basic JCR category.  Appendix 3-B shows that the empirical results are
robust to other classification schemes.
To map companies to research articles, I searched each article’s address field for
the company name or address.  Special care was taken when dealing with university
laboratories having the same names as these companies.159 Accidentally including them
can potentially distort the results because universities are a major locus of basic research.
These laboratories were identified correctly by searching the web pages of the
universities and companies involved and by contacting them where necessary.  In the
small number of cases where uncertainty could not be resolved, the observation was
dropped.
As shown in Table 3-4, the semiconductor companies in the sample published
77,417 relevant research articles between 1985 and 1997, of which 20% were classified
as basic research.  The pharmaceutical companies published 75,507 relevant research
articles, of which 25% were basic.  The number of basic and applied research articles is
large in both industries, and hence I used the simplified formulae for lg  (Equations 4a,
4b).
3.4.4 Data on Co-authorship with Academic Researchers
I identified co-authorship between industry and academic researchers by searching
the author affiliation field of each article for keywords such as “Univ,” “Inst,” and
                                                
159 Several of these laboratories are owned by companies but located on university campuses (e.g., Lilly
Laboratory at Indiana University).  Others are named after family trust funds unrelated to the business
(Wellcome, DuPont).  A handful are the addresses of individuals who have joint appointments at
universities and these firms, while others are simply names of buildings (e.g., the Searle building at the
University of Chicago).
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“Ecole.”160 An indicator variable, CoAu, was set to 1 if an article is co-authored between
a firm and an academic institution.  A broader measure, CoAuAll, also included
government laboratories, government ministries, medical centers, and hospitals.  Roughly
one-third of the articles published by semiconductor firms and half published by
pharmaceutical firms were co-authored with academics or public-sector researchers (see
Table 3-4).
Table 3-4: Summary Statistics (all firms, 1985-1997)
Data Item Semiconductors Pharmaceuticals
No. of firms in the sample per year 84 to 86 30 to 36
Patents
Total No. of U.S. patents awarded to
these firms
232,684 47,713
No. of U.S. patents awarded to these
firms in relevant patent classes
47,224 18,438
Scientific Publications
No. of research articles by firms in the
sample (all journals)
91,831 articles in
2053 journals
86,073 articles in
2721 journals
No. of research articles by firms in the
sample (relevant journals only)
77,417 articles in
803 journals
75,507 articles in
1815 journals
Basic Research and Co-authorship*
No. of basic research articles by these
firms in relevant journals,
i.e., JCRbas = 1
15,665 articles (20%) 18,945 articles (25%)
No. of articles co-authored
With academic institutions
(CoAu = 1)
With Public Sector Researchers
(CoAuAll=1)
25,782 articles (33%)
27,304 articles (35%)
38,219 articles (51%)
42,289 articles (57%)
* The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of articles expressed as a proportion of the total
number of research articles in relevant journals.
                                                
160 The Science Citation Index adheres to standard keywords, so “University” is always abbreviated as
“Univ.”  The keywords occurring most frequently were derived by manually coding every article
published by these companies in 1985 and 1995.  These keywords were then used to generate the
CoAu and CoAuAll measures of each article for the remaining years.
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Table 3-5: Descriptive Statistics
Variable (per firm per year) Avg Std. Dev. Min Max
Semiconductors
No. of Patents 46 73 0 420
No. of Basic Research Articles
(JCRBas=1)
17 60 0 510
No. of Applied Research Articles
(JCRBas=0)
66 141 0 918
No. of Articles Co-authored with
public-science (CoAuAll=1)
29 73 0 624
Pharmaceuticals
No. of Patents 43 38 0 236
No. of Basic Research Articles
(JCRBas=1)
35 45 0 270
No. of Applied Research Articles
(JCRBas=0)
105 105 0 582
No. of Articles Co-authored with
public-science (CoAuAll=1)
79 90 0 574
3.5 Results
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3-5.  The relationship among these
variables is summarized by a regression analysis of patent output versus basic and
applied research (see Tables 3-6 and 3-7).  As shown in Table 3-6, the coefficient for
applied research is positive in both industries, while that for basic research is negative for
semiconductors and insignificant for pharmaceuticals.  This provides suggestive evidence
that (1) applied research is more closely associated with innovation than basic research;
and (2) basic research is more closely connected to innovation in the pharmaceutical
industry than the semiconductor industry.  The same qualitative findings emerge when
the analysis is repeated using firm fixed-effects (Table 3-7).
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Table 3-6: OLS (dependent variable is the number of patents per firm per year)
LHS Variable Semiconductors
(N=930)
Pharmaceuticals
(N=431)
No. of Basic Research Articles
(JCRBas=1)
-0.32* (0.07) -0.01 (0.09)
No. of Applied Research Articles
(JCRBAS=0)
0.37* (0.03) 0.18* (0.04)
Year 4.2* (0.5) 1.3* (0.45)
Adj. R-squared 0.29 0.28
   Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Table 3-7: OLS with Firm Fixed Effects (dependent variable is number of patents per firm per year)
LHS Variable Semiconductors
(N=930)
Pharmaceuticals
(N=431)
No. of Basic Research Articles
(JCRBas=1)
-0.71* (0.12) -0.69 (0.07)
No. of Applied Research Articles
(JCRBAS=0)
0.46* (0.06) 0.18* (0.04)
Year 4.9* (0.3) 1.7* (0.32)
Firm fixed effects Significant Significant
Adj. R-squared 0.79 0.80
   Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
3.5.1 Main Results
The scatter-plots in Figures 3-1 and 3-2 provide some intuition for the main results.
In the semiconductor industry, a surprising number of companies appear close to the
vertical axis (Figure 3-1).  Many companies, such as Motorola, Fujitsu, and Texas
Instruments, perform little basic research but produce many patents.  In contrast, there
appears to be a closer relationship between patents and basic research in the
pharmaceutical industry (Figure 3-2).
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Figures 3-3 and 3-4 show the C4 Index of basic research, applied research, and
patents.  In any given year, the top four semiconductor firms accounted for 60-80% of all
basic research, but produced only about 30% of the patents.  By comparison, the top four
pharmaceutical firms accounted for only 30-50% of basic research and roughly the same
proportion of patents.  Interestingly, the concentration of basic research declined in both
industries between 1985 and 1997, as discussed in section 3.6.3.  Using the Herfindahl
Index rather than the C4 ratio produces similar results (see Figures 3-5, 3-6).
In both industries, applied research is less concentrated than basic research. 161  In
the case of semiconductors, applied research is more concentrated than patents, while for
pharmaceuticals it borders on being less concentrated.
Figures 3-7 and 3-8 show the Herfindahl Index for co-authorship with academic
scientists.  In both industries, the practice of co-authoring research articles with outside
researchers is less concentrated than basic research and close to that of applied research.
In fact, it is as widespread as all research publications taken together.  This suggests that
firms are indeed capturing spillovers from academic institutions and public-sector
laboratories.162
The results persist if we use the more carefully constructed Ellison-Glaeser indices
(see Figures 3-9 and 3-10).  I computed the E-G index for several hypothetical scenarios
                                                
161 This result holds whether we use the C4 index (see Figure 3-3 and 3-4) or the Herfindahl Index (see
Figure 3-5 and 3-6).
162 Co-authorship with academic institutions (CoAu=1) is highly widespread, so the addition of other
public-sector research organizations (CoAuAll=1) does not change the results.  As it has little effect,
CoAuAll was dropped in subsequent analysis.
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Figure 3-1: Semiconductor Firms- Number of Relevant Patents versus
Number of Basic Research Articles (1985-1997)
Figure 3-2: Pharmaceutical Firms- Number of Relevant Patents versus
Number of Basic Research Articles (1985-1997)
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Figure 3-3: Semiconductor Firms- C4 Index of Basic Research, Applied Research and Innovation
Figure 3-4: Pharmaceutical Firms- C4 Index of Basic Research, Applied Research and Innovation
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Figure 3-5: Semiconductor Firms- Herfindahl Index of Basic Research,
Applied Research and Innovation
Figure 3-6: Pharmaceutical Firms- Herfindahl Index of Basic Research,
Applied Research and Innovation
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Figure 3-7: Semiconductor Firms- Herfindahl Index of Articles
Co-authored with Academic Researchers
Figure 3-8: Pharmaceutical Firms- Herfindahl Index of Articles
Co-authored with Academic Researchers
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Figure 3-9: Semiconductor Firms- Gamma for Basic Research and Applied Research
Relative to Innovation
Figure 3-10: Pharmaceutical Firms- Gamma for Basic Research and Applied Research
Relative to Innovation
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Table 3-8: Hypothetical Scenarios: Gamma Relative to the Number of Relevant Patents (1985-1997)
Scenario Gamma
(Semiconductors)
Gamma
(Pharmaceuticals)
Actual Actual number of basic research
articles (JCRBas=1) between
1985 and 1997
0.13 0.02
Actual number of basic research
articles (JCRBas=1) in 1990
0.17 0.03
Actual number of applied
research articles (JCRBas=0)
between 1985 and 1997
0.04 0.01
Actual number of articles co-
authored with academic
researchers (CoAu=1) between
1985 and 1997
0.05 0.02
Scenario Basic research split equally
among the top 3 firms
0.29 0.26
Basic research split equally
among the top 4 firms
0.23 0.21
Basic research split equally
among the top 5 firms
0.17 0.16
Basic research split equally
among the top 6 firms
0.12 0.13
Basic research split equally
among the top 10 firms
0.06 0.07
Basic research uniformly divided
among all firms in the sample
0.03 0.02
Note: In each case, Gamma was calculated with respect to the actual number of patents awarded to each
firm between 1985 and 1997.
to provide meaningful interpretations of the results (see Table 3-8).163  For various
scenarios, lg  was calculated relative to the actual number of relevant patents awarded to
each firm between 1985 and 1997.  For semiconductors, the concentration of basic
                                                
163 These are not “simulations” because actual distributions are used for innovation output.
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research relative to innovation is around 0.13, which is similar to the scenario in which it
is only performed by the top 5 or 6 firms. For pharmaceuticals, however, the
concentration of basic research relative to innovation is around 0.02, which is no different
than the scenario in which it is uniformly distributed among firms.  In both industries,
applied research and co-authorship with academic researchers have similar
concentrations to the scenario in which they are uniformly spread out across firms.
3.5.2 Robustness Tests
For the semiconductor industry, there is a legitimate concern that the omission of
irrelevant patent classes may be driving the results.  In other words, the top firms may
have received “too few” semiconductor patents relative to basic research because their
basic research led to patents in other areas.  It turns out, though, that the results are
extremely robust to the inclusion of a broad range of patent classes.  Even if we include
patents from every patent class awarded to each firm, the concentration of basic research
relative to innovation remains practically unchanged ( Bg =0.14 for all basic research
articles relative to all patents between 1985 and 1997).
Another concern is that patent counts may not be a satisfactory measure of
innovation.  The value of patents is highly skewed (Trajtenberg, 1990; Harhoff, Scherer
and Vopel, 1997).  Also, some semiconductor firms may have obtained patents not
because they were producing real innovations but in order to engage in barter (Hall and
Ham, 1999).  Future research may explore the use of patent citation data to see if this
explanation is borne out.  Nonetheless, for patenting activity to be at least as concentrated
as basic research in the semiconductor industry, the average patent by the top performers
of basic research (IBM, AT&T, and Philips) would have to be five times more heavily
cited than other firms.  This would cause Gamma to fall below 0.05.
Instead of patent counts, I use the cumulative net profit of each firm as an
alternative measure of innovation performance.  Data from CompuStat were available for
47 major U.S. firms in the sample.  For these firms, the Herfindahl Indices of basic
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research, patents, and cumulative net profits were 0.43, 0.09, and 0.14, respectively.  The
concentration of basic research relative to relevant patents is Bg =0.33, and that of basic
research relative to cumulative net profits is g = 0.31.  Hence, basic research is highly
concentrated relative to cumulative net profits in the semiconductor industry.  The reason
is straightforward: almost all of the basic research among U.S. semiconductor companies
during the period examined was done by IBM and AT&T, while the largest profits were
made by Intel, followed by IBM, AT&T, Hewlett Packard, and Motorola.
Appendix 3-B explores the robustness of these results to different interpretations of
what constitutes “basic” research and expands the variables to include “highly academic”
research.  The results are essentially unchanged if we count research articles published in
journals with high basic science scores assigned by CHI Research, 164 those published in
highly cited journals, or those published in journals with a large number of academic
authors.
I performed an additional test for the pharmaceutical industry to explore the
possibility that basic research is not concentrated in this industry because our definition is
overly generous and hence many “applied” journals are inadvertently included. I
calculated Bg using only articles published between 1985 and 1997 in three leading
journals (Nature, Science, and Cell).  This yields a value of Bg =0.07, which is not
particularly high compared to the hypothetical scenarios shown in Table 6.  It appears
safe to conclude, therefore, that basic pharmaceutical research is indeed not concentrated
relative to innovation.
3.5.3 Limitations
A key limitation of this study is that I do not explicitly show a causal link between
spillovers from co-authored papers and innovation output.  It remains possible that while
many semiconductor firms co-author articles with academic researchers, their patents
                                                
164 CHI Research is a private company that specializes in evaluating the quality of intellectual property.
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grow from internal R&D efforts unrelated to the knowledge they acquire from the co-
authoring activities.  Further research is needed to validate the assumption that spillovers
occurred through co-authorship.
Another limitation of the study is that by comparing patents and publications
contemporaneously, I disregard the time lag between research and innovation.  Previous
work has shown a high variance in the time before basic research comes to fruition (e.g.,
Adams, 1990).  Unfortunately, I have no basis for guessing what kinds of lags and
depreciation rates are appropriate for each paper and patent in the sample.
A third limitation of this study is the inclusion of U.S. patents only.  Omitting
European and Japanese patents may bias the sample.  Fortunately, this risk is low because
the United States is the largest market for both semiconductor and pharmaceutical
products, so important European and Japanese patents are also filed in this country.
A fourth limitation is that the SCI is biased towards English-language publications.
Nevertheless, the results persist when all non-U.S. firms are dropped from the sample.
Despite the limitations, there emerges a robust empirical regularity in which basic
research is highly concentrated relative to innovation in the semiconductor industry.  In
the next section, I provide an interpretation of the results, propose an analytical
framework for understanding the relationship between research and innovation, and
examine changes in the concentration of basic research over time.
3.6 Discussion
One interpretation of the results is that most semiconductor firms do not perform
much basic research, but are able to capture spillovers.  Performing basic research is not
the only way a firm can remain connected.  Firms may also co-author papers with
academic and public-sector researchers, fund research at universities, and invite outside
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scholars to join their scientific advisory boards.  Several interviewees emphasized the
importance of hiring “fresh” Ph.D.s from leading academic institutions.  Some of these
Ph.D.s perform basic research (e.g., at IBM and AT&T), but many bring a wealth of
scientific knowledge to the firm and are assigned to work on the early stages of
development projects.
Historical accounts point to the mobility of labor, rather than internal basic
research, as the key driver of spillovers in the semiconductor industry (Tilton, 1971;
Wilson, 1980).  For example, William Shockley, one of the three inventors of the
transistor, left Bell Laboratories to form his own company.  Subsequently, key personnel
left Shockley’s company to form Fairchild Semiconductors, which spawned Intel
Corporation and much of the Silicon Valley (Riordan and Hoddeson, 1997).
Intel — arguably the most successful semiconductor firm in recent history —
eschews research laboratories. The firm spends heavily on development but performs
little basic research, exploiting knowledge spillovers by investing in external research at
universities and research consortia (Moore, 1996, pp. 170).  These relationships are
carefully managed by the Intel Research Council, which carefully regulates funding and
matches researchers at Intel with outside scientists.  According to Intel co-founder
Gordon Moore, “We don't have a separate R&D laboratory … the development work is
done right on the manufacturing floor” (Jelinek and Schoonhoven, 1990, p. 295).
3.6.1 An Analytical Framework
How is it possible for semiconductor firms to capture spillovers without performing
much basic research?  I speculate that the relationship between a firm’s basic research
and its ability to absorb external knowledge is non-linear (see Figure 3-11).  A firm may
perform some basic research (F) to gain membership in the external network of scholars,
as well as to attract talented employees.  But conditional on obtaining membership,
additional basic research may not greatly improve a firm’s absorptive capacity.  This is
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because a small number of people within a given organization — known as “gatekeepers”
or “boundary spanners” (Allen, 1977; Rothwell and Robertson, 1973; Zucker and Darby,
1995) — play an inordinate role in absorbing external information. These individuals
keep up with external knowledge and convey it into the internal language of the
organization.  By relying on only a few key individuals to span the realm of outside
knowledge, a firm reduces the number of redundant contacts it needs to maintain, thereby
creating a sparse network that is more efficient (Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 1992).
Figure 3-11: Hypothesized Relationship between a Firm’s Basic Research
and its Absorption of External Research
This non-linear aggregation of individual effort causes the relationship between a
firm’s basic research and its ability to keep up with external knowledge to saturate.  The
threshold level, F, varies by industry, depending on the structure of knowledge and the
effectiveness of alternative means for acquiring outside knowledge.
Absorption of Knowledge
From Outside the Firm
Basic ResearchF
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In contrast to basic research, a firm’s ability to benefit from external knowledge
should increase more gradually with applied research.  While academics and public-
sector researchers have incentives to publish and share their work, private firms have
stronger reasons to conceal information in order to benefit from that information.  Hence,
while basic ideas may diffuse easily, the information needed to translate them into
products and services may not spillover as freely.  Each firm has to experiment and
reverse-engineer competitors’ products to replicate such knowledge.  These constitute
development activities rather than basic research.
Closely related is that applied research is more difficult to codify than basic
research, 165 which makes it easier to conceal such information.  This also makes it more
efficient to rely on “strong ties” rather than “weak ties” for communicating applied
research (Hansen, 1999).166  Absorptive capacity may increase more gradually with
applied research as well because external information is used most heavily in the initial
stages of R&D projects, while subsequent product and process development depends
largely on internal knowledge (Utterback, 1971).  Thus, absorptive capacity may increase
over a fairly large range of applied R&D, but mainly for exploiting the knowledge rather
than for acquiring the knowledge from outside the firm.
If this explanation is true, why should any firm invest in substantial amounts of
basic research?  There are several possible explanations.  First, the alternatives to basic
research may also be costly (such as Intel’s approach of funding university research, or
paying higher salaries to attract high-quality talent).  Second, some firms may have
higher expected benefits or hold complementary assets that help them to appropriate the
returns of basic research.  Third, firms that perform more basic research may be
                                                
165 In other words, applied research is more “sticky” than basic research, as defined by von Hippel (1994).
Once discovered, fundamental concepts explaining how transistors work or how to splice genes are
relatively easy to convey.  However, the techniques involved may require many steps and a great deal
of tacit knowledge.
166 Hansen (1999) finds that strong ties between organizational units are more effective when knowledge
is highly complex and tacit, while weak ties are better when knowledge is easily codified.  This
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attempting to capture types of spillovers that are different than those sought by firms that
make less of an investment.  For example, these firms may be hiring discipline-oriented
researchers rather than those with domain-specific knowledge.  Further work is required
to investigate these possibilities and their implications for productivity.
3.6.2 Semiconductors versus Pharmaceuticals
While basic research is much more concentrated than patents in the semiconductor
industry, it mirrors the distribution of patents rather closely in the pharmaceutical
industry.  This implies a closer relationship between basic research and patents in the
pharmaceutical industry than semiconductors.
One explanation for this pattern is that a higher threshold exists for pharmaceuticals
than for semiconductors, so pharmaceutical firms must invest a higher level of basic
research to gain membership into the external network of researchers.  This could be due
to the presence of fewer research collaborations in pharmaceutical industry than in the
semiconductor industry (e.g. the Semiconductor Research Corporation and Sematech).
The alternative explanation is that pharmaceutical firms perform basic research in
excess of the level needed simply to absorb external knowledge.  Perhaps the expected
benefits are higher: medical research is the prototypical case of basic research that seeks a
fundamental understanding of phenomena and yet is motivated by practical goals (Stokes,
1997).  It is likely that pharmaceutical firms are willing to invest in useful research, even
if it is considered fundamental.  In addition, the appropriability of basic research may be
higher in the pharmaceutical industry than in the semiconductor industry.  This may be
due to the longer product lifecycle for pharmaceuticals and a stronger regulatory regime.
                                                                                                                                                
resonates with my argument if we accept that basic research is more easily codified than applied
research.
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As discussed in section 3.3, the methodology used in this chapter does not allow us
to distinguish between these two explanations.  It does, however, demonstrate a distinct
difference between the two industries (one requiring further exploration).
3.6.3 Changes In the Concentration of Basic Research Over Time
In both the semiconductor and pharmaceutical industries, the concentration of basic
research declined between 1985 and 1997.  For semiconductors, the C4 ratio for basic
research dropped substantially from 80% in 1985 to 58% in 1997 (Figure 3-3), while for
pharmaceuticals it fell more gradually from 45% to 31% (Figure 3-4).
One reason for this decline may be that basic research became increasingly
important, and so attracted investment from a greater number of companies.  But the
opposite may also be true: that basic research became less important, and so the leading
companies reduced their investments.
The first explanation appears to be true for pharmaceuticals, while the latter
appears true for semiconductors.  This is supported by the data in Figures 3-12 and 3-13,
which show the number of basic research articles published by leading semiconductor
and pharmaceutical firms.
IBM, which led basic research for semiconductors, faced financial difficulties in
the early 1990s and drastically reoriented its R&D organization towards applied science
and development.167  It slashed by more than half the number of basic research articles it
published between 1991 and 1997 (see Figure 3-12).  Similarly, AT&T faced the end of a
                                                
167 “In 1992, when newly appointed chairman Louis Gerstner began downsizing IBM, the research
division was included and saw its budget cut by a third, from $6.5 billion in 1992 to a low of $4.3
billion in 1994. It has since bounced back to $6 billion in 1995 as more of its work became product
oriented …” (“IBM Reconnects Research,” Electronics Business Today, Sept. 1996).  See also “Into
the Big Blue Yonder,” Technology Review , 1999, 102(4) 46-53;and “R&D Gets Real,” Electronic
Business Today, Oct. 1997.
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Figure 3-12: Top Semiconductor Firms- Number of Articles in Journals with JCRbas=1
Figure 3-13: Top Pharmaceutical Firms- Number of Articles in Journals with JCRbas=1
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long monopoly and reoriented Bell Laboratories, which was eventually spun off as part of
Lucent Technologies.168  Thus, in the semiconductor industry, basic research may have
been a luxury afforded by past success, rather than a prerequisite for capturing spillovers.
In the pharmaceutical industry, the advent of rational drug design in the early 1990s
may have triggered the increase in basic research at Merck and Roche (see Figure 3-13).
Smaller competitors took a different path, merging in two large waves in the late 1980s
and mid-1990s.  Some of the entities thus created had a significant number of basic
research publications, including Glaxo-Wellcome, Pharmacia-Upjohn, and Bristol-
Myers-Squibb.  Therefore, the concentration of basic research declined slightly, despite
Merck’s massive buildup.
The time-trend for pharmaceuticals reveals two other interesting points.  One, basic
research was relatively widespread in the pharmaceutical industry even before the advent
of rational drug discovery.  So, while rational drug design may have boosted its
importance, basic research was already significant.  Two, Merck’s basic research output
fell when it faced financial difficulties around 1993,169 echoing the events at IBM and
AT&T.  Additional analysis reveals that the company’s number of applied research
publications climbed unabated during this difficult period at Merck.
Finally, the time-series makes it unlikely that the difference between
pharmaceuticals and semiconductors arose simply because the semiconductor industry is
more “mature,” so that most firms innovate without depending on external knowledge.
On the contrary, basic research was even more concentrated in the past that it is today.
As early as 1985, many semiconductor firms innovated without performing much basic
                                                
168 In “Lucent’s Ascend,” BusinessWeek , February 8, 1999, the firm’s CEO describes how he linked Bell
Lab’s research budget directly to revenue growth.
169 According Merck’s 1994 Annual Report, net income fell by 11% in 1993, after which the company
took a $775 million restructuring charge and eliminated 2,100 jobs.
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research. 170  Another reason to doubt this claim is that most drugs being produced today
are still being made the old-fashioned way — that is, not through rational drug design.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter’s main contribution is a careful measurement of the concentration of
basic and applied research relative to innovation in the semiconductor and
pharmaceutical industries.  Basic research is found to be highly concentrated relative to
innovation in the semiconductor industry, but not in the pharmaceutical industry.  In both
industries, the practice of co-authoring papers with academic researchers is widespread,
implying that firms are able to capture spillovers.  I interpret this to mean that (at least in
the semiconductor industry) many firms are able to capture spillovers without performing
a great deal of basic research.  In both industries, the concentration of applied research
closely matches that of innovation output.  The results are robust to the use of alternative
definitions for “basic” research, the inclusion of various patent classes, and the use of net
profits rather than patent counts to measure performance.
These empirical regularities raise many exciting questions.  How effective are the
alternative modes used by firms to capture spillovers, when used with and without
internal basic research?  Why do some semiconductor firms perform more basic research
than expected?  And why do so many pharmaceutical firms perform basic research?  The
results here also strongly suggest that we need to consider more carefully what it means
to capture spillovers, whether there are different types of spillovers, and how the process
of absorbing external information actually unfolds.
                                                
170 Each process generation in semiconductors is approximately two years, so 1985 was at least seven
generations ago.
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Appendix 3-A: List of Firms in the Sample
Semiconductors Pharmaceuticals
Acer Labs, Inc.
Actel Corporation
Advanced Micro Devices (AMD)
Alcatel
Altera
American Microsystems, Inc.
Analog Devices
Asahi Kasei Microsystems
AT&T (Lucent)
Atmel Corporation
Brooktree Corporation
Burr-Brown
Canon, Inc.
C-Cube
Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing
Cherry Semiconductor Corp
Cirrus Logic
Cray Computer
Cray Research, Inc.
Cypress Semiconductor, Inc
Cyrix Corporation
Daewoo Electronic Components Co.
Dallas Semiconductor
Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC -
Now Compaq)
Ericsson Components A.B.
ESS Technology
Fuji Electric Co., Ltd.
Fujitsu
GEC-Plessey (acquired by Mitel)
General Semiconductor
Grumman (pre1994)
Harris Semiconductor
Hewlett-Packard Company
Hitachi
Honeywell, Inc., Solid State Electronics
Center
Hughes Aircraft Company (merged with
Raytheon)
Hyundai Electronic Industries Co., Ltd.,
Semiconductor Division
IBM
Integrated Device Technology (IDT)
Intel Corporation
International Rectifier
ITT Semiconductors (ITT Industries)
Lattice Semiconductor
LG Semicon (Lucky-Goldstar)
Linear Technology Corporation
LSI Logic
Macronix
Matsushita Electric Corporation
Microchip Technology
Micron Semiconductor Inc. (subsidiary of
Micron Technology)
Mitel Semiconductor
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation
Mostel-Vitelic
Motorola, Inc. (Semiconductor Products
Sector)
National Semiconductor Corp.
NCR Microelectronic Products
NEC Corporation
Newport Wafer Fab Limited
Northern Telecom (Nortel)
Northrop & Northrop Grumman Corp
NTT(Nippon Telephone & Telegraph)
Oki Electric industry Co., Ltd.
Philips
Raytheon Semiconductor Division
Ricoh Co., Ltd.; Electronic Device
Division
Rockwell International
Rohm Co., Ltd.
S3 Inc.
Samsung Electronics Company
Sanyo Electric Co.
Seiko Epson Corp.
Sharp Corporation
Siemens
Sony Corporation
ST Microelectronics (SGS-Thomson)
Symbios
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
Co., Ltd.
Tech Semiconductor Singapore Pte. Ltd.
Temic (Bought by Vishay; IC div sold to
Atmel)
Texas Instruments
Toshiba
United Microelectronics Corporation
(UMC)
United Technologies Microelectronics
Center
VLSI Technology, Inc.
Weitek
Westinghouse, Advanced Technology
Winbond
Xilinx
Yamaha Corporation
Zilog, Inc.
Abbott
American Home Products
Astra
BASF
Bayer
Beecham
Bristol-Myers
Bristol-Myers-Squibb
Burroughs-Wellcome
Ciba-Geigy
DuPont
ELAN
Fujisawa
Glaxo
Glaxo-Wellcome
Hoechst (&Roussel)
Hoffman-LaRoche
Johnson & Johnson
Eli Lilly
Marion
Marion-Merrell-Dow
Merck
Merrell-Dow
Procter & Gamble Pharmaceuticals
Pfizer (& Roerig)
Pharmacia
Pharmacia & Upjohn
Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer
Sandoz
Sankyo
Schering (German)
Schering-Plough (USA)
Searle (Monsanto owns it)
Smithkline
Smithkline-Beecham
Squibb
Takeda
Upjohn
Warner-Lambert
Yamanouchi
Zeneca
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Appendix 3-B: Robustness of the Results to Journal Classification Schemes
In this Appendix, I explore the robustness of the results to alternative ways of
classifying journals.  Four classification schemes are implemented using the indicator
variables JCRbas, CHIbas, HiSCI and HiAcad.  The first two variables attempt to
measure “basic” research as that which seeks a fundamental of phenomena.  The third
and fourth variables expand beyond basic research to look more generally at highly cited
research and the types of research typically performed at academic institutions.
Summary statistics of these four variables are shown in Table 3-9.
Table 3-9: Descriptive Statistics of Journal-Level Variables (all journals in the SCI, 1985-1997)
Variable N Min Max Avg StdDev Percentiles
25% 50% 75%
SCI85 3421 0 39.7 1.27 1.85 0.41 0.79 1.5
SCI93 1367 0 37.2 1.44 2.08 0.46 0.93 1.7
SCI97 3826 0 40.8 1.51 2.44 0.46 0.91 1.7
Acad85 3205 0 1 0.79 0.19 0.73 0.84 0.92
Acad90 3043 0 1 0.82 0.16 0.77 0.86 0.93
Acad95 3274 0 1 0.84 0.15 0.80 0.88 0.93
Acad97 3293 0 1 0.85 0.14 0.80 0.88 0.93
JCRBas 4901 0 1 0.18 0.38 NA NA NA
CHIBas 4901 0 4 2.75 1.15 2 3 4
Note: Numerical suffixes represent the year. For example, SCI85 is the Science Citation Index Impact
factor for each journal in 1985.
The first variable, JCRBas, is defined on page 106.  The second variable, CHIbas,
uses the classification scheme developed by CHI Research, Inc.  CHI awards each journal
a score from zero to four.  For the physical sciences, levels 1 through 4 correspond to
applied technology, engineering sciences, applied research, and basic research,
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respectively.  For the biomedical sciences, they correspond to clinical observation,
clinical mix, clinical investigation and basic science (see Hicks, 1996, for more details).
In this thesis, I define a research article as “basic” if it is published in a journal with
CHIbas = 4.
The third variable, HiSCI, identifies research articles that are published in highly
cited journals.  It is based on each journal’s SCI Impact Factor (SCI), which is published
in the Journal Citation Reports that accompany each year’s edition of the Science
Citation Index.171  The SCI Impact Factor for journal k in year y is given by:
(5)
)2( and )1( yearsin   journalin  articles of No
)2( and )1( yearsin   journalin  published articles  toyear in  citations of No
y-y-k
y-y-ky
kySCI º
As shown in Table 3-9, the distribution of SCI is highly skewed. A small number
of journals have high impact scores, reaching up to 40.8.  However, 75% of the journals
in a given year have impact scores less than 1.7.  This is consistent with the bibliographic
literature on Zipf’s Law and Bradford’s Law, which states that only a small set of core
journals in a scientific discipline are highly cited (Garfield, 1980).  I define a journal to
be highly cited if it falls within the top 25% of this distribution, specifically those with
SCI Impact Factor scores exceeding 1.7.
In year yy, define 
î
í
ìº >
otherwise
SCIif yy
yyHiSCI 0
7.11
The fourth variable, HiAcad, identifies research that is similar to academic
research.  It locates articles that are published in journals with a large percentage of
academic authors.  Such journals are often heavily circulated among academics, and their
editorial boards are dominated by academics.  HiAcad is based on each journal’s Acad
score, which is the percentage of papers in that journal with one or more academic
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authors.  Each journal’s Acad score is derived by searching the address fields of every
article in the SCI for keywords such as “university,” “school” and “ecole”.172
The construction of the Acad and HiAcad variables is a novel contribution of this
thesis and may have other applications.  As shown in Table 3-9, most journals have a
high percentage of papers with one or more academic authors.  The twenty-fifth
percentile of Acad is around 80%, so in three-quarters of the journals, at least 80% of the
articles include an academic author.  I define a journal to be highly academic if it is in the
top quartile in its Acad score.  This corresponds to having at least 93% of the papers in
the journal written by at least one academic author.
 (6b) In year yy, define 
î
í
ìº >
otherwise
Acadif yy
yyHiAcad 0
%931
Table 3-10 shows the correlation between HiSCI, HiAcad, JCRBas and
CHIBas.173  As expected, the correlation between variables is low because they measure
different things.  What is important is the high correlation across years for HiSCI and
HiAcad.  This implies that a journal’s importance and academic orientation remained
fairly stable between 1985 and 1997.  I therefore use HiSCI97 and HiAcad97 to measure
basicness.
Despite the low correlation between the various measures of basic research, the results
are remarkably consistent.  Figures 3-14 and 3-15 show the E-G Gamma for basic
research and co-authorship relative to patents (other results are available upon request).
Further analysis shows that the results are also robust to changing the cutoff values of
HiSCI and HiAcad.  Hence, the results are robust over a wide range of definitions for
basic research.
                                                                                                                                                
171 ISI does not publish the SCI scores for every journal each year, but all the major ones are included.
172 Not all journals have Acad scores for any given year, since some journals changed their names,
merged with other journals, or were discontinued.
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Table 3-10: Correlation for Various Measures of Basic Research (all journals in the SCI, 1985-1997)
HiSCI85 HiSCI93 HiSCI97 HiAcad85 HiAcad90 HiAcad95 HiAcad97 JCRBas CHIBas
HiSCI85 1.00
HiSCI93 0.73* 1.00
HiSCI97 0.68* 0.75* 1.00
HiAcad85 0.01 0.01 0.00 1.00
HiAcad90 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.56* 1.00
HiAcad95 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.52* 0.54* 1.00
HiAcad97 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.49* 0.51* 0.55* 1.00
JCRBas 0.14* 0.15* 0.11* 0.21* 0.20* 0.20* 0.22* 1.00
CHIBas 0.18* 0.28* 0.16* 0.31* 0.27* 0.24* 0.24* 0.36* 1.00
Notes: *= significant at the 5% level.
The results are similar for journals relevant to semiconductors or pharmaceuticals.
                                                                                                                                                
173 The correlation coefficients remain similar for the subsets of journals relevant to semiconductors and
pharmaceuticals.
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Figure 3-14: Semiconductor Firms- Gamma of Number of  Basic Research Articles
Relative to Innovation.
Figure 3-15: Pharmaceutical Firms- Gamma of Number of Basic Research Articles
Relative to Innovation.
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Chapter 4: 
Publishing and Patenting: Researcher-Level Evidence from
Five Companies
This chapter explores the relationship between patents and publications by
researchers at five companies (IBM, AT&T, Intel, DuPont and Merck).
4.1 Introduction
Industrial research is an important contributor to scientific progress and a major
source of science-based innovations (Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman, 1958; Mowery and
Rosenberg, 1989).174  Many scholars have studied the relationship between scientific
research and patents at industrial firms (e.g., Griliches, 1984; Jaffe, 1986; Patel and
Pavitt, 1994).  Fewer studies have examined the relationship between patents and
publications, taking the researcher — rather than the firm — as the unit of analysis.175
This is a difficult exercise, because patent and publication databases provide incomplete
information about the names and affiliation of researchers, making it harder to match
individuals within and across these databases than it is to identify the firm that produced
the patent or publication.
In this paper, I explore the relationship between publishing and patent production
by researchers at five leading research laboratories (IBM, AT&T, Merck, DuPont, and
Intel).  To do so, I created a new dataset that combines patents from the U.S. Patent
Office database with publications in the Science Citation Index (SCI).  This relies on a
new technique for matching individuals based on their abbreviated names (see Appendix
4-A).
                                                
174 See Hounshell (1996) for a history of industrial research in the United States.
175 For example, see Gittelman and Kogut (2000); Noyons, Luwel, and Moed (1998); Cockburn,
Henderson and Stern (1999); and Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong (1998).
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Choosing the individual researcher as the unit of analysis complements previous
studies by adding another perspective.  One advantage is that it allows for comparisons of
scientists within the same firm, such as the relationship between their participation in
basic research and the number of patents they produced.  Performing this comparison at
the level of the firm does not allow us to distinguish whether an observed relationship is
due to the characteristics of scientists employed by each firm, or other firm-specific
effects (such as the product-markets in which the firms compete).  A related benefit of
individual-level data is that they allow comparisons to be made across scientific
disciplines more effectively than do firm-level data, which are clouded by company-
specific differences.
Adopting the individual researcher as the unit of analysis allows us to test several
important theories.  In this paper, I test the following hypotheses:
· Researchers face a tradeoff between basic research and patenting, so that those who
are more heavily involved in basic research are less likely to patent than those who
are more heavily involved in applied research.
· Basic research improves the productivity of researchers, so that those who are more
focused on basic research are also more likely to patent relative to others who do
applied work. (This hypothesis is the opposite of the first hypothesis, above.)
· Researchers that produce more patents are also more likely to publish more articles,
either because they have higher abilities, or because firms which provide incentives to
encourage publications “balance” these with incentives to encourage patenting
(Cockburn, Henderson and Stern, 1999).
· There is a stronger link between basic science and patents in drug discovery than in
other areas, at the level of the individual researcher.
· Researchers who co-author with academics and scientists at public-sector laboratories
are more likely to obtain patents than are those researchers who do not so co-author.
137
Some of these hypotheses have been tested at the firm level.  For example,
Cockburn and Henderson, 1998, show a positive relationship between a firm’s
productivity and whether its researchers co-author with universities and public-sector
laboratories.  It would be interesting to see whether the same effects occur at the level of
the individual, as this might help us better understand the firm-level effects and offer new
insights on behavior within the firm.  Other hypotheses have been not formally tested
against patent and publication data, such as the claim that researchers choose between
participating in science and in engineering (Allen, 1977), and that the link between basic
and innovation is closer in drug discovery than elsewhere (Stokes, 1997).
When choosing the individual as the unit of analysis, one should not automatically
draw the same conclusions about firms (Judd, Smith and Kidder, 1991, p. 356).176  For
instance, observing a negative relationship between participation in basic research and
patent output at the level of the researcher does not necessarily imply that the same
relationship holds at the firm level.  In particular, some individuals may specialize in
basic research and others in patent-production such that the firm benefits from knowledge
shared among these workers.  Nonetheless, if the same effect is observed at both levels of
analysis, it is plausible that some degree of aggregation exists.
I found the following in testing the above hypotheses: given two researchers at
IBM, AT&T, or Intel who published the same number of articles, the one who published
a greater fraction of papers in basic research journals is less likely to obtain patents.  This
supports the view that scientists are different from engineers.  However, the opposite
relationship holds at Merck and DuPont: the higher the proportion of papers a researcher
publishes in basic scientific journals, the more likely she is to obtain patents.  This is
consistent with prior studies that showed a positive impact on productivity of
participating in basic research among firms engaged in drug discovery (Gambardella,
1992; Zucker and Darby, 1995).  This paper shows that the effect exists at the level of the
                                                
176 Using the individual rather than the firm as the unit of analysis is neither better nor worse, only
different.
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individual researcher.  Furthermore, I show that the result for Merck and DuPont is
driven largely by publications in the field of basic chemistry.  Even at these
pharmaceutical firms, the relationship between basic research and patents is stronger for
chemistry than for other fields; it is also stronger among researchers who work on
pharmaceutical R&D than on other areas within the same firm.
Another result is that the number of patents obtained by a researcher is positively
related to the number of articles she published.  Further research will be needed to
determine whether this signals her ability, or because firms that give higher incentives for
publishing also increase their incentives for patenting.
Patents are related negatively to the fraction of articles co-authored with academic
and public-sector researchers.  This is surprising in view of previous research that
underscored the importance of “connectedness” at the level of the firm (e.g., Cockburn
and Henderson, 1998).  One possible explanation is that researchers who co-author with
outsiders may be playing the role of gatekeepers (Allen, 1977), increasing the
productivity of other researchers within the firm but not necessarily adding to the number
of patents they obtain.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 4.2 reviews prior
research and develops hypotheses on the relationship between patenting and publishing
by industrial researchers.  Section 4.3 presents the empirical methodology used in the
paper.  Section 4.4 describes the datasets and algorithms used to identify the corporate
affiliation of individuals and to match them based on their abbreviated names.  Section
4.5 presents the results and discussion as well as the limitations of this study.  Section 4.6
draws conclusions.
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4.2 The Relationship between Publications and Patents
In this section, I explore how researcher preferences, ability bias, balanced
incentives, scientific area and connectedness may affect the relationship between the
patents and publications produced by industrial researchers.
Researcher Preferences
Researchers who work in industrial laboratories face conflicting demands.  On the
one hand, many would like to perform interesting research that is important to the
scientific community — and thus gain peer recognition (Merton, 1973).  On the other
hand, such research is not necessarily in line with the firm’s financial interests.  Research
that seeks a fundamental understanding of phenomena (which I term “basic research”) is
expensive and has uncertain payoffs.  Often, the only extrinsic reward is a publication in
an esteemed journal (Stephan, 1996).
In theory, firms would prefer the speculative investigation of “basic research” to be
done by others (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962).177  In contrast, firms are likely to support
applied research and development, which have a higher chance of creating new products
and services.  Applied research is also more likely to be associated with patents, since an
invention must exhibit usefulness to be patentable.178  While primarily a source of
intellectual property protection, patents also act as a measure of a firm’s innovation
output.179  From the researcher’s point of the view, applying for a patent is an onerous
activity that takes up time that could otherwise have been spent writing articles or on
other activities.
                                                
177 National Science Foundation data show that in 1997, industry 67% of U.S. applied research but only
21% of basic research (NSF, 1998, Tables 4-7 and 4-11).  These tables also show that private
industry’s share of basic research is declining, while its share of applied research is increasing.
178 An invention must also be novel and non-obvious to be patentable.
179 There is a well-developed literature on the strengths and weaknesses of patent analysis (see Griliches,
1990).  Patents are an imperfect measure of innovation: they are highly skewed in their economic value
(Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999), and not all innovations are patented.
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Faced with this tension between basic and applied research, how should an
industrial researcher spend her time?  One solution is to choose one alternative over the
other.  Allen (1977) and Ritti (1971) maintain that researchers are either engineers or
scientists.  Whereas an engineer is most interested in career advancement within the firm,
a scientist cares most about her reputation outside the company.  The engineer’s goals
coincide with those of the firm: to develop new products and succeed commercially.  In
contrast, the scientist desires professional autonomy and to publish her research (Allen
1977, pp. 37-39).  These preferences are due to self-selection as well as the socialization
process in educational institutions: engineers typically hold a bachelor’s degree, while
most scientists earn a Ph.D.
The distinction between scientists and engineers suggests the following hypothesis:
H1: A researcher who is heavily involved in publishing basic research articles is less likely to
produce patents than one who is heavily involved in publishing applied research articles.
An alternative hypothesis is that there is no tradeoff between basic and applied
research.  Scientists who publish basic research may be better connected to external
sources of knowledge.  Therefore, they are more likely to have early access to new ideas
that stimulate creativity.  For example, Zucker and Darby (1995) show that “star”
scientists who are heavily involved in public science play an important part in the
productivity of biotechnology firms.  Similarly, Gambardella (1992) advocates a science-
oriented research environment within firms that gives greater autonomy to researchers
and encourages them to publish.  Basic and applied research may also be complementary
to each other if there are strong feedback loops in the innovation process (Roberts, 1988).
In this case, researchers who are more likely to perform applied research may be more
likely to contribute to basic science.
If there is no tradeoff between basic and applied research, so that they are
complements rather than substitutes, then Hypothesis H1 is reversed:
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H1’: A researcher who is heavily involved in publishing basic research articles is more likely
to produce patents than one who is heavily involved in publishing applied research
articles.
Ability bias and balanced incentives
In practice, is difficult to test the above hypotheses because other factors affect the
relationship between patents and publications.  The most important is that people have
different abilities.  Moreover, this ability bias may be magnified by the “Matthew Effect”
(Merton, 1973), in which success breeds further success.  Therefore, a successful
researcher may have better opportunities to perform basic research as well as better
organizational resources for obtaining patents.
A related issue is that firms which offer greater incentives for researchers to publish
scientific results also provide them with stronger incentives to produce patents, as this
encourages individuals to balance their efforts between patenting and publishing
(Cockburn, Henderson and Stern, 1999).
The differential ability of researchers, coupled with the balancing of incentives by firms,
would lead us to expect that researchers who produce a greater number of publications
(basic plus applied) are also more likely to obtain a greater number of patents:
H2: Researchers who publish more articles also receive more patents.
It would be interesting to distinguish the effects of ability bias from balanced incentives,
but this would require additional data presently not available in my dataset.
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Area of scientific research
The relationship between publications and patents is also likely to depend on the
scientific area under investigation.  Stokes (1997) observes that the dichotomy between
basic and applied research breaks down in the field of medicine: medical research is
performed both in the quest for fundamental breakthroughs as well as to create practical
remedies.  Hence, it is likely that researchers who work to discover new drugs are more
likely to obtain patents than researchers who work in other fields.180  I therefore propose
the following:
H3: In the area of drug discovery, a researcher who participates heavily in basic scientific
research is more likely to receive patents than is a researcher less involved in basic
research.
H3’: In other areas, a researcher who participates heavily in basic scientific research is less
likely to receive patents than is a researcher who is less involved in basic research.
Co-authorship and connectedness
Another factor that might affect a researcher’s likelihood to obtain patents is the
extent to which she co-authors articles with scientists at universities and other public-
sector laboratories.  Such co-authorship is distinct from having a preference for basic
research.  An industrial researcher may co-author heavily with researchers from outside
her firm, but much of it could be applied research.  Prior research shows a relationship
between a firm’s productivity and its rate of co-authorship with universities and public
sector laboratories (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998).  It is not known whether this
relationship holds for individual researchers as well as for firms.  I hypothesize that the
exchange of ideas among co-authors makes these researchers better connected to sources
of new technical ideas and may lead them to produce a greater number of patents.
                                                
180 Allen’s (1977) work on the dichotomy between scientists and engineers is based on data collected at
two engineering laboratories.  It is interesting to inquire whether the results apply equally well to drug
discovery.
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H4: An industrial researcher who co-authors with academics and public-sector researchers is
more likely to obtain patents than are industrial researchers who do not so co-author.
Firm-level controls
The firm that employs a researcher also influences the extent to her which
participation in basic science translates into a larger number of patents.  In part, this is
because firms produce different goods and services, and therefore pursue research in
different scientific fields.  In addition, the industries in which they compete have different
degrees of appropriability (Levin et al., 1987).  This affects the extent to which firms rely
on patents vis-à-vis secrecy and time–to–market.  Furthermore, von Hippel (1988) shows
that some firms play a key role in developing innovations, while others depend on users
or suppliers to take the lead.  Firms also vary in size and their ability to capture
economies of scope with regards to knowledge spillovers.  Firms also exert strong
selection pressures on the types of researchers they attract and those they eventually
employ.  For these reasons, it is important to control for firm-level differences when
comparing the patenting and publication behavior of industrial researchers.
In the next section, I describe an empirical methodology to test the hypotheses
outlined above.
4.3 Methodology
Let the number of patents awarded to researcher i in firm j be denoted by Pat ij.
Similarly, let the number of articles published by this researcher be Pubij.  The extent of
her participation in basic research is reflected in the percentage of articles she published
in “basic” scientific journals, PctBasij.  The following model relates these variables:
(1)  jjijijjjijij PctCoauPctBasPubPat dcfdgba ++++= *)*(*
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where  d j are dummy variables for each firm, and
PctCoauij is the percentage of articles co-authored with academics and
other public-sector scientists
This specification attempts to capture the effect of participating in basic research on
patenting (PctBasij on Pat ij), “controlling” for ability bias and balanced incentives
through the effect of Pubij on Pat ij.  Conditional on observing two researchers with the
same number of publications, it asks whether the one who published a higher percentage
of articles in basic scientific journals is more likely to obtain patents.  I also added
another variable, AvgSCIij, to further control for ability bias.  For a given researcher,
AvgSCIij is the average of the SCI impact scores of the journals in which she
publishes.181,182  Despite my attempts to control for ability bias, it is still possible that the
researcher who published a higher percentage of articles in basic journals had higher
ability than the other, but that remains a limitation of this study.
Equation (1) takes into account the difference among companies by including a
fixed effect for each firm (d j), so that each firm has a different intercept, a + cj.  In
addition, the firm dummy is interacted with PctBasij, so each firm has a different slope, gj.
The number of patents awarded to researcher i is also affected by the percentage of
articles she co-authors with academics and public-sector researchers (PctCoauij).
We can test the hypotheses in the previous section by estimating the parameters of
this model.  Testing the hypothesis that g = 0 tells us whether researchers who participate
heavily in basic research are more likely to be awarded patents than those who
concentrate on applied research (hypotheses H1, H1’).  Testing b = 0 indicates whether
researchers who publish more articles also receive more patents (hypothesis H2).  We can
test hypothesis H4 — that researchers who co-author with outside researchers are more
                                                
181 Each journal’s SCI impact score is published with the Science Citation Index.   I used impact scores
for 1997.  These scores are very stable across time (see Appendix 3-B).
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likely to patent — by estimating f.  A value of f > 0 would be consistent with this
hypothesis, while a value of f [ 0 would reject the hypothesis.  To test for differences
among firms, we can examine whether firms have the same intercept terms
(c1=c2=…=cn) and the same slope coefficients (g1=g2=…=gn).
The basic model can be modified to test Hypothesis H3, which proposes a stronger
relationship between basic research publications and patents for researchers in the field of
drug discovery than those in other areas.  For each scientific discipline (k), a separate
coefficient gijk can be estimated as follows:
(2)  jjij
k
ijkjjkijij PctCoauPctBasPubPat dcfdgba ++++= å *)*(*
Among the papers published by researcher i from firm k, PctBasijk is the percentage
of those papers that appear in basic scientific journals in scientific field k.  It is not the
share of basic research publications in field k by researcher i.  The estimated value gjk
tells us whether a scientists who concentrates on publishing basic research in field k is
more likely to receive patents than another researcher who concentrates less on it.183
Basic versus Applied journals
An essential ingredient in this methodology is the ability to distinguish between a
“basic” and “applied” journal.  This paper relies on the journal classification scheme
developed by CHI research. 184  Each journal is assigned a number from zero to four,
indicating increasing basicness (see Hicks, 1996 for details).  In this paper, I define a
journal as “basic” if it scores a four; all other journals are “applied.”  Naturally, this
                                                                                                                                                
182 The expected effect of AvgSCIij on patenting is uncertain: publishing in highly cited journals signals a
researcher’s ability, but might also take time and effort away from creating patentable inventions.
183 An alternative would be to create dummy variables to indicate the field in which a researcher works.
The shortcoming of this approach, however, is that some researchers work in multiple fields.
Furthermore, using percentages rather than dummies measures the strength of participation in a
particular field of basic research.
184 I thank Diana Hicks for sharing these valuable data.
146
approach ignores heterogeneity among articles within the same journal.  However, it is
the only tractable approach given the large number of publications in the dataset.
In order to identify scientific disciplines, I use another journal classification scheme
from CHI Research.  The classification used is very similar to that in the Journal Citation
Reports, which are published as an accompanying volume to the Science Citation Index
each year.
Research Setting
I estimate the model for researchers at five leading companies spanning a broad
range of industries: IBM, AT&T, Merck, DuPont, and Intel.  IBM produces computers,
microelectronics, and information services; AT&T is involved in telecommunications and
microelectronics; Merck is a leading pharmaceuticals company; DuPont is involved in
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and materials science; and Intel specializes in
semiconductors.
Each of these five firms is an important innovator. AT&T created the transistor
(Nelson, 1962; Riordan and Hoddeson 1997); DuPont created Rayon, Nylon and Teflon
(Mueller, 1962); Intel invented the microprocessor (Jackson, 1997, pp. 69-77); Merck
was the first to create vaccines against mumps, measles, rubella, and hepatitis (Galambos
and Sewell, 1995); and IBM has created many important computer and semiconductor
technologies (Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, 1996).185
While IBM, AT&T, DuPont and Merck have excellent central research
laboratories, Intel was added to the analysis for its very different R&D strategy: with no
central research laboratories, Intel performs R&D on the manufacturing floor and relies
heavily on relationships with universities and other firms for basic scientific knowledge
(Moore, 1996).
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4.4 Data
The dataset contains U.S. Patents (1976-99) and publications in the SCI (1985-97)
by these companies.186  I used U.S. Patent data for the entire period to identify inventors
within each firm.  However, I used only patents between 1985 and 1997 in the regression
analysis, to coincide with the period for which publication data were available in
electronic format.  I performed a careful search to obtain patents that list the firms in the
sample as “assignees,” and searched the SCI for all publications that include the name of
these firms among those listed in the “author address” field.
The publication and patent record reflects the characteristics of these firms (see
Table 4-1).  The large number of patents and publications produced by IBM and AT&T
reflects these companies’ size.
There is a remarkable variation in the percentage of articles published in basic
research journals by the five companies.  About half of the DuPont and Merck articles are
in basic scientific journals, while the figure is around one-third for IBM and AT&T.
Only 5% of Intel’s articles are published in basic journals, which is unsurprising given its
R&D strategy described above.
The breakdown of publications by scientific area reflects the different product
markets within which these firms compete.  Most of the IBM, AT&T, and Intel
publications are on physics, engineering/technology, or chemistry. Merck articles focus
primarily on clinical medicine, followed by biomedical research and chemistry. DuPont’s
major field of publication is chemistry, but the firm also produces a large number of
articles on clinical medicine, biomedical research, and physics— reflecting DuPont’s
diversification across a broad range of industries.
                                                                                                                                                
185 IBM’s most famous inventions include the fabled S/360 computer and Deep Blue.
186 These are the periods for which patent and publication data were available to me in electronic format.
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Table 4-1: Summary Statistics for Each Company
DuPont Merck AT&T IBM Intel
Patents
Number of Patents (1976-1999) 9938 4974 12364 22078 3330
Number of Patents (1985-1997) 6007 2822 6930 12452 1752
Publications in SCI Journals (1985-1997)
Total Number 8428 10443 19724 20049 665
Articles Published in Basic Journals 4466 5080 6698 7072 31
Percentage Basic Research 53% 49% 34% 35% 5%
Publications in SCI Journals (1985-1997) by Scientific Area
- Biology 357 375 24 15 1
- Biomedical Research 1141 2801 387 371 5
- Chemistry 3715 2160 2463 3368 70
- Clinical Medicine 1284 4855 143 200 3
- Engineering & Technology 746 41 5011 4752 370
- Mathematics 20 40 699 496 7
- Physics 918 24 10289 10340 198
- Multidisciplinary 124 90 274 213 4
- Other 123 57 434 294 7
Notes:
· Patents and publications by the Dupont-Merck subsidiary (which existed from 1991) are excluded,
because they would have introduced ambiguity when trying to identify the affiliations of authors and
inventors.  The numbers involved were small: Dupont-Merck obtained 208 patents (1976-1999) and
published 1,219 articles (1985-1997).
· The multidisciplinary journals are: Science, Nature, Recherche, and Search.
4.4.1 Identifying the Inventors and Authors of each Firm
Once I identified the patents and publications by each firm, the next step was to
identify authors and inventors associated with each firm.  An “inventor” is a researcher
listed in a patent, while an “author” is one who published an article.
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It is not easy to identify the inventors and authors of each firm.  The patent and
publication databases show the addresses of all authors and inventors, but neither
specifies which address belongs to which person.  This is only a minor problem for the
patent database because most patents are assigned to only one firm.  However, it is a
major problem with publications because of the large number of articles co-authored by
researchers at these firms with outside researchers.  In general, it is impossible to link a
specific author with a specific firm.  I used the following heuristic to identify individuals
associated with each firm:
· For publication with one address (or multiple addresses that all refer to the same
firm), I associated all the authors of that publication with the company listed in the
address.  I term these individuals “positively associated.”  The database is then
searched to identify co-authored articles that include each of the positively associated
authors within each firm.
· I used an analogous process to associate inventors of patents with firms.
· I cross-referenced the patent and publication databases to identify individuals
positively associated to firms in one database but not in the other database.
I dropped from the analysis any individuals who could not be positively identified
through the process described above.  It was impossible to determine whether they were
individuals from other organizations who published or patented jointly with researchers
from firms in the sample, or individuals from the firms in the sample who had never
single-authored a paper or published one exclusively with other people from the same
firm.
4.4.2 Matching the Abbreviated Names of Authors and Inventors
A second limitation with the data concerns the use of author abbreviations.  While
the patent database contains the full name of each inventor of each patent, the SCI —
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unfortunately — identifies authors only by abbreviation.  For example, John Harry
Truman is identified as Truman-JH.
This raises two issues.  First, it creates a risk that several people might be
confounded as a single individual because they share the same abbreviation (e.g., Smith-J
could refer to John Smith or Jane Smith).  I refer to these as “overdetermined”
abbreviations.
Second, a systematic technique is needed to match abbreviations of authors and
inventors within each company that refer to the same person (e.g., Truman-J and Truman-
JH may both refer to John Henry Truman).  The absence of such a technique could distort
the results.  For example, Willis-A might have a large number of patents but appear to
have no publications, while in fact the publications are listed under Willis-AXP.
The Appendix 4-A presents an algorithm that matches individuals with similar
abbreviated names who are likely to be the same person (this is a novel contribution of
my paper).  A manual examination of the database shows that this algorithm works very
well for matching the abbreviations of inventors, for which full names are available for
verification.  However, there is a risk of matching authors with similar abbreviations, but
who received no patents.187  While this remains a possibility, the risk is very low: of the
37,831 inventors positively associated with firms, only 140 had overdetermined
abbreviations.  It is unlikely that the rate of people with the same abbreviations is much
higher among authors than among inventors.  Furthermore, the results are robust when I
exclude individuals with common last names such as “Smith” (see section 4.5.2).  Their
common last names make these people the most likely ones to share abbreviations with
others.
                                                
187 As long as these authors received at least one patent, the problem doesn’t arise, since each inventor’s
full name is known and is assigned a unique abbreviation.
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4.4.3 The Results of the Algorithms to Identify and Match Authors and
Inventors
Table 4-2 summarizes the number of researchers identified per firm and the results
of matching them using their abbreviations.  The corporate affiliations of most inventors
could be identified.  However, only about one-third of authors could be positively
identified with each company.  The rest were dropped from the analysis.188
Table 4-2: Inventors and Authors Identified and Matched in Each Firm
DuPont Merck AT&T IBM Intel
Inventors (1976-1999)
Number of inventors in each
company’s patents†
5456 2767 9133 19057 2309
Number of inventors positively
identified with each firm*
5294 2697 8740 18837 2263
Authors (1985-97)
Number of authors in each
company’s publications†
11269 17250 16540 19097 1463
Number of authors positively
identified with each firm
4012 5996 6603 8163 471
Researchers Positively Identified with Each Firm After Matching by Abbreviation
Total number of researchers
positively identified with this firm
7771 6233 12006 22470 2465
Of which:
- Researchers who only patent 3958 1149 5725 14752 1997
- Researchers who patent and
publish
1336 1548 3015 4085 266
- Researchers who only publishY 2477 3536 3266 3633 202
Notes:
* Of the 37,831 inventors positively associated with these firms, only 140 inventors had overdetermined
abbreviations (e.g., Larry Smith and Laura Smith are both Smith-L).  These were subsequently
dropped.
† Includes individuals from universities and other firms that co-authored or co-invented with researchers
within these firms
Y This is a lower bound for the total number of researchers who published but did not patent, since some
authors could not be positively identified with each firm.
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The lower half of Table 4-2 shows the results of running the matching algorithm of
section 4.4.2.  It is interesting that, with the exception of Merck, the companies have far
fewer researchers who obtained patents and published articles than researchers who
obtained patents but did not publish.  This suggests that, relative to Merck, there is a
weaker link at the level of the individual between publications and inventions in the other
companies.
4.5 Results and Discussion
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4-3 shows the variables used in the regressions.  They vary considerably, as
revealed by the wide standard deviations and their maximum and minimum values.
The sample contains 41,325 researchers who had published articles and/or received
patents between 1985 and 1997.  Each researcher was awarded an average of 1.8 patents.
The average researcher published 3.9 articles, of which 1.5 were in basic science
journals.  Conditional on having published at least one article, a researcher published
29% of her articles in basic science journals.189  The PctCoauij variable shows that on
average, each researcher co-authored one-third of her articles with scientists at academic
or government laboratories.  The intensity of basic research in various scientific fields is
shown in the middle portion of Table 4-3.  The fields in which the average researcher
published the highest percentage of her papers in basic research journals are chemistry,
biomedical research and physics.
                                                                                                                                                
188 As previously mentioned, they might be co-authors from outside the firm, or people within the firm
who have never published a single-authored article or published one which involves only other authors
from within the firm.
189 The number of papers published by a researcher appears in the denominator and cannot be zero.
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Table 4-3: Variables used in the Regressions
Variable Description N Mean StdDev Min Max
Main Variables
Patij Number of patents by this researcher
(1985-1997)
41325 1.8 3.6 0 94
Pubij Number of publications by this
researcher (1985-1997)
41325 3.9 11.4 0 429
PubBas ij Number of publications by this
researcher in “basic” journals
41325 1.5 6.3 0 202
PctBas ij Percentage of publications by this
researcher in “basic” journals
23279 0.29 0.39 0 1
PctCoauij Percentage of publications by this
researcher co-authored with academic
or public-sector laboratories
23279 0.23 0.32 0 1
AvgSciij Average SCI Impact Scores of the
journals in which this researcher
publishes.
22065 2.4 2.4 0.08 38.9
Percentage Basic Research by Scientific Area
Pc_bas_biol Percentage of publications by this
researcher in basic biology journals
23279 0.09 0.07 0 1
Pc_bas_biomed Percentage of publications by this
researcher in basic biomedical journals
23279 0.07 0.22 0 1
Pc_bas_chem Percentage of publications by this
researcher in basic chemistry journals
23279 0.12 0.27 0 1
Pc_bas_clinical Percentage of publications by this
researcher in basic clinical medical
journals
23279 0.01 0.09 0 1
Pc_bas_engtech Percentage of publications by this
researcher in basic engineering and
technological journals
23279 0.0004 0.01 0 1
Pc_bas_math Percentage of publications by this
researcher in basic mathematics
journals
23279 0.002 0.04 0 1
Pc_bas_physics Percentage of publications by this
researcher in basic physics journals
23279 0.07 0.20 0 1
Control Variables
Comn_lastnam Dummy for researchers with common
last names
1898 0 1
D_Merck Dummy for researchers positively
identified with Merck
41325 0 1
D_Dupont Dummy for researchers positively
identified with DuPont
41325 0 1
D_ATT Dummy for researchers positively
identified with AT&T
41325 0 1
D_Intel Dummy for researchers positively
identified with Intel
41325 0 1
Notes: The subscripts refer to researcher i in company j.
For the company dummies, IBM is the base case.
140 inventors with overdetermined abbreviations were dropped
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Table 4-4: Pairwise Correlation Coefficients
Patij Pubij PubBas ij PctBas ij PctCoauij AvgSciij
Patij 1.00
Pubij 0.16* 1.00
PubBas ij 0.11* 0.79* 1.00
PctBas ij -0.02* 0.13* 0.35* 1.00
PctCoauij -0.01 0.11* 0.11* 0.06* 1.00
AvgSciij -0.05* 0.13* 0.22* 0.45* 0.11* 1.00
Note: * = significant at the 5% level.
Table 4-4 shows pairwise correlation coefficients for the key variables.  All else
being equal, the number of patents awarded to a researcher has a weak negative
correlation with the percentage of articles she published in basic scientific journals (Pat ij
with PctBasij).  However, the number of patents is positively correlated to the total
number of articles she published (Pat ij with Pubij).  The correlation coefficient between
PctBasij and AvgSCIij is rather high at 0.45.  This is interesting because across the entire
set of journals covered by the Science Citation Index, the correlation coefficient between
a journal’s SCI impact scores and its basicness is only 0.14.  Therefore, researchers from
these companies who published a large fraction of their papers in basic journals had
published them in highly cited journals.
4.5.2 Regression Results
Table 4-5 shows ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with the number of
patents awarded to a researcher between 1985 and 1997 (Pat ij) as the dependent variable.
In Model I, PctBasij has a negative coefficient.  This is consistent with hypothesis H1’,
that a researcher who is heavily involved in publishing basic research articles is less
likely to produce patents than one who is heavily involved in publishing applied research
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Table 4-5: OLS with Number of Patents Awarded to a Researcher as the Dependent Variable
Dependent Variable = Patij (1985-97)Independent
Variables
(I)
Base Model
(II)
Coauthor-
ship and
SCI Impact
(III)
With Firm
Effects
(IV)
Eliminate
Common
Last Names
(V)
Huber-
White
Robust Std.
Errors
Main Variables
Pubij 0.069*
(0.002)
0.071*
(0.002)
0.075*
(0.002)
0.075*
(0.002)
0.075*
(0.005)
PctBas ij -0.59*
(0.07)
-0.18*
(0.08)
-1.82*
(0.15)
-1.85*
(0.15)
-1.85*
(0.11)
PctCoauij -0.44*
(0.08)
-0.22*
(0.09)
-0.22*
(0.09)
-0.22*
(0.08)
AvgSciij -0.13*
(0.01)
-0.11*
(0.01)
-0.11*
(0.01)
-0.11*
(0.01)
Intercept 1.2*
(0.03)
1.5*
(0.04)
2.02*
(0.06)
2.0*
(0.06)
2.0*
(0.06)
Firm Effects
D_Merck -1.41*
(0.12)
-1.38*
(0.11)
-1.38*
(0.10)
D_Dupont -0.98*
(0.11)
-0.96*
(0.11)
-0.96*
(0.09)
D_ATT -0.85*
(0.08)
-0.84*
(0.08)
-0.84*
(0.07)
D_Intel -0.08
(0.20)
0.02
(0.21)
0.02
(0.23)
D_Merck*PctBas ij 3.38*
(0.21)
3.40*
(0.21)
3.40*
(0.19)
D_Dupont*PctBasij 2.19*
(0.22)
2.20*
(0.22)
2.20*
(0.17)
D_ATT*PctBas ij 0.33
(0.22)
0.32
(0.22)
0.32*
(0.14)
D_Intel*PctBas ij 1.49
(1.92)
1.40
(1.92)
1.40
(1.01)
Regression Statistics
N 23279 22065 22065 21045 21045
Adj R-quared 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses
* = significant at 5%
140 inventors with overdetermined abbreviations were dropped
When firm dummies are used, IBM is the base case.
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articles.  The coefficient for Pubij is positive, which favors hypothesis H2 (that
researchers with the greatest ability publish more and receive more patents, or that firms
attempted to balance incentives).  Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 5%
level.
Model II incorporates the percentage of papers a researcher co-authored with
academic and public-sector scientists (PctCoauij) and the average SCI impact scores of
the journal in which each researcher published (AvgSCIij).  The effect of these variables is
to soak up some of the variation previously explained by PctBasij.  Surprisingly,
PctCoauij has a negative and significant relationship to the number of patents awarded to
a researcher.  This contradicts hypothesis H4 that better-connected researchers are more
likely to obtain patents.  One possible explanation is that better-connected researchers
may be playing the role of gatekeepers (Allen, 1977) — increasing the productivity of
others within the firm, but not necessarily obtaining more patents.
Model III incorporates firm dummies to test for inter-firm differences.  A Wald test
of the hypothesis that each firm has the same intercept is rejected with F(4,22052)=61.
Likewise, a Wald test of the hypothesis that each firm has the same slope for PctBasij is
rejected with F(4,22052) = 84.  They therefore do not reject the hypothesis that each firm
is different in terms of the relationship between the number of patents awarded to a
researcher and the extent to which she publishes basic research.  The parameter estimates
for IBM are given by the case where all the dummies are zero.  For the remaining firms,
the dummies add a component to the intercept and to slope of PctBasij.  The dummy
variables for Intel are not significantly different from zero, nor is the coefficient for
D_ATT*PctBasij.  However, the other dummies are statistically significant, so these firms
have different slopes and coefficients from IBM.  The estimates for each firm
(conditional on all other variables) are given by:
Pati,IBM    = 2.02 – 1.82 PctBasi,IBM    + …
Pati,ATT     = 1.17 – 1.49 PctBasi,ATT    + …
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Pati,Intel     = 1.94 – 0.33 PctBasi,Intel     + …
Pati,Merck  = 0.61 + 1.56 PctBasi,Merck  + …
Pati,Dupont = 1.04 + 0.37 PctBasi,Dupont + …
The key result is that the coefficient estimates for PctBasij are negative for IBM,
AT&T and Intel, but positive for Merck and DuPont.  Given two researchers at IBM,
AT&T or Intel, the one who published a higher fraction of papers in basic scientific
journals was less likely to obtain patents, ceteris paribus.  The opposite is true at Merck
and DuPont, with the one who published a higher fraction of papers in basic scientific
journals being more likely to obtain patents.
This evidence also supports hypothesis H3, that the connection between basic
research and patents is stronger in drug discovery than in other areas.  Section 4.5.3
explores whether this is due to the different scientific areas or to other firm-specific
characteristics (this is important to investigate since DuPont is involved in many areas
outside pharmaceuticals).
Model IV eliminates all researchers who have common last names such as Smith,
Chen, Lee, Jones, and so on.  This reduces the likelihood of confounding authors who
share the same abbreviations, as discussed in section 4.4.2.  This makes no significant
difference to the results of Model III.
Model V re-estimates the regression using Huber-White robust standard errors.
This analysis was performed because a plot of the residuals revealed some
heteroscedasticity in the data.  The results remain unchanged, except that the coefficient
for D_ATT*PctBasij becomes statistically significant at the 5% level.
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4.5.3 Firm Effects and Scientific Disciplines
As the previous section shows, researchers at DuPont and Merck who publish a
large fraction of their papers in basic research were more likely to obtain patents than
other researchers who published more heavily in applied journals; the reverse is true at
IBM, AT&T, & Intel.  Is this because the firms have different incentive structures and
Table 4-6: OLS of Patents per Researcher by Firm and Scientific Area (Robust Standard Errors)
Dependent Variable = Patij (1985-97)Independent
Variables
Merck DuPont AT&T IBM Intel
Percentage of Research Published in basic Journals in each Field:
Pc_bas_biol 0.5*
(0.2)
-0.8*
(0.2)
-2.8*
(0.8)
-2.1*
(0.8)
NA
Pc_bas_biomed -0.5*
(0.1)
-0.6*
(0.1)
-0.7
(0.4)
-0.5
(0.9)
-4.9*
(1.2)
Pc_bas_chem 3.3*
(2.6)
1.6*
(0.2)
-1.1*
(0.2)
-1.0*
(0.2)
-1.7*
(0.8)
Pc_bas_clinical 1.5*
(0.4)
-1.0*
(0.1)
-1.1*
(0.3)
-1.1
(0.9)
2.5
(3.4)
Pc_bas_engtech NA 4.5
(4.9)
-0.6
(0.6)
-2.4
(2.7)
NA
Pc_bas_math NA NA -1.6*
(0.2)
-2.2*
(0.3)
NA
Pc_bas_physics 8.8
(6.2)
-0.7
(0.5)
-1.9*
(0.1)
-2.3*
(0.1)
NA
Other Variables:
Pubij 0.15*
(0.02)
0.04*
(0.01)
0.06*
(0.006)
0.07*
(0.007)
0.10
(0.07)
PctCoauij -0.38*
(0.19)
0.48*
(0.18)
-0.12
(0.09)
-0.21
(0.12)
0.19
(0.54)
AvgSciij -0.07*
(0.01)
-0.04*
(0.02)
-0.05*
(0.02)
-0.09*
(0.02)
-0.31*
(0.13)
Intercept 0.04
(0.11)
0.85*
(0.08)
1.20*
(0.05)
2.03*
(0.07)
2.02*
(0.32)
Regression Statistics:
N 4839 3363 6101 7333 429
R-Squared 0.19 0.06 0.13 0.05 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses
* = significant at 5%
140 inventors with overdetermined abbreviations were dropped
NA denotes a scientific area in which researchers from a firm did not publish in any basic journals.
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organizations to support basic research, or because the researchers were in different
scientific fields (H3)?  To address this question, I performed a separate regression for
each firm and included the percentage of basic articles by each researcher in each
scientific area.  Table 4-6 displays the results,190 with Huber-White standard errors shown
in parentheses.
Table 4-6 reveals that researchers at IBM, Intel, and AT&T who published a higher
percentage of basic research in any scientific field produced fewer patents.  Thus, for
these companies, there is a distinction between scientists and engineers regardless of
scientific discipline.  The disparity appears greater in basic biology, physics, and
mathematics than in other fields.
At Merck and DuPont, researchers with a preference for basic chemistry were more
likely to obtain patents.  A Merck scientist who published only in basic chemistry
obtained 3.3 more patents than another researcher who published no basic research
articles in chemistry.  The corresponding figure for DuPont is 1.6.  These coefficients are
large relative to the average number of patents produced per researcher, which is only 1.8
(Table 4-3).  At Merck, basic research in biology also had a positive relationship with
patents, while at DuPont it was negative.  The result for DuPont is surprising, since one
would expect a strong link between pharmaceutical patents and basic biology.  Another
unexpected finding is the negative relationship between patents and basic biomedical
research.  For the other scientific fields, the coefficient estimates for basic research were
imprecisely estimated, and sometimes even negative.
The overall implication of the results for Merck and DuPont is that the positive
relationship between basic research and patents observed in the previous section is driven
largely by publications in basic chemistry.  Thus, the dominant effect is that of scientific
                                                
190 Several parameters could not be estimated for Intel because the firm did not publish basic research in
those areas.
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discipline, rather than the firm per se: even at Merck and DuPont, there is a weak
relationship between basic research and patents outside basic chemistry.
An issue that arises is that the coefficient for basic chemistry for DuPont is much
less than for Merck.  Could this be because DuPont is more diversified than Merck,
which is primarily a pharmaceutical company?  To answer this question, I repeated the
analysis but included only researchers who obtained patents in U.S. Patent Classes 424
and 514 (drugs, bio-affecting and body treating compositions).  This subset of researchers
definitely performed pharmaceutical R&D. 191 As shown in Table 4-7, the results for
Merck are qualitatively the same as before.192  This is important because it suggests that
researchers who received patents in the aforementioned patent classes are representative
of Merck (and presumably of pharmaceutical research).
For DuPont, the results are now very similar to those for Merck.  A typical DuPont
researcher who published articles only on basic chemistry obtained 4.1 more patents than
another who performed no basic chemistry research, ceteris paribus.  This is much higher
than before, and close to the corresponding estimate for Merck, which is 5.8.193  This
means that a stronger relationship between basic chemistry research and patents exists in
pharmaceutical R&D than in other areas, even within the same firm (DuPont).
The rest of the parameter estimates for DuPont in Table 4-7, where precisely
estimated, are qualitatively similar to those for Merck.  Basic biological research again
exhibits a surprising negative relationship to patents, although this time it is not
statistically significant.
                                                
191 Pharmaceutical researchers also obtain patents in other U.S. patent classes, including 435, 436, 530-
570, and 585.  However, these patent classes overlap with various fields of chemistry unrelated to
pharmaceuticals.
192 Due to the small sample size, some of the parameter estimates are now imprecise.
193 The average number of patents per researcher at Merck and DuPont are 1.6 and 1.7, respectively.
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Table 4-7: OLS for Researchers who Received Patents in U.S. Patent Classes 424 and 514
(drugs, bio-affecting and body treating compositions).
Dependent Variable = Patij
(1985-1997)
Independent
Variables
Merck DuPont
Percentage Basic Research in Each Field
Pc_bas_biol -0.8
(1.2)
-2.7
(1.9)
Pc_bas_biomed -3.5*
(0.9)
0.1
(1.1)
Pc_bas_chem 5.8*
(1.0)
4.1*
(2.1)
Pc_bas_clinical 3.4*
(1.4)
-3.8
(2.6)
Pc_bas_engtech NA NA
Pc_bas_math NA NA
Pc_bas_physics 54
(51)
-4.1
(4.0)
Other Variables
Pubij 0.17*
(0.03)
0.02
(0.02)
PctCoauij -1.61*
(0.69)
-0.10
(0.81)
AvgSciij -0.19*
(0.09)
-0.28*
(0.13)
Intercept 3.52*
(0.66)
4.29*
(0.89)
Regression Statistics
N 859 151
R-Squared 0.21 0.09
Notes: Patij refers to the number of patents obtained by these researchers in all patent classes.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses
* = significant at 5%
NA denotes a scientific area in which researchers from a firm did not publish in any basic journals.
Apart from the results for basic research, Tables 4-6 and 4-7 reconfirm the positive
relationship uncovered in section 4.5.2 between patents and the total number of
publications by a researcher.  As before, co-authorship with outside researchers is
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negatively related to patents.194  And publishing in highly cited journals is negatively
associated with patents, as previously shown.
4.5.4 Limitations and Sources of Bias
The regression analysis explains only 6-9% of the variance in the data, as evident
from the low R-squared values in Tables 4-5, 4-6 and 4-7. The exception is Merck, for
which the R-squared is relatively high, around 0.2 (see Tables 4-6 and 4-7).  The poor
overall fit is unsurprising, given that many other factors affect the relationship between
patents and publications, including individual preferences for leisure and other activities,
occupational and educational background, demographics, and so on.  Despite this
shortcoming, the estimated coefficients generally have low standard errors and are stable
across models.  They have statistically significant implications for the theories tested.
Another limitation of this study is that it includes researchers from only five
companies.  These companies are interesting and important in themselves, but much work
remains to expand the sample to other firms.
There are also data limitations arising from the use of the Science Citation Index
database.  I overcame several of these limitations by using the algorithms to identify the
authors of each firm and match them using their abbreviated names.  Nonetheless, a large
number of authors listed in the publications by these firms could not be positively
identified with the firms.  In contrast, recall that almost all inventors are included in the
analysis (see Table 4-2).  Therefore, the missing data creates a downward bias, since it
mainly contains researchers who have publications (including basic research articles) but
no patents.
                                                
194 For Du Pont, the coefficient estimate for PctCoauij is positive and significant in Table 4-6, but becomes
negative and significant in Table 4-7, which only includes researchers who worked on pharmaceutical
R&D.
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A separate source of bias arises from researchers who patented inventions but did
not publish anything.  These individuals are automatically dropped because the number
of publications appears as the denominator of PctBasij.  In this case, the direction of bias
is upwards: these individuals were able to obtain patents without even publishing
anything (let alone publishing basic research), meaning that the link between research
and innovation may be weaker than I measured it to be.
4.6 Conclusions
A comparison of two researchers at IBM, AT&T, or Intel who published the same
number of papers reveals that the one who published a higher proportion of her research
in basic scientific journals obtained fewer patents.  The opposite was true for Merck and
DuPont, but this was largely driven by a positive relationship between basic chemistry
research and patents. The link is weaker between patents and other areas of research,
even within these two pharmaceutical firms.  In the case of DuPont, the relationship
between basic chemistry and patents was stronger for researchers working on drug
discovery than for the firm as a whole.
Further research is required to learn whether these findings can be generalized.  If
so, it means that while scientists and engineers are inherently different, there is a special
role in drug discovery played by scientists who perform basic research.  In particular,
participation in basic chemistry research by these individuals is strongly associated with
the production of new, patentable ideas.  While a relationship between scientific
publications and productivity has been reported before for pharmaceutical firms, it is
remarkable that it occurs at the level of the individual researcher.
The low correlation between basic biological research and patents is rather
surprising.  My interpretation of this result is that chemistry was the primary basis for
drug discovery during the period this sample covers (1985-1997).  A closer link with
biology only began to emerge with the advent of rational drug design and genetics in the
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1990’s (Cockburn, et al., 1999).  Given the gestation period required to produce new
drugs and the time lags associated with patenting and publishing, these data will take
time to appear in the database.
Apart from these results, I also found a positive correlation between the number of
patents obtained by a researcher and the total number of articles (basic plus applied) that
she published.  This most probably reflects the heterogeneity in the ability of individual
researchers, and/or the firms balancing the incentives for their researchers to produce
patents versus publications.  Further work will be needed to disentangle these effects.
The results for co-authorship revealed a surprise: there is a negative correlation
between the number of patents obtained by a researcher and the percentage of her
publications that are co-authored with academics and public-sector researchers.  Further
research will be needed to gain a full understanding of this result.
This chapter presents several important contributions.  It attempts to develop a
systematic understanding of the relationship between patents and publications by
researchers at leading industrial firms.  It tests the implications of several competing
theories on the relationship between basic research and patents and shows how
applicability of such theories depends upon the scientific discipline in which a researcher
is engaged.  Finally, the technique developed for matching inventors, authors, and firms
may have other potentially useful applications.
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 Appendix 4-A: Algorithm for Matching Authors and Inventors
The U.S. patent database contains the full name of each inventor of each patent, but the
Science Citation Index (SCI) identifies authors only by abbreviation. For example, John
Harry Truman is identified as Truman-JH.  I designed the following algorithm to match
authors of publications in the SCI to inventors of U.S. patents, based on each researcher’s
abbreviated names.
Steps:
· First, I corrected misspellings in the patent and publication datasets.
· Next, I assigned a unique abbreviation that maximally differentiates each inventor in
the patent database.  For example, Ron Willis, Ron M. Willis, and Ronald Willis were
abbreviated as Willis-RM, not Willis-R (note that Willis-R would not maximally
differentiate this individual if the database also included a Rachel V. Willis, who
would be Willis-RV).
· I marked abbreviations that refer to more than one individual as “overdetermined”
(e.g., Smith-J, which refers to John Smith and Jack Smith).
· For each company, I created a tree structure from the abbreviated names of all authors
and inventors (see Figure 4-1).  Each last name is a “root” of the tree.  I then
classified each node of the tree into one of four types (L, B, I or P) as described
below.  The purpose is to identify nodes that can be combined with other nodes
because they refer to the same individual.  L, B and I nodes cannot be combined,
while P nodes must be checked to see if they can be combined, or “promoted.”
· After each node has been classified, the entire tree is traversed along each arc starting
from the root.  Each P-node is matched to the next node along its arc until reaching a
leaf node or until a B-node or an I-node blocks the path.  The result is shown as
dashed lines in Figure 4-2.  Willis-A is matched to Willis-AXP and Willis-RM is
matched to Willis-RMU.  However, Willis-SL is not matched to Willis-SLA because
they refer to different inventors (Samuel and Sandra).
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Figure 4-1: Matching Authors to Inventors
Shown is a hypothetical case for individuals who share the last name “Willis”:
· Each node is the abbreviated name of an author or inventor.
· The “Willis” node is the root of the tree; each line is called an “arc”.
· The nodes are classified into four types: (L)=leaf, (B)=branch, (I)=invariant, and
(P)=promotable.  Only p-nodes can be matched to other nodes.
· The dashed arrows show abbreviations matched by running the algorithm.  Willis-A
is matched to Willis-AXP, Willis-RM is matched to Willis-RMU, and Willis-S is
matched to Willis-SL.  Observe that Willis-SL is not matched to Willis-SLA because
they refer to different inventors (Samuel Lee Willis and Sandra Lauren A. Willis).
Willis
(root)
Willis-A
(P-node)
Willis-R
(B-node)
Willis-AXP
(L-node)
Willis-L
(L-node)
Willis-RM
(P-node)
Willis-RV
(L-node)
Willis-S
(P-node) Willis-SLA
(L-node)
Willis-RMU
(L-node)
Willis-SL
(I-node)
For company j:
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Figure 4-2: Types of Nodes
Ø L-nodes: A leaf node refers to an abbreviation that is not part of another, longer,
abbreviation (e.g., Willis-AXP, Willis-RV).
Ø B- nodes: A branch node is part of several longer abbreviations along divergent
arcs.  For example, Willis-R is a branch node because both Willis-RM and Willis-
RV exist and diverge into separate paths.  B-nodes cannot be matched to longer
abbreviations because of the ambiguity caused by branching. Thus, Willis-R
cannot be matched to Willis-RM or Willis-RV.
Ø I-nodes: An invariant inventor node refers to an inventor whose abbreviated name
is part of another inventor’s with a longer abbreviation. 195  In Figure 4-1, Willis-
SL and Willis-SLA refer to “Samuel Lee Willis” and “Sandra Lauren A. Willis,”
respectively.  Therefore, Willis-SL is an I-node.  I-nodes cannot be matched to
longer abbreviations because they refer to different inventors.
Ø P-nodes: The remaining nodes are promotable.196  They must be checked to see if
there exists a longer abbreviation along the same arc.  If so, they are matched to
the longer abbreviation, unless the path is blocked by a B or I node.  For example,
Willis-A is matched to Willis-AXP, since there are no obstacles on the arc
between the two nodes.197
                                                
195 It is impossible to do this for authors because their full names are unavailable.
196 By “promotable” I mean that the node must be tested to see whether it can be merged into another
node that is further from the root and closer to a leaf.
197 The fact that Willis-A is a “P-node” means that there cannot be another inventor with the abbreviation
Willis-AXP.  Otherwise Willis-A would have been classified as an “I-node.”
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